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ABSTRACT 
Several decades of research in the social sciences, particularly science and 
technology studies, have demonstrated both the political and controversial nature 
of technological innovation and the limitations of regulating its implications solely 
by reference to scientific assessments of its risks. This has led to calls for greater 
socio-technical integration in regulatory decision-making in recognition of the 
values, commitments and concerns underpinning both risk assessment and societal 
attitudes to risk. Much EU policy on regulating risk technologies acknowledges 
these findings and commits to enhancing socio-technical integration in its decision-
making, often through enhanced public participation and debate. Much EU law, 
however, remains committed to a model of regulation based on scientific risk 
assessment resulting in a gap between EU policy and practice. This thesis 
investigates reasons for the persistence of this gap.  
Taking pesticides and synthetic biology as example technologies and examining 
their associated governance discourses (sustainability and responsible research and 
innovation, respectively) this thesis explores the opportunities provided for 
enhancing socio-technical integration in the regulation of those technologies. It 
focuses on the ways in which the legal and policy frameworks of both operate to 
deprive those two discourses of their potential and thereby contribute to 
maintaining the policy-practice gap. It derives further insights into the persistence 
of the policy-practice gap by looking beyond those specific technologies to the EU 
internal market, the WTO regime and wider EU policy on innovation. It argues firstly 
that science is frequently attributed priority of agency in determining the existence 
of a problem warranting the law's response, excluding other perspectives. It argues 
secondly, that the weight of EU policy commitment to economic competitiveness, 
technological progress and commercialisable innovation to realise its future visions 
fundamentally undermines its commitment to, and ability to achieve, enhanced 
socio-technical integration. The policy-practice gap remains. 
99,972 words 
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Chapter One – Introduction  
1. Introduction  
Technology is controversial. Its ambiguity inheres in its very etymological root: 
‘techne’, signifying art or skill, but also cunning.1 Ancient suspicion of techne 
presaged many contemporary concerns; unpredictable consequences, 
uncontrollability, the potential destruction invited by increasing technological 
domination of nature and even the dangers of mistaking good judgment for 
technical knowledge.2 Though technology evolved, those themes persist.  
Equally controversial is whether, and how, the law should respond to socio-
technical change.3 These are vast, infinitely complex and politically charged 
questions, for all technologies differ, as do the societies in which they exist. 
Protecting human health and the environment is an important reason for regulating 
but there are others.  
Research by the social sciences, particularly science and technology studies (STS) 
into the nature of risk, technology and science, including regulatory science, over 
the past five decades, has significantly enhanced our understanding of societal 
attitudes to the risks and implications of technological innovation and the 
limitations of basing regulation on risk alone. Anticipating Chapter Two, briefly the 
arguments are that risk assessment offers a reductive and incomplete foundation 
on which to regulate a particular technology, despite its frequent employment to 
that end. This is firstly because it generally provides a simple, probabilistic picture 
of the risks to health and to the environment posed by the technology in question. 
This fails to incorporate the multifarious considerations and values constituting 
broader, societal attitudes to risk and technologies and the (scientific) uncertainty 
which inevitably stems from the interaction of a technology with highly complex 
                                                          
 
1 Henry G Liddell (ed), An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (Clarendon Press 1889) 804. 
2 David E Tabachnick, ‘Techne, Technology and Tragedy’ (2004) 7 Techné: Research in 
Philosophy and Technology. 
3 On some potential guiding principles, see Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Regulating in the Face of 
Sociotechnical Change’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford and Karen Yeung (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law and Regulation of Technology (OUP 2016). 
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(eco)systems.4 It is secondly because, contrary to frequent claims to objectivity, risk 
assessment is coloured by the commitments, values and assumptions of those 
conducting it, such that the results of risk assessment cannot genuinely be credited 
with this quality.5 Furthermore, this model of regulation has been criticised for 
forcing all concerns relating to a technology through the validating filter of risk,6 
when they might be better expressed otherwise. If a concern cannot be expressed 
in terms of safety or risk, it may be ignored. Any expression of broader 
considerations and values in decision-making tends to be shunted into overtly 
political discussions regarding risk management in accordance with the rubric of 
‘facts first, values second’.  
This risk-centric paradigm means firstly, that the commitments, values and 
assumptions underpinning risk assessment remain unexamined; and secondly, that 
despite the existence of other valid reasons for regulating a technology which 
cannot be elucidated by risk assessment, such reasons rarely constitute the primary 
(or indeed, any) basis for regulating a technology.  
The norms that derive from this social science research tend towards increasing 
‘socio-technical integration’ in the governance of technology, spurred too by an 
acknowledgement of the valuable knowledge which non-expert ‘publics’ could 
contribute.7 That is, informing regulatory decision-making with a broader range of 
information than scientific data produced by risk assessment, founding decisions 
on values beyond safety or environmental protection and opening up the 
commitments, values and assumptions underpinning risk assessment to 
examination. In other words, regulation of ‘risky technologies’ should not proceed 
                                                          
 
4 For example in relation to agricultural biotechnology in the UK, Matthew Kearnes and 
others, ‘From Bio to Nano: Learning Lessons from the UK Agricultural Biotechnology 
Controversy’ (2006) 15 Science as Culture 291, 296–297. 
5 Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management (Royal Society 1992) 97. 
6 EGSG, Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously (EUR-OP 2007) 10–11, ch 3. 
7 Jack Stilgoe, Alan Irwin and Kevin Jones, The Received Wisdom: Opening up Expert Advice 
(Demos 2006) 31–33, 43. 
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solely on the basis of managing and reducing the risks to safety that such 
technologies pose, albeit that these risks may often seem most urgent. 
Rhetorically, the EU broadly recognises and accepts these norms and the overall 
thrust of this social science research.8 Increasing public participation or 
engagement, in particular, is frequently invoked in aid of opening up governance of 
science and technology.9 As Chapters Two to Five indicate, attempts to enhance 
participation in decision-making have often constituted the core of the EU’s 
response to this research.10 Much of the argument in this thesis adopts the basic 
position that participation, if genuine and conducted well, can aid decision-making 
and it is on such EU initiatives that much of the following analysis focuses. 
However, Sheila Jasanoff observes: ‘All the empirical observations about the 
constructedness, context-dependency, and incompleteness of regulatory science 
and its consequent function as a political force, have left curiously untouched the 
discourse of good science that still permeates Western practices of governance’.11 
That the EU simultaneously remains stubbornly dedicated to privileging risk 
assessment in its regulation of risky technologies has been extensively and 
eloquently established elsewhere, particularly by Maria Lee. Indeed, it is Lee’s 
arguments and observations12 that there exists an unacceptable gap between what 
the EU says and what it does in relation to the regulation of risky technologies, 
which prompted the line of enquiry pursued in this thesis.  
It is, I argue, important to close the gap between policy and practice for the 
following reasons. Firstly, for the political integrity of the EU. If the EU claims non-
                                                          
 
8 Maria Lee, ‘Risk and beyond: EU Regulation of Nanotechnology’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 799, 820. 
9 Andy Stirling, ‘“Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power, Participation, and Pluralism in 
the Social Appraisal of Technology’ (2008) 33 Science, Technology & Human Values 262, 
263–264. 
10 EGSG (n 6) 33; Žaneta Ozoliņa and others, Global Governance of Science (EUR-OP 2009) 
26–28. 
11 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United 
States (Princeton UP 2007) 231. 
12 In particular, Lee, ‘Risk and beyond’ (n 8); Maria Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening 
Scope of Risk Regulation’ (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 242. 
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safety values are important and that it will regulate on the basis of such values, it 
should do so. Secondly, to respond to the valid concerns of citizens by basing 
decisions on as much information about the technology as possible, from as many 
different perspectives as possible. Thirdly, better and more acceptable decisions 
may result from the genuine appreciation, for example through deliberation or 
participation,13 of more and different knowledge and perspectives.  
To summarise, the thesis works from three foundations. Firstly, that EU regulation 
of technologies which pose risks to the environment and human health, needs to 
be: a) founded on a range of considerations beyond ensuring safety; and b) 
informed by broader information than scientific data produced by risk assessment. 
Secondly, EU policy accepts, at least rhetorically, the need for a broad evidence 
base. Thirdly, despite this acceptance, the EU paradigm of risk regulation still 
emphasises risk as a decision-making technique and thereby prioritises protection 
of health and the environment to the near exclusion of all other values and aims. 
This gap between policy and practice, should be closed. This thesis investigates why 
the policy-practice gap persists. 
Each stage of this argument is dealt with more fully in subsequent chapters, as set 
out in section 7. Before that, however, these observations and underlying concepts 
require some preliminary context and explanation. Section 2 considers what I mean 
by ‘risky technologies’. Section 3 discusses the place of science and technology in 
the thesis and what it means to assess and regulate technology on the basis of risk. 
Section 4 firstly introduces two specific technologies which I discuss throughout the 
thesis. Secondly, it provides support for the third foundation, above, demonstrating 
that the EU’s reliance on risk in decision-making extends beyond these two 
technologies and pervades its regulation of risky technologies generally. Sections 5 
and 6 discuss methodology and the scope of the thesis respectively and section 7 
sets out its structure. 
                                                          
 
13 Daniel J Fiorino, ‘Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional 
Mechanisms’ (1990) 15 Science, Technology, & Human Values 226, 228. See also Chapter 
Three. 
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2. ‘Risky technology’ 
It is hardly necessary to state that there are many different kinds of technology. 
Some, incorporeal financial technologies, others material devices. Some living, 
others non-living. Some visible to the naked eye, some too minute for human 
perception. While the same sorts of concerns can surface across many 
technologies, this thesis focuses on a sub-group of technologies which exemplify a 
specific set of concerns. These are technologies which pose risks to the 
environment and human health, including for example, genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), nanotechnology, chemicals, pesticides, synthetic biology, 
genome editing, fracking and nuclear energy. I refer to them, for brevity’s sake, as 
‘risky technologies’. While we may be preoccupied with privacy in relation to smart 
meters, for example, or ethics in stem cell research, the most obvious concern with 
risky technologies is their capacity to alter and damage the environment and health 
often in unpredictable and unintended ways. We have, by now, sufficient 
experience of comparable technologies, for example CFCs and the pesticide DDT, 
and the almost predictable pattern of unintended damage,14 to countenance the 
likelihood of variations on this theme with each new technology, and indeed 
mature technologies (see Chapter Four). While the overall theme is predictable,15 
the individual variations are not and may be exacerbated by interaction between 
complex technologies and the equally complex and unpredictable socio-economic 
sphere.16 Environmental problems in particular are characteristically ‘messy’ and 
often subject to profound scientific uncertainty17 which, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, significantly complicates decision-making. 
                                                          
 
14 For example, EEA, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: Science, Precaution, Innovation 
(EUR-OP 2013). 
15 Jenny Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart 2004) 31. 
16 Tomas Hellström, ‘Systemic Innovation and Risk: Technology Assessment and the 
Challenge of Responsible Innovation’ (2003) 25 Technology in Society 369. 
17 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Risk and Environmental Law: A Beginner’s Guide’ in Benjamin 
Richardson and Stepan Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability: A Reader (Hart 
2006) 99. 
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However, beyond the show-stopping question of potential harm, the same risky 
technologies raise questions of economic costs, distribution and certainty of risks 
and benefits,18 ethics and whether in general a technology helps create a desirable 
society, to name but a very few. Notwithstanding this variety of questions and 
impacts, regulatory decision-making in the EU (and elsewhere)19 remains 
concentrated on ascertaining the risks to safety and then managing those risks, as 
argued immediately below and throughout the thesis. This emphasis on risks and 
pursuit of safety forms one half of an asymmetrical understanding of, and response 
to, risky technologies which will also be touched upon throughout the thesis. It is 
based on an assumption that any negative impacts will manifest themselves solely 
in safety terms. This is seen, for example, in the acceptance that the main worries 
about pesticides are their impacts on health and the environment, discussed in 
Chapter Four. By contrast, it is assumed (as highlighted in Section II and Chapter 
Eight) that any non-safety impacts will be solely beneficial, such as economic 
growth and competitiveness, job creation or other kinds of social progress. Indeed, 
science and technology have long been presented as guaranteeing democracy, 
freedom and social justice.20 This understanding of risky technologies is highly 
disputable, as argued in Chapter Two and illustrated by the discussions in Section II.  
3. Science, technology and risk regulation 
Science appears in this thesis in two guises. Its first guise is as pure scientific 
research, disclosing facts about the natural world and delivering innovation. Some 
caution is required regarding this conception of science. The terms ‘pure science’ 
or ‘basic science’ are used to describe the fundamental, curiosity-driven scientific 
research conducted to enlarge human understanding of nature, whose primary goal 
is not necessarily innovation or application. For example, research into planetary 
atmospheres or the study of fundamental particles at CERN. The rhetorical concept 
of a ‘linear model of innovation’ casts technological innovation and diffusion as 
                                                          
 
18 Lee, ‘Risk and beyond’ (n 8) 801–803. 
19 Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (n 7) 37–39; Lee, ‘Beyond Safety?’ (n 12) 253–260. 
20 Langdon Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ (1980) 109 Daedalus 121, 121. 
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issuing from basic, via applied, science.21 Blue skies to blu-ray is an intuitive and 
attractively simplified account of where technologies come from. It is of course 
hard to generalise either way,22 but research indicates that technological 
innovation is not necessarily applied science nor the inevitable result of pure 
scientific research,23 developed in a rational and orderly manner towards a pre-
determined, precise goal.24 
The distinction is blurred and the kinds of risky technologies to which this thesis is 
relevant are sometimes closely linked to scientific research. For example, 
biotechnology originated in research into recombinant DNA,25 and the recent 
discovery of CRISPR/Cas9, a new method of genome editing, arose directly out of 
fundamental research into bacterial immune systems.26 Thus, it is often difficult and 
perhaps futile to distinguish between pure science and applied science and 
technology. Pure scientific research itself raises questions, regarding inter alia, its 
purpose, direction, speed, the motivations of those who conduct it27 and whether 
we should act early while control is still relatively easy.28 Frustration at the 
limitations of post hoc, risk-based regulation have prompted innovation 
governance initiatives to respond to some of these concerns,29 marking a shift 
                                                          
 
21 Benoît Godin, ‘The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an 
Analytical Framework’ (2006) 31 Science, Technology, & Human Values 639. 
22 See discussion of the three technologies in Wiebe E Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and 
Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press 1995). 
23 Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (2nd ed, Wiley-
Blackwell 2010) 93–94.  
24 Eugene S Ferguson, ‘Toward a Discipline of the History of Technology’ (1974) 15 
Technology and Culture 13, 19. 
25 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘“Let Them Eat Cake”: GM Foods and the Democratic Imagination’ in 
Melissa Leach, Ian Scoones and Brian Wynne (eds), Science and Citizens: Globalization and 
the Challenge of Engagement (Zed Books 2005) 188–189. 
26 Colin Barras, ‘Right on Target: New Era of Fast Genetic Engineering’ [2014] New Scientist 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22129530.900-right-on-target-new-era-of-fast-
genetic-engineering/> accessed 26 June 2017 accessed 12 July 2015. 
27 Phil Macnaghten and Jason Chilvers, ‘The Future of Science Governance: Publics, Policies, 
Practices’ (2014) 32 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 530, 534–537. 
28 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Frances Pinter 1980) 17–20. 
29 Jack Stilgoe, Richard Owen and Phil Macnaghten, ‘Developing a Framework for 
Responsible Innovation’ (2013) 42 Research Policy 1568, 1569. 
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‘upstream’ of the discourse on socio-technical integration, discussed further in 
Chapters Three and Five. 
Science’s second guise is as assessor and producer of information regarding the 
health and environmental risks created by technologies, for the purpose of 
regulation.30 It is the use of such ‘regulatory science’31 or ‘science for governance’ 
and specifically risk assessment, its potential, limitations and problems, which is the 
main focus of this thesis. The origins and practice of risk assessment are discussed 
further in Chapter Two. However, a word is due here on the EU’s approach to risk 
in general in order to highlight the assumptions about science, expertise and public 
attitudes, which pervade the EU’s approach to regulating risky technologies, and 
which the subsequent analysis rejects.  
In its Communication on the Precautionary Principle, the European Commission 
declares that ensuring ‘proportionate, non-discriminatory, transparent and 
coherent’ decisions requires a structured decision-making process.32 It derives this 
structure from that proposed to guarantee ‘objective’ decision-making by the US 
National Research Council, in its 1983 ‘Red Book’.33 This structure (including ‘risk 
communication’), which the EU refers to as ‘risk analysis’, separates the objective, 
scientific, fact-gathering exercise of risk assessment, from the subsequent, political, 
value-based exercise of risk management during which decisions regarding the 
regulation of the risks identified by risk assessment are taken.34 This is partly a 
response to the inadequacies identified in the Commission’s handling of the BSE 
crisis in the late 1990s in which expert scientific advice was found to have been 
excessively influenced by politics, specifically British political interests.35 The 
creation of the independent and expert European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) by 
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the General Food Regulation (GFL),36 for example, aimed to separate science from 
politics and thereby regain legitimacy in risk regulation for the Commission.37  
Given the damage done by the BSE crisis and the strength of the criticisms regarding 
the mixing of science and politics,38 it is easy to understand the EU’s dedication to 
an institutional separation between expert advice and political deliberation as a 
means to guard against bias in decision-making and ensure political responsibility.39 
Expert knowledge and advice is crucial to decision-making concerning risky 
technologies40 and neither scientists nor politicians should step beyond the limits 
of their respective roles. However, evidence does not speak for itself41 and may not 
necessarily translate easily into policy; evidence-based policy often creates further 
difficult questions about the purpose, type or quality of the evidence provided and 
may overlook uncertainties.42 Finally, more knowledge or information may 
aggravate, rather than resolve, political conflict43 or de-legitimise political 
institutions as decision-makers.44 Scientific advice, however, resists challenge due 
to its expert authority and apparent impartiality, objectivity, certainty and 
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independence,45 and regimes of measurement and assessment may be held in place 
by political, cultural and economic stays.46 
Furthermore, dogmatic adherence to this separation between risk assessment and 
risk management institutionalises a set of artificial dichotomies and perpetuates 
assumptions, unsupportable in light of the STS insights, discussed in Chapter Two. 
This division is the clearest expression of an ideological commitment to an 
overarching dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity – facts and values47 - 
enhanced procedurally by the norm that scientific risk assessment precedes 
political discussion and risk management. It further reflects another broad 
distinction between ‘science’ and ‘society’ to which are attributed, respectively, 
objectivity and rationality, or subjectivity and sometimes irrationality,48 which 
disintegrate under closer scrutiny but which persist, as touched upon throughout 
the thesis. 
This overarching dichotomy has been a defining feature of risk discourses and still 
is, albeit with some modifications, despite challenges from social science research. 
For example, questioning the implicit claims of objectivity, Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky argue that it is made into ‘an absolute value for all discourse’, that it 
excludes subjectivity and that the objectivity of a judgment or report does not 
guarantee that it is right; intelligence and experience are also required in 
determining the relevant facts.49 However, they continue, ‘objectivity comes to 
mean some final truth about physical nature’.50 Further challenges have targeted 
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the assumed objectivity of risk assessment itself and the distinction between that 
and risk management alleging that it is in fact impossible to separate science and 
politics; decisions may take a scientific form but still be based on political concerns 
and present varying answers depending on context.51 Furthermore, the fact/value 
divide is permeable: ‘‘the facts’ are less self-evident than they sometimes appear, 
and values are not an illegitimate intruder in ‘objective’ decision-making’’.52 
Another facet is the expanding boundary around matters deemed to be ‘factual’: 
the Expert Group on Science and Governance (EGSG) notes that ‘the avowed 
societal benefits of GM crops’ have been described by scientists as being a scientific 
fact.53 This is interpreted as science replacing moral judgment through its 
invocation as public authority and an example of the normative prescription with 
which ‘innocent factual’ learning is imbued;54 an act of depoliticising goalpost-
movement which shuts out debate.  
4. The primacy of risk in EU regulation of risky technologies: pesticides, synthetic 
biology and beyond 
My argument that risk and safety concerns dominate EU regulation of risky 
technologies, though there exist other valid reasons to regulate, is largely 
presented in Section II with a discussion of two example technologies. However, a 
brief introduction to these technologies is warranted here as they permeate the 
entire thesis. 
4.1 Meeting the technologies 
In 2009, the EU introduced a new Directive designed to achieve the sustainable use 
of pesticides (the Sustainable Use Directive, or SUD).55 Pesticide use is complex, 
encompassing a diverse range of social, ethical, economic, environmental, health-
related and scientific questions and impacts, discussed further in Chapter Four. 
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Sustainability is equally complex, demanding the consideration of, amongst other 
things, the social, economic and environmental, as discussed in Chapter Three. As 
such, legislation built on the principles of sustainability could provide a powerful 
and sophisticated framework through which to consider, and respond to, the 
multiple concerns pesticide use raises. The regulation of pesticides was chosen, 
therefore, for the opportunity to examine the EU’s current approach to 
sustainability and the potential it provides to increase socio-technical integration in 
the regulation of a risky technology, a question not previously addressed. Despite 
its significant potential, risk and safety concerns still dominate the legislation: I 
argue in Chapter Four that the SUD essentially eschews an interpretation of 
sustainable use informed by the richness of the sustainability discourse in favour, 
primarily, of an unambitious understanding of ‘sustainable use’ as ‘risk reduction’ 
and efficiency. 
Synthetic biology is an emerging biotechnology. Its great potential is a central 
theme of EU policy and its alleged promises include speeding up and simplifying 
processes for producing useful products, improving efficiency and vastly reducing 
both costs56 and the uncertainty of traditional biotechnology.57 It also raises 
numerous social, economic, ethical, environmental and health-related concerns as 
well as being characterised by significant uncertainty as to its implications, both 
beneficial and harmful. Synthetic biology, as argued in Chapter Five, exhibits a fresh 
enthusiasm for openness and EU policy itself promotes responsible research and 
innovation (RRI) as a governance framework for synthetic biology. This framework, 
as discussed in Chapter Three, aims specifically to enhance socio-technical 
integration in policy- and decision-making. The regime regulating GMOs applies to 
synthetic biology and has been extensively researched. Indeed, this research has 
played a significant role in establishing and criticising the primacy of risk in EU 
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regulation of risky technologies.58 The growing prominence of RRI represented an 
opportunity to test the current regulatory regime, in light of a different technology, 
against recent EU initiatives to enhance socio-technical integration. However, I 
argue in Chapter Five that the continued dominance of risk undermines realisation 
of these new initiatives. 
4.2 The broader context 
The features identified in relation to these two examples are part of a larger trend 
in EU regulation of risky technologies. A survey of all such EU legislation is 
impossible and unnecessary here. I therefore review academic comment on two 
other areas of regulation which are not considered subsequently in this thesis but 
which epitomise the EU’s overall approach: chemicals and nanotechnology. It 
would be, of course, overly simplistic to claim that the EU always and only considers 
risks to human health and the environment when regulating risky technologies and 
one should perhaps refrain from asserting that EU governance of biotechnology, 
for example, is entirely technocratic.59 A more nuanced picture than sole reliance 
on risk assessment emerges. This is acknowledged in the literature60 and instances 
where other concerns can be considered will be highlighted, particularly in Chapters 
Four to Seven as well as briefly below. However, safety remains the primary 
concern in regulation61 and the use of technical or scientific criteria to define risks 
(including uncertain risks) remains the primary decision-making tool.62  
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4.2.1 Chemicals 
Chemicals in the EU are governed by the REACH Regulation.63 Briefly, REACH 
requires manufacturers or importers seeking market access and which produce or 
import over one tonne of a chemical per year to apply for registration of that 
chemical.64 Where a substance is deemed to be ‘of very high concern’ (SVHC), that 
substance requires authorisation65 according to various criteria, including that the 
risks it poses to human health and the environment are ‘adequately controlled’.66  
REACH contains a number of positive features from the point of view integrating 
non-safety values into decision-making. There is scope under REACH, despite the 
predominantly expert-driven and risk-centric tone of the authorisation process, for 
the integration of existing risk management information into the science-based risk 
assessment process, thereby influencing the final risk characterisation67 and 
eroding the fact/value dichotomy in some small but arguably important way. 
However, perhaps the most significant evidence of an effort to move beyond safety 
and risk assessment is the ability, under Article 60(4), where adequate control is 
not possible, to authorise a SVHC where the socio-economic benefits of 
authorisation outweigh the risks to human health and the environment and no 
suitable alternatives are available. Furthermore, in assessing the availability of 
alternatives, the Commission, under Article 60(5), is required to consider ‘all 
relevant aspects’ and ‘the technical and economic feasibility of alternatives’. As 
Joanne Scott observes, ‘the conditions for authorization are anything but scientific’ 
and require ‘wide judgment… in balancing costs and benefits’.68 
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However, Article 60(4) only applies to a sub-set of high risk substances.69 Where a 
suitable alternative is available, there is no scope to consider the social benefits of 
either that or the SVHC, which may be a particular problem for nanosubstances 
subject to REACH.70 Furthermore, there are concerns the socio-economic analysis 
will simply allow industry ‘to mitigate any unfavourable indications in the risk 
assessment’ given the commercial orientation of the concerns emphasised.71 There 
is no scope for socio-economic considerations to prevent marketing, and the 
equivalent provision in relation to the availability of substitutes also works to 
permit a SVCH.72 This illustrates the asymmetry mentioned in section 2, leaving 
intact, as opposed to challenging, the hegemony of risk and suggesting a 
predisposition towards particular economic interests.73 Restrictions may be 
imposed where there is an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, 
taking into account the socio-economic impact of the restriction,74 but ‘the 
implication seems to be that this is another hurdle to be crossed to impose a 
restriction rather than a reason for a restriction’.75  
Other, more general criticisms highlight the overall paucity of opportunities for 
non-safety concerns to influence decision-making under REACH. Although the 
consultation leading to REACH has received (qualified) praise for its breadth and 
inclusivity,76 REACH itself has been criticised for its poor public participation 
provisions77 and for the limited range of actors that can prompt change under 
REACH by submitting information dossiers.78 Provision for public participation does 
not guarantee expression of non-safety concerns or that scientific expertise will be 
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challenged by other public forms of knowledge but, without it, any chance for such 
contributions is absent. Broad conclusions are that there is very little scope for 
socio-technical integration in the control process. Overall, REACH is ‘framed around 
narrow human health and environmental protection concerns as grounds for 
limiting availability of chemicals’.79  
4.2.2 Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology is not regulated by its own dedicated regime, but by a sprawling 
web of regulations covering chemicals, food and cosmetics. Nanomaterials are 
regulated by REACH and so the criticisms above apply, alongside criticisms specific 
to its application to nanotechnology.80 Elen Stokes argues that the wholesale 
application of existing regulatory regimes, here REACH and EU consumer protection 
law, designed without nanotechnology in mind, imposes an inappropriate scope 
and set of assumptions on nanomaterials which prevent scrutiny of the aims and 
values underlying (or which should underlie) its regulation.81 In addition, she notes 
criticism by the European Parliament of the reluctance, in consumer protection 
legislation, to consider concerns other than risks to safety and the promotion of the 
internal market over other socio-economic and environmental objectives.82 
In her wide-ranging studies of regulation relevant to nanotechnology, Lee considers 
the extent to which, in addition to REACH, the Cosmetics Regulation83 and the GFL 
regulate on the basis of social and ethical concerns ‘beyond risk’.84 Her observations 
are summarised below. 
With respect to the GFL, perhaps its most significant feature is the recognition that 
‘scientific risk assessment alone cannot, in some cases, provide all the information 
on which a risk management decision should be based’ and that ‘other factors 
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relevant to the matter under consideration should legitimately be taken into 
account’.85 This works alongside the requirement, in Article 6(3), that risk 
management decisions take into account, alongside the results of the risk 
assessment and the opinion of EFSA, ‘other factors legitimate to the matter under 
consideration’. Other legitimate factors hold great potential, for example enabling 
‘the regulator to take account of, and explain a decision by reference to, the likely 
impacts of corporate control and industrialization of the food industry’, ‘the scale 
of uncertainty and ignorance’86 or even the outcomes of innovation governance 
activities (see Chapter Five).  
However, the legal context ultimately ‘limits the scope of ‘other legitimate factors’’ 
and otherwise ‘constrains the openness of policy-making and legislation,87 due to 
the following factors. The GFL aims to ensure the effective functioning of the 
internal market and the protection of human health; exercising power for other 
purposes would be unlawful.88 The GFL also seeks to protect consumers which 
could provide a chink through which the ray of other concerns could shine. 
However, the consumer interests listed in Article 8 GFL are narrow, and relate 
mainly to deceiving or misleading the consumer and the adulteration of food. In 
general, the GFL prioritises human health and, even though food regulation 
achieves a degree of openness with its reference to other legitimate factors, ‘there 
are enormous legal incentives to frame decisions in terms of safety assessments’.89 
Amongst these legal incentives too are the EU’s approach to the precautionary 
principle which conceives uncertainty narrowly and privileges scientific and 
technical information,90 and EU case law, which also incentivises ‘the explanation 
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of decisions by reference to (perhaps minority) scientific evidence’,91 discussed 
further in Chapter Six.  
Turning briefly to the Cosmetics Regulation, Lee identifies an acceptance that more 
flexibility may be required to deal with uncertainty surrounding nanomaterials.92 
She also praises the regulation for its obligation to indicate ingredients which are 
nanomaterials, enabling consumers to ‘make judgments on ethical and social issues 
as well as issues of personal risk’ thereby taking a ‘step towards addressing ethical 
and social commitments in the regulation of nanotechnology’.93 However, labelling 
may struggle to fulfil its various policy goals for various reasons including a lack of 
information supporting consumer choice and low consumer awareness.94 
Furthermore, it is not possible to label for purposes other than safety and individual 
consumer choice, of course, cannot ‘respond fully to the collective ethical issues 
around nanotechnology’.95 Stokes argues that without engagement or further 
information, the label ‘nano’ alone ‘does little to enable consumers meaningfully 
to differentiate between nano and non-nano products, whether on the grounds of 
risk, uncertainty or any other social or ethical repercussions’; it does however, 
enable their commercialisation and normalisation through trade on the regular 
market.96 On the regulation of nanotechnology in general: ‘[t]he regulation leaves 
little if any space for consideration of… broader social and ethical issues…’.97  
Scientifically-defined safety appears to be the dominant value, operating in support 
of narrow economic (primarily commercial/market) values, by minimising the 
restriction of economic or commercial activity by regulation to that necessary to 
ensure safety and environmental protection. However, there remains reason for 
optimism that non-safety values may compete with such narrow economic values 
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and even that non-safety values may influence risk assessment. The internal market 
is still the EU’s core project98 but the EU does explicitly espouse other, non-market 
policy goals which project beyond the arguable minimalism of health and 
environmental protection. Article 2 TFEU mentions inter alia, democracy, equality, 
pluralism, non-discrimination and justice. Article 3(3) TEU commits the EU to 
working for ‘the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
full employment and social progress’. Other social aims expressed here include 
combating ‘social exclusion and discrimination, and [promoting] social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and 
protection of the rights of the child’. 
The crucial point is that these admittedly broad-brush and vague aims indicate, at 
minimum, the existence of a space, sanctioned at the highest political and legal 
level, in which the acknowledgement, discussion and pursuit of non-safety and non-
economic policy goals is entirely valid. Perhaps even required.  
5. Methodology 
This thesis sits within the field of environmental law scholarship. It therefore 
encountered several of the methodological challenges faced by environmental law 
scholars, particularly the difficulty of identifying a single, appropriate 
methodology.99 The primary challenge has been the interdisciplinary nature of the 
subject.100 Though legal scholarship, this thesis is interdisciplinary in that I have 
drawn on knowledge and conceptualisations from disciplines outside legal 
academia,101 primarily the social sciences. Environmental law also transcends 
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traditional legal disciplinary boundaries102 and I have, accordingly, drawn on other 
legal sub-disciplines, such as administrative law and trade law. 
I approached the question at the heart of this thesis – why does the policy-practice 
gap persist? – in two stages. Firstly, I sought to understand the nature of the gap; 
evidence of its existence, where it has been articulated and the scholarly basis for 
its articulation. This enquiry entailed textual analysis of EU policy ambitions for the 
governance and regulation of risky technologies. It also required engagement with 
legal, and other, scholarship on the primacy of risk in EU regulation of risky 
technologies. Finally, though the thesis does not aim to contribute to STS research, 
it required interactional expertise103 in STS, acquired through extensive reading in 
this field. 
STS concerns the relationship between society, science and technology. It is, itself, 
profoundly interdisciplinary, encompassing sociology, history, philosophy, politics, 
law, economics and anthropology.104 Space prevents a full exposition of its 
precepts. In brief, however, much STS scholarship takes a social constructivist105 
approach to science and technology which rejects a model of science as provider of 
privileged methods which translate nature into knowledge.106 Rather, it sees 
scientific knowledge and technological artefacts as socially constructed.107 It thus, 
more or less, rejects realist arguments that ‘truths are more dependent upon the 
natural world than upon the people who articulate them’108 and looks to the social 
realm to account for scientific knowledge or facts.109 Likewise, it rejects a 
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technological determinist account of history, according to which technological 
change drives social change.110 In co-productionist terms, knowledge and artefacts 
both arise from, and constitute, society; natural and social orders are produced in 
conjunction.111 These notions underpin much STS scholarship.  
This thesis however, mines a much more specific seam of STS scholarship 
concerning public attitudes to risk, which criticises an (over-)emphasis on scientific 
assessments of risk in the governance of technologies. While this literature may be 
less esoteric and more practice-orientated than that just mentioned, its theoretical, 
constructivist foundations are clear and crucial to my argument, particularly the 
connection between a rejection of technological determinism and a faith in the 
ability of public engagement to influence technological trajectories. Together they 
form the framework I adopt to explain and understand concepts central to this 
thesis (science, scientific knowledge, technology, risk, public attitudes etc.) and 
which I use to criticise the EU’s attempts (or lack thereof) to respond meaningfully 
to the findings of STS scholarship in its regulation of risky technologies.  
The second stage of my analysis sought to answer the question posed by this thesis 
by employing three different analytical angles. Firstly, I selected, as examples, two 
technologies and their surrounding policy and regulatory frameworks to enable 
concrete examination of the gap and reasons for its persistence. These technologies 
were chosen for the reasons described in section 4.1 and offer helpful insights into 
the gap’s persistence in the different, but complementary, conclusions drawn. 
I approached the analysis of each technology as follows. Initially, drawing on (non-
legal/STS) scholarship, policy (including documents produced or commissioned by 
EU institutions, such as Commission communications or agency opinions) and other 
grey literature, I sought to understand the technologies themselves and associated 
risks and concerns. Next, I engaged in doctrinal analysis of the relevant law. This, 
partly descriptive work, consisted primarily of analysis of legislation in light of the 
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EU’s policy ambitions in order to measure the capacity of the legislation to 
implement those ambitions. Finally, I re-contextualised the regulation of each 
technology in a broader policy framework and, drawing on both policy and 
academic literature, identified reasons, within the specific policy areas, for the gap. 
Technologies are traded. I therefore chose, as my second angle, both EU internal 
market law and WTO law. This involved doctrinal analysis of primary legal sources: 
relevant treaty provisions and case law. The method of analysis applied to both 
regulation and trade law constituted problem-based doctrinal analysis in that it 
analysed, synthesised, interpreted and evaluated a body of primary legal material 
in terms of its application to existing and hypothetical problems of controlling 
technological innovation.112 It adopted, in addition, an ‘external approach’ to such 
analysis. This concerns the study of law in practice – in a social, economic and 
political context – and sees legal systems as partly determined by external forces.113 
As such, the analysis was strongly informed by STS literature and my own research 
into pesticides and synthetic biology regulation. 
Reasons for the gap remaining evaporate at the boundaries of neither technology-
specific regulation nor trading regimes; these too sit in context. Maintaining the 
external approach, for my third angle therefore, I chose the realm of ideas. To keep 
this, potentially limitless, enquiry manageable, I restricted my starting point to EU 
innovation policy ambitions. Drawing on STS and political science, I used the 
concepts of imaginaries and master narratives to understand the power of these 
policy ambitions and the role such ideational factors play in maintaining the gap. 
Structurally, the first stage corresponds roughly to Section I and the second stage 
to Sections II and III. However, both stages of the enquiry informed each other and 
the analysis contained in Sections II and III corroborates the arguments in Section I. 
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My argument is not simply that the law should ‘solve’ a particular societal 
problem.114 It is rather that the law, as currently constituted, undermines the EU’s 
own ambitions to solve a problem it has acknowledged. I make the assumption that 
the law can contribute to fulfilling these ambitions and in this sense view the law 
instrumentally. However, my argument and criticism of the current law is strongly 
normative and points towards change, though no explicit recommendations are 
made. Due to the significant STS influence permeating my doctrinal analysis and 
pervasive reference to the policy context, though not empirical, the thesis can be 
described as a socio-legal115 endeavour. 
6. Scope 
Due to limitations of space, this thesis cannot, of course, present a comprehensive 
discussion of every area of potential interest and relevance to its main subject 
matter. Firstly, I concentrate my criticisms of the use of regulatory science in 
decision-making on scientific risk assessment. However, I am aware of the existence 
of other reductive decision-making techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
which may also play a role in regulating technology. Risk assessment and CBA are 
closely related and exhibit similar difficulties associated with the privileging of 
technical expertise in decision-making.116 However, this thesis is specifically 
concerned with the kinds of considerations (other than science-backed safety 
concerns) which decision-makers may take into account when regulating risky 
technologies and the degree to which regulatory science itself may be opened up 
to other values, perspectives and framings as opposed to balancing costs and 
benefits. Furthermore, risk is the primary decision-making technique for the two 
technologies I discuss in detail in this thesis. For these reasons, I have restricted the 
decision-making techniques examined to risk assessment. 
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Secondly, both technologies have agricultural applications. I acknowledge their 
connections with agriculture, particularly in Chapter Four. However, I have 
refrained from engaging in-depth with the EU’s legal and policy framework on 
agriculture, primarily due to its sheer size and complexity. I chose these 
technologies as illustrative examples for reasons other than their connection to 
agriculture, as described in section 4.1. Furthermore, pesticides, and particularly 
the 2009 regulatory regime, are currently under-examined, representing an 
opportunity to initiate discussions in this field.  
Thirdly, the SUD has a twin: the Plant Protection Product Regulation (PPPR).117 I 
decline to discuss the latter. The relationship between the two instruments is 
undoubtedly a matter worthy of further research, not least into the extent to which 
the PPPR may support or undermine achievement of sustainable pesticide use. 
However, breadth would have sacrificed depth in that a single chapter could not 
deliver an analysis of both instruments and sustainability in satisfactory detail. 
Fourthly, I occasionally allude to the place and importance of intellectual property 
in relation to technological innovation, particularly biotechnology. Indeed, the 
growth of this field has been partly attributed to the landmark US case of Diamond 
v Chakrabarty118 which provided that living organisms could be patented.119 
Arguments for strong IP protection are central to the knowledge-based economy 
discussed in Chapter Eight and IP protection forms part, increasingly perhaps, of the 
political economy of technoscience.120 Patent law also provides, controversially,121 
another forum for political contestation over the rights and wrongs of 
biotechnology.122 However, other than brief mentions, particularly in Chapters 
Three and Five, I have not engaged further with this field. My intention is to 
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maintain a strict focus on regulation which governs the authorisation and use of 
technologies as this is where the policy-practice gap I am interested in lies. It would 
be a different and ambitious thesis indeed which sought to encompass other 
forums for decision-making.  
Finally, as discussed, much of the analysis in this thesis is influenced by elements of 
social constructivist thinking, specifically in relation to technology,123 and the 
sociology of scientific knowledge.124 Indeed, this thinking is fundamental to my final 
argument in Chapter Nine that we have a choice with respect to the kinds of 
technology we, as a society, develop125 and the shape of the markets we allow to 
distribute them.126 These are questions whose inherently political nature perhaps 
appears denied by much of the policy examined in Chapter Eight but which 
contribute to inspiring calls for participation in decision-making.127 However, I 
include no discrete analysis of social constructivism or the sociology of scientific 
knowledge per se. Many of their precepts, as elucidated by STS, already form the 
well-established foundations of scholarship on risk regulation to which this thesis 
contributes. They find implicit acceptance in the vast majority of such scholarship 
cited hereafter which consistently highlights the need to acknowledge the ‘social 
constructedness’ of the regulatory science employed to aid governance of 
technology. Given this context, a general exposition of social constructivist thought 
is not vital to the following discussion.  
The law and policy is up to date as at 31 December 2016, although some later 
developments are included. 
7. The structure of this thesis 
The arguments of this thesis, as indicated above, rest on three foundations. 
Section 4 above, established the third foundation. Chapter Two discusses the 
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arguments behind the normative claims in the first foundation. It reviews STS (and 
related) literature which criticises risk assessment as a regulatory tool, 
contextualised in the broader relationship between science and society both in 
general, and more specifically, in relation to risk. The review examines the appeal 
of risk-based governance methods and gives an account of the now (academically) 
uncontroversial conclusion that risk assessment is not necessarily the value-free 
and objective endeavour it has been touted as.128 It identifies the importance of 
values both in assessing risk and in governing technologies. This forms a basis for 
picking out certain problems and problematic assumptions embedded in the 
current paradigm of risk governance in the EU, for example the narrowness of risk 
assessment as a decision-making tool and the tendency to reduce all concerns 
about a technology to questions of safety resolvable by science,129 often combined 
with a lack of acknowledgment of the diversity of values and concerns which 
constitute individual or societal attitudes to risk. This chapter does not aim to break 
new ground but rather provides context and acts as a springboard into the analysis 
and arguments contained in the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter Three establishes the second foundation, i.e. that EU policy relating to the 
governance of risky technologies displays a commitment to socio-technical 
integration. It does so through a survey of European policy, specifically concerning 
pesticide use and synthetic biology. It also considers European innovation policy 
more broadly, highlighting the relevance of innovation governance for downstream 
risk regulation. In relation to synthetic biology, it focuses on the EU’s adoption of 
‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ (RRI) as a governance framework for 
synthetic biology.130 It argues that this approach demonstrates a general 
commitment to opening up a range of synthetic biology-specific concerns to early 
and ongoing public debate and greater socio-technical integration. In relation to 
pesticides, it argues that a commitment to exploring both the social and economic 
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dimensions in the broadest terms, as well as the environmental dimension of the 
technology, is implicit in the EU’s employment of the language of sustainability in 
the relevant policy and legislation.  
Section II comprises Chapters Four and Five which discuss pesticide use and 
synthetic biology regulation respectively. Together, they bolster the third 
foundation of this thesis and identify some technology-specific reasons for the 
persistence of the policy-practice gap. 
Chapter Four provides an in-depth examination of one of the primary pieces of 
legislation regulating pesticides in the European Union: the SUD. It discusses the 
various problems and concerns related to pesticide use. It recalls the argument in 
Chapter Three that employment of the language of ‘sustainability’ implies that the 
elements commonly associated with sustainability will influence the regulation of 
pesticides under this Directive. Finally, it examines the detail of the SUD in light of 
the foregoing discussions. It argues that while there is some flexibility and potential 
for consideration of broader issues, the unambitious approach taken, which 
equates sustainable use with risk reduction and efficiency, overall limits potential 
for the substance of decision-making under this directive to reflect the various 
elements of sustainability and therefore represents a failure by the EU to close, or 
even narrow, the policy-practice gap. It attributes this failure to, amongst other 
things, the narrowness of the consultation process leading to the SUD and the EU’s 
current overall lack of ambition for sustainable development. 
Chapter Five reviews the current regulatory regime governing synthetic biology 
and, with reference to the EU’s policy ambitions discussed in Chapter Three, 
assesses the potential of the regime to meet those ambitions. The chapter focuses 
on opportunities for public and other stakeholder participation as the main 
legislative instrument capable of implementing the principles of RRI, in addition to 
other opportunities for values other than safety to influence decision-making 
processes. I argue that the legislation examined cannot implement the EU’s policy 
ambitions, primarily due to the weakness of its provision for participation. 
Returning to policy, I argue that overall confusion as to the goals of participation in 
the governance of synthetic biology renders it unlikely that legislation will be 
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amended to reflect increased ambition. That confusion, I argue, is exacerbated by 
the fact that discussion relating to the governance and regulation of synthetic 
biology is conditioned by its inheritance of a regime designed for a different 
technology131 which further restricts opportunities to enhance socio-technical 
integration. 
Section III comprises Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, which present an analysis of 
reasons for the persistence of the policy-practice gap from the angles of trade law 
and the ideational context. 
Chapter Six tackles the EU internal market and focuses on opportunities in internal 
market law for Member States to regulate on the basis of a range of social values 
and uncertainty through analysis of Articles 36 and 114 TFEU, the mandatory 
requirements132 and the precautionary principle. It considers the degree to which 
these provisions restrict or support socio-technical integration. It argues that when 
adjudicating a Member State’s justification for maintaining a trade-restrictive 
measure, the EU Courts tend to grant scientific or technical expertise priority of 
agency in determining whether a problem justifying regulation actually exists. This 
approach pre-empts the use of other forms of (non-scientific) evidence and 
reasoning as to the existence of a problem, inhibiting fulfilment of the EU’s policy 
commitments discussed in Chapter Three and reinforcing the policy-practice gap.   
Chapter Seven considers the World Trade Organisation rules within which EU risk 
regulation regimes operate. Focusing on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPSA), the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBTA) and associated 
case law it performs a similar analysis to that in the previous chapter. It examines, 
in particular, scope to restrict trade in risky technologies for reasons other than 
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safety, such as public morals or on the basis of scientific evidence inflected by the 
culture, values and concerns of the regulating Member. I argue that, while the GATT 
and TBTA recognise a broad range of justifications for national regulation, their 
availability may still be restricted. With respect to the SPSA, there is little scope for 
the EU to justify its regulation on the basis of risk assessment as defined by its own 
values and concerns. I argue that in these ways, the interpretation of these 
agreements contributes to constraining the EU’s own progress towards closing the 
policy-practice gap.  
Chapter Eight examines reasons, outside the realm of regulation and trade law, for 
the difficulty in closing the policy-practice gap. I focus almost exclusively on 
analysing EU policy on innovation, governance and the regulation of technology in 
order to describe the ideational context for the EU’s approach to regulating risky 
technologies. I save the analysis of the relationship between this context and the 
law examined in the rest of the thesis for Chapter Nine. I use this policy analysis to 
construct a picture of the EU’s ambitions by identifying various imaginaries and 
master narratives which permeate EU policy. I argue that the EU is committed to 
the idea that its future survival and success depend upon economic 
competitiveness and growth which in turn are contingent upon science and 
technological innovation and a well-functioning internal market. Furthermore, this 
commitment is reinforced by the depoliticising effect of these imaginaries and 
narratives and their potential to shut down wider democratic debate on, for 
example, what the future of Europe should be and the direction research and 
innovation should take.133 Instead, a narrow debate about safety in relation to 
specific technologies134 occurs in which regulatory science is granted priority of 
agency in identifying which implications of technological innovation warrant a 
regulatory response. Implicit in these arguments is the contention that while EU 
policy presents its vision as the only option for its future, the direction it pursues is 
still very much a matter of choice. 
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Chapter Nine attempts to demonstrate the manifestation of the EU’s commitments 
discussed in Chapter Eight in the fine detail of the policy and legislation explored in 
Chapters Three to Five. I argue it is these commitments to which we may, at least 
partially, ascribe the lack of ambition in these fields and locate the source of 
obstacles to greater socio-technical integration, deriving therefrom an explanation 
for the persistence of the policy-practice gap. With respect to pesticides, I link the 
EU’s overarching commitment to the reconciliation of environmental and 
social/economic goals through innovation-aided resource efficiency, discussed in 
Chapter Eight, with its equation of sustainability with risk reduction and efficiency 
identified in the policy and regulation of pesticide use. With respect to synthetic 
biology, I link the EU’s commitment to an imaginary of governable emergence of 
innovation and search for consensus, discussed in Chapter Eight, with the priority 
of agency granted to science to define problems worth regulating and the narrow 
provision for, and expectations of, public participation established in the policy and 
legislation. I also highlight broader themes and patterns pervading EU policy on 
innovation, governance and technology which contribute to maintaining the policy-
practice gap. Much of the analysis throughout the thesis, particularly Chapter Eight, 
shows or implies the difficulty of taking substantive steps towards realising the EU’s 
commitment to increasing socio-technical integration due to, for example, the 
longevity, appeal and resilience of its commitment to innovation and its 
commercialisation as guarantor of future well-being. However, this chapter 
concludes by highlighting the potential for change enlivened by an inextinguishable 
flame of choice. 
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SECTION I – TALKING THE TALK: EUROPEAN POLICY ON GOVERNING 
‘RISKY TECHNOLOGIES’ 
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Chapter Two – Setting the scene: insights into risk regulation from 
science and technology studies 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I set out my overarching argument that there is typically 
a gap between the EU’s policy and practice in its regulation of risky technologies. In 
that chapter, I argued that the EU’s approach to regulating risky technologies is 
primarily based on risk assessment. This chapter discusses the critical light shed on 
risk as a regulatory tool and on the risk assessment exercise itself, by social science 
research, particularly STS. It gives an account of the scholarly basis for, and content 
of, the position I contend EU policy on risky technologies has accepted but which 
its practice does not implement. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 
concentrates on risk and risk assessment. It discusses the origins and development 
of these concepts and their popularity through an account of their perceived 
benefits and advantages for regulation.  
Section 3 presents a summary of the criticisms of risk assessment resulting from 
social scientific research over the last few decades. Firstly, it discusses the 
formation of public attitudes to science and technology, demonstrating the vast 
range of public concerns and values typically ignored by the reductive pictures of 
risks obtainable from scientific risk assessment. Secondly, it scrutinises claims that 
risk assessment provides an objective, neutral and therefore rational 
representation of reality. Thirdly, it discusses the inability of risk assessment to deal 
with the uncertainty and unpredictability endemic in the interactions between 
technology and the social world135 and environment.136 Finally, it looks outside 
assessing physical risks to questions of trust in matters of science and technology 
governance which indicate the need not only to improve and broaden our 
understanding of risk, but also to pay attention to the relationships between publics 
and institutions. 
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Section 4 contains a brief account of changes which have occurred in response to 
the criticisms in section 3. It charts developments in the relationship between 
science and society in preparation for discussion of European policy on these 
matters in Chapter Three. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Risk assessment 
2.1 The meaning and growth of risk and risk assessment 
The definition of ‘risk’ is not, in itself, straightforward or uncontroversial. Ten 
different formal definitions of ‘risk’ have been identified.137 With regard to 
environmental risks, risk can be defined as the probability of an identified hazard 
occurring138 and ‘hazard’ as ‘the situation that in particular circumstances could 
lead to harm or damage’.139 Likewise, there is no monolithic understanding of risk 
assessment. Techniques of risk assessment have developed differently for different 
risks.140 It is defined in many different ways depending on context, not just scientific 
but institutional and socio-political too.141 Risk assessment here means a scientific, 
probabilistic analysis, which in the EU, is divided into four stages:142 (1) hazard 
identification, defined as ‘identifying the biological, chemical or physical agents that 
may have adverse effects’; (2) hazard characterisation, defined as determining ‘the 
nature and severity of the adverse effects’ of those agents; (3) appraisal of 
exposure, defined as evaluating the probability of exposure to the agent of the 
relevant population or the environment; and (4) risk characterisation, defined as 
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estimating the probability, frequency and severity ‘of the known or potential 
adverse environmental or health effects liable to occur’.143  
The popularity of risk-based governance can be traced to the Victorian predilection 
for measurement and quantification, which returned, post-World War II, as 
renewed enthusiasm for rationality and measurement,144 perhaps reflecting the 
increasing authority of quantification and measurement in the West over the last 
two centuries.145 Probabilistic risk assessment techniques themselves have their 
origins in various different industries, including finance and insurance and 
engineering, in assessments of risk and safety problems arising out of for example, 
mercantile shipping, or the design and control of chemical or nuclear plants.146 
These were regarded, at least initially, as well defined and well bounded human 
activities and therefore amenable to scientific analyses of risk.147 Such 
quantification exercises were also extended, in the USA, to new problems; 
assessing the risk of cancer from increasing environmental pollution, or ecosystem 
disruptions.148  
Risk assessment came to be specifically encouraged in US agencies in the second 
half of the 20th century as a way of making decision-making ‘more objective and 
‘rational’ and therefore more accountable and effective’, in a society increasingly 
concerned with over-regulation.149 At the end of the 1970s, a US Supreme Court 
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decision made risk central to regulation.150 The growing scientific ‘look’ of risk 
assessment was subsequently promoted in the US National Research Council’s 
(NRC) 1983 ‘Red Book’. This report concluded that there should be a clear 
conceptual distinction, in regulatory decision-making, between scientific risk 
assessment, which would disclose objective ‘facts’ regarding risks, and ‘political’ 
risk management, during which expression of values would be appropriate in 
deciding whether or not to accept a risk and how that risk might be managed. That 
distinction, it was believed, would guarantee the objectivity of decision-making.151 
The NRC’s statement of the role of risk assessment in environmental regulation 
came to be authoritative152 and is reflected in the Commission’s risk assessment 
structure, described above.153 More generally, the dichotomies established then, 
between facts and values, subjectivity and objectivity and risk assessment and risk 
management persist in the European model of risk regulation, as discussed in 
Chapter One.  
2.2 The appeal of numbers 
The above brief history of the development of risk assessment already hints at some 
of the reasons behind its appeal. Firstly, it was promoted for its perceived ability to 
legitimise new US regulatory agencies, for example the Environmental Protection 
Agency. This perceived ability may also appeal to the European political 
institutions,154 as may quantification generally for its ability to create a unified 
environment out of disparate cultures with ‘systematic and rational methods’.155 
Framing actions and decisions as ‘risk-based’ is a useful method of gaining 
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legitimacy for a regulatory actor by creating a ‘sense of strategy and control’156 and 
for ‘…rationalizing the practical limits of what regulation can achieve and rendering 
given degrees of regulatory failure acceptable’.157 Thus it can also be seen as a 
response to demands for accountability and justification in political and regulatory 
decision-making, and the result of increasing public, executive, judicial and public 
scrutiny of such decisions.158 Set against the political extremes of the 20th Century, 
objective public knowledge was regarded as the best protection against arbitrary 
political power.159 Furthermore, risk, by transforming decision-making into a 
probabilistic assessment of success and failure, compensates for the uncertainties 
which result from our inevitably limited knowledge. Risk-based regulation can 
allocate blame and set out those risks which it is reasonable to require an agency 
to prevent.160 Risk assessment may be used in conjunction with, or alongside, other 
regulatory tools based on technical expertise such as CBA. 
Secondly, its legitimising power stems from the understanding of risk assessment 
as provider of ‘objective facts’,161 a perception itself inherited from an 
understanding of science generally as disinterested discloser of trustworthy, 
neutral and universal knowledge about nature.162 These ‘facts’ are valued as a 
‘common metric by which competing social goods… can be compared in an 
apparently simple and objective way’.163 Numbers and the neutral language of risk 
assessment can speak across different viewpoints and cultural contexts and provide 
a ‘universal justification of action’.164 The appearance of mirroring reality places 
authority founded on ‘objective facts’ beyond contestation,165 and gives the 
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impression of reliability.166 It may also contribute to stabilising policy-relevant 
knowledge;167 indeed objectivity has been closely associated with the ability to 
reach consensus.168 Basing decisions on risk may be intended to generate public 
trust in a governmental authority and its decisions: ‘[p]olicymakers earn our trust 
through demonstrations of epistemic virtue, which include… the capacity to 
produce and act on objective knowledge’.169 
Much of the appeal is based on the assumption that factual evidence has normative 
force.170 In extreme cases, it may,171 but subjective value judgments must 
complement and interpret ‘objective’ science.172 Furthermore, talking ‘objective’ 
numbers and ‘facts’, allows decision-makers to avoid talking a ‘more politically 
contentious and difficult ethical language’.173 Likewise, a reliance on neutral 
technical expert advice has the attraction of relieving governments of the 
responsibility to make difficult political decisions.174 Finally, objectivity, with its 
promise of impartiality and freedom from bias, may appeal in its potential to help 
decision-makers appear ‘fair and impersonal’,175 protecting against ‘charges of 
arbitrariness or self-interest’.176 It is thus vital to governmental power,177 especially 
perhaps in liberal democracies, committed to value-neutrality.178 According to 
Sheila Jasanoff, ‘[o]bjectivity… allows governing bodies to claim the cognitive high 
ground, a place from which they can be seen to be acting for the benefit of all, 
without bowing to any particular interests or knowledge claims’.179 The appearance 
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of risk assessment in trade law may be attributed to this perception, found in the 
commitment that requiring state action to be founded on scientific risk assessment 
will prevent discriminatory and arbitrary behaviour,180 alongside its promise of 
creating universal standards and their role in building markets.181 
Thirdly, the above claims to objectivity, truth, universality and neutrality establish 
risk assessment as the basis for a ‘rational’ and unemotional response to an 
uncertain future. Indeed ‘[t]here can be no higher form of rationality than acting on 
the strength of objective knowledge’.182 Viewing hazards in terms of risks can hold 
out the attractive ‘promise that the challenges and complexities of regulation can 
be rationalised, ordered, managed, and controlled’.183 If we cannot know the risks 
we face and yet must act as if we do,184 science-driven risk assessment would 
appear to grant us that ability.  
Finally, as stated above, one of the causes of an increasing reliance on risk as basis 
for regulation was concern about over-regulation and a conviction that regulatory 
costs should be balanced against benefits to health and the environment.185 
Furthermore, risk, in its ability to set clear limits on the circumstances in which 
regulation is and is not appropriate, may appeal as a spur for regulation consistent 
with deregulatory agendas186 and is therefore popular with certain economic 
interests, examined further in Chapter Eight.  
3. The limits of risk 
The traditional understandings of the capabilities and reach of rational science and 
risk assessment presented above have, over the last few decades, been subject to 
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challenge and scrutiny. This has significantly enhanced our comprehension of risk, 
risk assessment and its limitations. This section focuses on these insights. 
3.1 Public attitudes to risks  
The branch of social science discussed here challenges the notion that an 
expression of risk as a simple probability grants a rational and sufficient basis for 
regulation. The assumption of rationality based on objective, scientific information 
denies the possibility of valid disagreement. It leads directly to taking public 
disagreement with the level of risk deemed acceptable by experts, or public 
assumption of risks with statistically higher chances of injury or death, as evidence 
of irrationality, based on subjective bias, emotion and a misperception of the 
probabilities involved.187 A distinction, discussed further in section 3.2, is drawn 
between ‘real’ risk as understood by scientist risk assessors, due to their objective 
scientific knowledge, and ‘perceived’ risk held by the public as a result of their 
misunderstanding and ignorance of the scientific content of risk knowledge.188 
This characterisation of the public as ignorant has been labelled the ‘deficit’ model 
of the public understanding of science. Or, more specifically, the ‘cognitive deficit’ 
model, to distinguish it from later iterations of the same idea, discussed below. 
Public opposition to scientific development which runs counter to assertions of 
safety as calculated by risk assessment is deemed to be a wholesale rejection of 
science,189 again, due to the public’s ignorance, further corroborated by the 
consistently low levels of public scientific literacy observed since the 1970s.190 
Public concerns about the limits of our knowledge (discussed below), for example, 
have been likened by institutional science, to the ‘imaginings of some fevered 
brow’, implying the irrationality of seeking to acknowledge such matters as 
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relevant.191 Such opposition has led to a further characterisation of the public as a 
threat to innovation-based progress, as discussed in Chapters Five and Eight.192 
The cure for public ignorance, irrationality and mistrust was education, to engender 
trust, a proper, rational understanding of risk and thereby replace opposition with 
support.193 Thus, as a response to the ‘legitimation vacuum which threatened the 
wellbeing and social standing of science’,194 in the mid-1980s, the Public 
Understanding of Science (PUS) movement was born.195 The movement was based 
on several further assumptions. It was assumed, for example, that experts were 
grounded in reality while public discourses were ‘essentially groundless and 
emotionally-based only’ and ‘intellectually unreal’.196 In addition to the need to 
address the public’s scientific illiteracy197 and mistrust, it was assumed that the 
public’s ignorant rejection of science was the result of the failure of scientists to 
communicate well with the public.198 Scientific illiteracy was also conceived of as a 
moral problem; people incapable of understanding the world would be unable to 
act rationally in it.199 The approach taken by the PUS movement to address these 
concerns, was therefore one of one-way transmission of knowledge to a passive 
public.200 
However, while it is admitted that there is public ignorance of science,201 the deficit 
and PUS models have been profoundly criticised. Social scientists have argued that 
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ignorance neither explains nor correlates with public responses to science and 
technology.202 Nor does it explain why the same scientific facts and technological 
artefacts provoke different public responses.203 It is argued that the deficit model 
‘fails to appreciate the contextual nature of knowing’204 and privileges public 
knowledge of facts ‘over more complex frames of meaning’.205 Moreover, it makes 
little sense, in highly technologised contemporary societies, flatly to dismiss public 
responses as ‘anti-technology’.206 
The study of public attitudes to risk has seen the development of various strands of 
research which combine to challenge and demonstrate the PUS model’s lack of 
explanatory power.207 For example, the ‘cultural theory’ of risk selection argues that 
risks are selected for attention by different people in keeping with the forms of 
social organisation they prefer to belong to and which confirm their way of life.208 
According to this analysis, attitudes to risk are based on cultural biases, there can 
be no single metric for risk assessment and even the concept of ‘risk’ is variable.209  
Another approach, the psychometric tradition, used revealed preferences to 
examine judgments of acceptable risk. This method relies on observing the risks 
people actually take by focusing on the economic costs people pay for, against the 
benefits they receive from, a given activity.210 Later studies using psychometric 
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surveys, employed expressed preferences,211 which involve asking people directly 
about their preferences in relation to various risk/benefit trade-offs.212  
Each of these methods comes with its own imperfections and assumptions,213 like 
risk assessment itself. However, they and others have added valuable colour and 
depth to our understanding of the considerations people take into account when 
judging acceptable risk. Firstly, when considering risks, people look both at the 
probability of a hazard occurring and at its possible consequences. For example, the 
catastrophic consequences of a severe nuclear reactor accident may weigh more 
heavily on people’s minds than the extreme unlikelihood of it ever happening. Risk 
assessment reaches its limits on such questions and normative judgment is crucial. 
While a high likelihood of one death and a low likelihood of 10,000 deaths are 
numerically similar, the social and ethical consequences of each are very 
different.214 
Secondly, the overall purpose of the underlying research or controversy over the 
claimed benefits of a technology, for example whether GM crops will increase yields 
or reduce pesticide use, will influence attitudes to risk. The risks of a given 
technology, to some, may not seem to be worth its alleged benefits.215 In the 
biosciences for example, along with safety,216 a primary public consideration 
appears to be ‘whether there is a sense of genuine social benefit from publicly 
funded science’ and ‘where the social benefit was high, the public were prepared 
to accept higher trade-offs’.217 Purposes of research also appear to be related, in 
public discourses, to the unpredictability of technologies and their impacts, for 
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example in terms of controllability and irreversibility.218 Uncertainty is discussed in 
greater detail in section 3.3. However, people are not hereby necessarily 
demanding complete control. It is rather the case that uncertainty will more likely 
be tolerated ‘if the purposes driving research and innovation are sound’ but not 
necessarily where they are unsound, unaccountable or unclear.219 Furthermore, the 
unfamiliarity of a risk may lower public tolerance and may even reflect concern over 
reckless pursuit of technical change in situations of scientific uncertainty.220 
Thirdly, public attitudes to risk are influenced by concerns regarding to whom the 
risks and benefits accrue.221 It is a common adage that taking some risk is a 
necessary condition for progress.222 However, there is a sense that large, 
multinational corporations receive the benefits of new scientific research while the 
risks are socialised.223 Beyond this instrumental approach to risks and benefits, 
principles themselves matter. Where equitable distribution of risks and benefits 
throughout society is considered desirable, differential impacts may increase risk 
aversion,224 as may the principle that the more vulnerable members of society 
should be protected from risks.225 
Fourthly, such questions about distribution, and indeed about safety in general,226 
are broadly speaking, ethical. The biosciences in particular have prompted wide-
ranging ethical (and religious/spiritual) debate concerning, for example, human 
control of and interference with nature, where the distinction between ‘natural’ 
and ‘unnatural’ lies, what it means to be human227 and human dignity.228 
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Finally, though it may be difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
risks,229 there is evidence that attitudes to risk vary where risks are perceived to be 
imposed by others rather than voluntarily assumed. People tend to demand higher 
levels of safety and certainty where risks are imposed involuntarily,230 for example 
a nuclear power station, than for voluntary risks, like dangerous sports. Obtaining 
consent to a risk does not necessarily address this problem. Those most able to give 
genuine, informed consent are likely to be educated, well-informed people who, 
being better-off, would be less willing to grant consent, while those most likely to 
consent to a risk, for example for financial betterment by accepting a risky job, are 
those who are least able to give it, likely due to poor education and financial 
insecurity.231 Thus, attitudes to risk may depend on the social situation of the 
individual concerned. 
The main achievement of these lines of research is the recognition that ‘the public’s 
viewpoint must be considered not as error but an essential datum’.232 Our 
traditional model of rationality, based on facts and probabilities, provides only a 
partial explanation of how rational humans make decisions; the kind of brain 
required by this model is one that ‘would have to know and understand everything, 
completely and at once’.233 Civic epistemology criticises the PUS model’s 
construction of the public as either knowing or not knowing234 by asking how 
knowledge comes to be seen as reliable in political settings. People evaluate 
scientific knowledge by evaluating different things, such as the institutions and 
scientists presenting it. Public attitudes to risk are not simply about factual 
knowledge. There are different types of expertise,235 as seen most famously in Brian 
Wynne’s analysis of the interactions between Cumbrian sheep farmers and 
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scientists post-Chernobyl and their respective types of specialist knowledge.236 
Furthermore, attitudes are ‘conditioned by different rationalities and knowledges 
from those of experts’.237 Civic epistemology argues against the reductionist 
assumption that societal knowledge is the sum of a population’s understanding of 
scientific facts and rejects the ignorant and illiterate publics presented by the deficit 
model. Instead, it presents humans as knowledgeable agents able to know things 
in common and who share approaches to sense-making to create public knowledge 
by appraising knowledge claims ‘according to culturally sanctioned criteria of 
competence, virtue, and reasoning’.238 
Risk assessment need not be quantitative and indeed, can be qualitative,239 perhaps 
incorporating a more explicit element of judgment. However, juxtaposed against 
the diversity of meanings and attitudes described above, the paradigm of risk 
assessment is ill-equipped to reflect the nuanced value-judgments of publics in 
response to the multiple technological risks they frequently face. All these 
considerations are relevant to determining ‘acceptable risk’ when it comes to 
regulating technologies,240 and not just to managing risks. However, the appeal of 
risk has encouraged the expression of non-risk considerations as concerns about 
safety for humans or the environment,241 on the assumption that the ‘real’ issues 
are about risk and therefore any other public concerns must be too.242 This has the 
effect of obscuring the types of considerations behind public attitudes to 
technologies and their risks,243 of which lack of official acknowledgement leads to 
an intensifying of such concerns.244 As Wynne puts in: ‘[t]he full range of moral and 
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social issues at stake is not adequately described by leaving the ‘factual’ science 
realm as if it is a separate black box from the normative’.245 
3.2 Objectivity and neutrality 
The problematic nature of understanding risk assessment as provider of objective 
and authoritative ‘facts’ is implicit in the above discussion of the complex concerns 
which make up public attitudes to risk. The conceptualisation, in the PUS model, of 
the relationship between ‘the public’ and ‘scientists’, reinforced dichotomies 
between subjectivity and objectivity and the public as consumers of innovation on 
one side and innovators and science on the other. It was not considered that the 
public might have a role in ‘defining the public interest or social benefit in 
technoscientific domains’ and scientists, while claiming to be objective, did not 
separate their own commitments, such as their technological, policy and social 
choices, from the ‘science’ they practised and advised on,246 although, as we shall 
see in Chapter Three, the former at least is now subject to challenge. 
The ideal of factual, objective risk assessment and the reification of ‘risk’ as an 
object itself amenable to scientific enquiry without being constructed,247 have also 
come under specific challenge. As a result, the separation between ‘objective’ risk 
and subjective ‘perceived’ risk is no longer a mainstream position. It is now 
generally acknowledged that all scientific risk assessment is conditional, predicated 
upon myriad assumptions and value judgments248 which combine to undermine its 
claims to objectively disclose a risk.249  
Risk assessors, in identifying a risk, employ a process of ‘framing’ in order to select 
and characterise a problem.250 This process is informed by their own assumptions, 
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commitments, values, priorities and knowledge,251 which may not reflect those of 
society. Frames are ‘principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed 
of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters’.252 
Framing excludes or includes questions, such as different types of scientific 
uncertainty, depending on their perceived relevance, comprehensibility and 
controllability.253 It may also involving choosing between ‘conflicting scientific 
criteria of valid knowledge (for example, precision, or comprehensiveness, or 
realism).254 Likewise, basing problem identification on mortality, morbidity or 
economic consequences may influence assessments of risk.255 And, with respect to 
new technologies particularly, the relevant expertise may not always be clear.256 
Wynne’s example regarding the risk assessment of herbicide 2,4,5-T in which it was 
assumed that the herbicide would be applied under strictly controlled conditions, 
illustrates the type of assumptions made in a risk assessment.257 More recently, the 
discovery that lab rats and mice react differently depending on the gender of the 
researcher in behavioural experiments258 may indicate the existence of previously 
unexamined assumptions about gender in research. The framing of a problem may 
also directly influence the quality of proposed solutions and, in cases of uncertainty, 
is likely to create chronic disagreement.259 Ultimately, techniques such as risk 
assessment tend only to be capable of responding to ‘lessons compatible with their 
initial assumptions’.260  
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Furthermore, due to incomplete and imprecise information at every stage of risk 
assessment, risk assessors are required to make methodological value judgments 
in order to interpret the data at hand.261 These judgments include, for example, 
‘which data to select…; how to choose statistical tests…; how to select sample 
size’.262 Since risk assessments necessarily depend on such judgments, they are 
often subjective263 and contingent.264 Individual scientists may evaluate data 
differently and advise policy-makers on the basis of their own ‘epistemic, 
theoretical and methodological commitments’, while these commitments and 
professional judgments are concealed in the ‘natural’ discourse of science and 
quantification,265 demonstrating the ‘fundamentally negotiable definition of the 
boundary between science and policy’.266 This framing of the results of risk 
assessments may have significant policy implications or elicit vastly different public 
reactions.267 A scientist might also choose to examine particular areas which will 
support the desired conclusions.268 
Finally, the presence of the market in science and technology, as providers of 
economic ‘goods’ (as discussed in Chapter Eight) may undermine the ideal of 
science’s adherence to the Mertonian269 norm of disinterestedness, with further 
implications for its objective and neutral status.270 Claims of the societal benefits of 
GM crops being asserted as scientific facts,271 for example, illustrate the infiltration 
of normative judgments into science, and perhaps echo idealised images of science 
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as inherently socially beneficent.272 However, while the ‘science’ contained implicit 
value commitments, the focus on educating the public in risk science, excluded the 
possibility of wider political discussions of other considerations.  
Given the many considerations that contribute to the formation of an 
understanding of a risk, risk is not in fact a simple object, amenable to 
understanding through scientific study but is itself, constructed.273 However, the 
persistent ideal of risk as a scientific object contributes to the exclusion of other 
social, ethical and political dimensions in the debate over acceptable risk which 
therefore become more ‘intractable’,274 while the dismissal of the public as 
irrational becomes ‘provocative and self-defeating’.275 
It is not denied that experts are vital to decision-making in modern societies.276 We 
should want experts to be ‘final arbiters on everything in their domains’,277 but not 
necessarily on ‘good judgment’ in general278 since decisions on risk acceptability 
ultimately ‘require judgments beyond the scope of science’.279 We should recognise 
the caveats elaborated by the social sciences, including the porous boundaries 
between facts and values and between risk assessment and risk management and 
that even ‘objective’ expert knowledge is embedded in assumptions about the real 
world.280 It is ‘impossible to disentangle social values and worldviews from the 
process of identifying, estimating and evaluating risks’.281  
3.3 Uncertainty confounds  
While science is often seen as conqueror of ignorance and uncertainty,282 
incomplete knowledge is pervasive in many areas of scientific endeavour, especially 
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environmental science,283 diagnosed by some (along with disputed values, high 
stakes and urgency) as characteristic of ‘post-normal science’.284 I use Wynne’s 
scheme of uncertainty285 to describe the various challenges risk assessment faces 
here. According to Wynne, the term ‘risk’ strictly applies to a situation in which the 
odds of harm are known. Uncertainty applies where the ‘types and scales of 
possible harms’ are known, but not their probabilities. ‘Risk assessment’ does not 
apply here.286 Next, ignorance, characterised by our incomplete knowledge of the 
possible harms. These are ‘unknown unknowns’; for example, we did not consider 
the relevance of the ozone layer during the development and use of CFCs but much 
later became aware of the damage caused.287 Ignorance is, of course, endemic to 
scientific knowledge. However, it is only problematic, according to Wynne, when 
scientific knowledge is institutionalised in policy-making without acknowledging its 
inevitable presence.288 
Wynne’s final category of uncertainty is indeterminacy, which is characterised by 
the openness and reflexive changeability of the social, technological and natural 
systems in which we operate. We can never comprehensively measure an open 
system289 and any attempt to perform a risk assessment will be based on 
assumptions about the behaviour of its various participants. Indeterminacy 
underlies scientific knowledge even if ‘uncertainty’ is actually small, and in fact all 
types of uncertainty are overlaid on each other, increasing as social commitments 
based on current knowledge increase.290 This open-endedness is found in both in 
both ecosystems and social systems. In the latter, for example, it is impossible to 
predict how individual actors will behave, for example farm workers’ behaviour 
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when applying pesticides.291 It is therefore difficult, in this situation, to establish 
lines of causation between decisions and consequences.292  
Where ignorance comes to light, the response tends to focus on improving the 
scientific model to generate more knowledge for policy. Recalling risk assessment’s 
origins in analysing well-defined systems, this reductive approach ‘tends to treat all 
uncertainties as if they were due to incomplete definition of an essentially 
determinate cause-effect system’, when in fact risk assessment is now being 
applied to unpredictable and complex systems, where even identifying the target 
systems to protect and assess is challenging.293 The consequence of this, and the 
assumptions made in such assessments, is to misrepresent and hide ignorance and 
indeterminacies in risk systems, generating an illusion of control.294 This ‘distorts 
public debate and understanding of the proper relationship between expert 
knowledge and public value-choices’ in regulating technologies.295 While 
uncertainty implies that more knowledge is needed, indeterminacy suggests 
contingent social behaviour should be included in assessment frameworks.296 
Furthermore, both ignorance and indeterminacy should be treated ‘as potential 
sources of risk in themselves’ and embraced ‘in broader debate about the 
implications of societal commitments’.297  
Even established scientific knowledge is contingent,298 resting on the particular 
conditions in which it became ‘knowledge’. When it is transferred, to a different 
context where different variables obtain, it may no longer hold true.299 Thus, 
despite extensive testing of products before commercialisation, newly-marketed 
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innovations will always meet novel conditions to which pre-market testing is not 
entirely applicable.300 In other words, what is presented as an established fact, for 
example, the safety of a product, is contingent on what tests have been conducted. 
Contingencies have typically been misrepresented as residual uncertainties which 
will be conquered by further research and experimentation, when more research 
may in fact reveal more ignorance.301 Indeed, the best foundation for policy that 
science can provide is a ‘robust consensus’, not proof.302 This situation is further 
exacerbated by the current speed of innovation, often outstripping ethical and 
regulatory oversight,303 in which society finds that it is, itself, the laboratory; a fact 
often left unacknowledged.304 
Governance processes based on risk assessment have often failed to predict 
subsequent, significant impacts of innovation.305 Ultimately, the potential for risk 
assessment to enable us to act as if we know the risks and to exert a degree of 
control, ceases to be so convincing. This danger is inherent in the model: the rigidity 
found in the detailed rules of risk-based frameworks ends up restricting the scope 
for a regulatory response to ‘an unpredicted and unpredictable future’.306 Even the 
desire for control and ‘zero uncertainty’ may in itself be based on a false assumption 
that this is what the public demands yet cannot understand science’s inability to 
provide.307 In fact, publics understand uncertainty and ‘recognise a more radical 
uncertainty (indeed indeterminacy) than that admitted by science’.308 The 
exaggeration of control by experts has significant negative implications for trust 
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between publics and scientific and policy institutions, discussed below, and 
uncertainty may be ‘manipulated politically, to accelerate or defer initiatives’.309  
The above ‘uncertainties’ do not fit comfortably into traditional risk assessment and 
as such, tend to be excluded from discussion. For example, in the EU and the WTO 
(discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven), hypothetical risk may not form the 
basis of a regulatory decision, nor may regulation seek ‘zero risk’,310 despite the 
clear case for acknowledging uncertainty in decision-making. Uncertainty is also 
relevant to other questions. In relation to the ‘acceptability’ of hypothetical risk, 
‘ignorance may be more salient if the contested activity raises ethical concerns, or 
has doubtful social benefits’.311 Likewise, uncertainty ‘may be compounded by 
issues of ethics, economics, social implications and public acceptability’,312 and 
suggests a need for public engagement and deliberation on those very questions.313 
3.4 Risk and trust 
The lines of research detailed in section 3.1, especially psychometric research, 
showed that scientists had reduced salient dimensions of ‘risk’ to a narrow object 
of research which did not reflect the more complex public definitions of risk. The 
value of this research is not doubted. However, these insights still left intact the 
assumption that all public concerns were related to the inherent properties of the 
risk.314 Public scepticism towards risky technologies does not derive simply from 
their risks but also reflects judgments about the science and policy institutions 
controlling the risks and crucially, the reliability of their track record.315 These 
judgments are both ethical and intellectual and may concern, for example, 
institutional denial of the limitations of scientific knowledge, a sense of the 
available science as being ‘captured’ by commercial or political interests and a 
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greater need for public accountability and debate over driving purposes and 
forces,316 some of which do also exacerbate risk aversion. Wynne further attributes 
public scepticism to a rejection of expert discourses of control and knowledge, 
which ignores the findings described in section 3.1 and which continue to construct 
the public as emotional and intellectually-vacuous, concerned only with statistical 
risk.317 
Public attitudes to risky technologies are therefore not solely composed of nuanced 
personal understandings of physical risk. They involve general matters of trust 
between publics and institutions,318 understandings of the social processes involved 
in risk management, for example, the degree of organised safety, or level of 
personal control,319 or confidence in the risk assessment procedures.320 Trust is 
two-fold and involves public concerns that the responsible institutions act in the 
public interest and in accordance with the best possible technical and safety 
practices.321 Thus mistrust of institutions, combined with an unavoidable 
dependence on the same institutions,322 contributes to the formation of public 
responses to (risky) technologies. 
These insights further undermine the artificial separation between facts and values, 
or ethics: public meanings and responses do not fit into these categories and public 
judgments regarding the matters described above comprise both intellectual and 
ethical content.323 These insights also undermine the deficit model;324 even with 
sophisticated scientific knowledge, concerns about the responsible institutions 
would clearly persist. This could also be seen as part of the morphing relationship 
between the public and authority (in this instance, scientists) wherein it is normal 
for assertions of authority to be questioned. Indeed, such critical questioning may 
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even be an indication of a ‘more informed and scientifically literate citizenry’.325 On 
the question of independence, public opinion surveys have shown that people 
regard the perceived source of, or source of funding behind, scientific research as 
important.326 As Sir Aaron Klug observed, ‘it is probably futile to argue that a 
scientist can interact with a commercial company without becoming an implicit 
advocate for the company’.327 This being the case, it may be hard for people to 
retain the belief that the public interest is always being protected. 
3.5 Summary 
The above insights and arguments combine to form a powerful case for relieving 
risk assessment of its burden as ascendant source of knowledge in regulatory 
decision-making. The information it provides is vital, as is expert knowledge, but its 
deficiencies beyond probabilistic analysis are apparent and undermine many of its 
assumed attributes. It is not sensitive to public methods of rationalising risks and 
cannot necessarily lay claim to providing an authoritative characterisation of the 
risk faced, though it may be an authoritative expression of a particular perspective 
on risk. The presence of assumptions and value judgments in expert risk assessment 
suggests its results may not be unqualifiedly ‘objective’, which further weakens its 
ability to provide institutional accountability and support ‘rational’ decisions. These 
two observations would also seem to suggest the need for elision between the 
matters deemed appropriate for discussion during risk assessment and 
management. It struggles to cope with uncertainty, with implications for its 
adequacy as a foundation for future control of the implications of a technology. 
Finally, public attitudes towards technologies may not stem from their attitudes to 
physical risks but instead reflect their confidence in the institutions charged with 
controlling those risks, which risk assessment, by definition, also cannot read. 
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4. The impact of social science research 
4.1 The institutional response 
Many suggestions for addressing some of the problems identified above through 
broadening considerations in regulatory decision-making beyond risk involve 
promoting some kind of wider public deliberation in which different opinions, 
values, frames of meaning etc. can be aired and where expert assumptions may be 
challenged. The growth of this approach, often referred to as the Public 
Understanding of Science movement (though without the pejorative associations 
mentioned above), demonstrates a recognition that citizens can contribute 
worthwhile and relevant insights which may, though not necessarily,328 improve a 
decision.329  
Scholarship on deliberation is vast and the arguments for it are impossible to 
condense here but the following key ideas are briefly noted. As a theory of 
democracy, it is concerned primarily with the legitimacy and justification of political 
authority,330 thought to be enhanced by the participation of those affected by a 
decision.331 Multiple models of ‘deliberative democracy’ have been proposed.332 
These differ in significant ways but all adhere to the basic belief that participants 
can change their preferences and values through reasoned argument designed to 
persuade one another, ultimately reaching a collective decision.333 Deliberation 
may foster the exchange of ideas,334 challenge political priorities335 and make public 
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policy responsive to public opinion through communication between the public 
sphere and the state.336 There are various rationales for deliberation. Firstly, 
‘procedural’, which argues that the procedures of deliberation are intrinsically good 
in terms of, for example, promoting a sense of ownership over resulting decisions 
and therefore more successful implementation,337 benefiting participants morally 
and intellectually338 and enhancing public-spirited attitudes and tolerance between 
groups.339 Secondly, ‘substantive’, which argues that deliberation can lead to better 
decisions340 and improved policy.341 Finally, ‘instrumental’, which argues that it can 
foster trust in institutions of governance of technological innovation or help 
manage negative social reactions to a (pre-made) decision,342 as discussed below. 
In the environmental sphere, the substantive rationale resembles arguments for 
the superior qualities of deliberation to solve complex environmental problems by 
recognising that in a diverse society, relevant knowledge (especially ‘situated 
knowledge’), expertise and values are widely distributed. These arguments similarly 
hold that more inclusive, deliberative decision-making processes, in which citizens’ 
contributions are valued as resources for problem-solving, could improve the 
quality of decision-making, the decisions themselves and broaden the range of 
solutions available.343 This account further recognises the centrality of values to 
deliberation and the benefits of incorporating, through deliberation, citizens’ 
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values, in framing policy questions, evaluating risks and benefits and assessing 
whether any uncertainty is worth tolerating in light of putative benefits.344 
This idea of broadening involvement is reflected in techniques suggested 
elsewhere, such as extended peer review, which involves the many stakeholders 
affected by the relevant science or technology to democratise science.345 The NRC 
itself, originator of the almost indelible risk assessment/risk management divide, 
departed in its 1996 report Understanding Risk, from this previous advice and 
emphasised ‘risk characterisation’, a responsive, analytic-deliberative process that 
deals with uncertainties in a ‘comprehensible way’.346 
Although there is evidence that the deficit model of the public understanding of 
science and the belief that scientific knowledge is objective still persist (discussed 
further in Chapters Five, Eight and Nine),347 a change in emphasis in the relationship 
between science and society has occurred. There was a shift, since the late 1990s 
from the one-way transmission of scientific information of the PUS movement, to 
a two-way dialogue, termed Public Engagement with Science (PES), or ‘new 
scientific governance’.348 This can be attributed to an acceptance in policy and 
science circles of the above findings that values are important in regulatory science 
and should be integrated into decision-making. These developments in public 
involvement have been tracked at EU level, with the shift from the 2001 ‘Science 
and Society’ Action Plan349 to ‘Science in Society’ in 2007 and then to ‘Science with 
and for Society’ under Horizon 2020.350 
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An early example of this new form of scientific governance is the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution’s 1998 report, Setting Environmental Standards.351 The 
report emphasises that lay people can contribute to defining environmental 
problems and that ‘people’s values’ are an integral part of the environmental policy 
process and should be taken into account ‘from the earliest stage’.352 This new 
approach was based on openness and transparency and was presented as a means 
of stemming the decreasing public trust in science and its use in regulation.353 The 
assumptions were that mutual education would restore public trust in science,354 
that consensus could be achieved by greater transparency, openness and public 
consultation and thereby achieve the somewhat instrumental aim (identified 
above) of diffusing subsequent public opposition to technological innovation.355 
However, due to various systemic and practical problems, it has been argued that 
the PES movement has failed to achieve its objectives.356 Firstly, understanding as 
to the required extent and timing of engagement is lacking. Engagement events, at 
least in the UK, have tended to be ‘isolated ad hoc events, disconnected from 
institutional responsibilities and decision-making procedures, which do not 
themselves change the terms, relationships and cultures of the institutions which 
make public policy’.357 They have also been described as ‘partial and limited in 
scope’,358 with mainstream policy still insulated from such engagement attempts.359 
Secondly, while it is acknowledged that concerns about (amongst other things) the 
purpose, direction and benefits of innovation need to be considered early in the 
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innovation process (‘upstream engagement’),360 it is doubtful whether true 
upstream engagement is or will be implemented,361 although it forms part of the 
innovation governance activities discussed in Chapter Three. The idea behind 
upstream engagement is that people’s values could influence or change research 
trajectories.362 However, it is often presented as a way to address the impacts of 
technology by shifting downstream questions from their traditional home in risk 
management discussions, to an earlier point in the research process.363 The 
resonance of the upstream/downstream metaphor with the linear model of 
innovation has been criticised as unhelpful in terms of its ability, genuinely, to open 
up social appraisal of technologies or to effect a departure from instrumental use 
of such processes to dissolve public opposition thereby ensuring the smooth 
commercialisation and distribution of the technology in question.364 It may also 
exacerbate social indeterminacy.365 As currently enacted, then, it may not 
represent a significant challenge to the science/society divide.366 
Thirdly, there is the risk that PES exercises are not, or are not perceived to be, 
genuine. There are doubts as to whether there is real scope for dialogue given that 
the underlying enthusiasm for a science-led society is still strong,367 and a sense 
that PES exercises pursue trust purely instrumentally, to support a pre-determined 
approach,368 discussed further in Chapters Five and Eight. In the EU specifically, the 
Commission’s commitment to PES appears to be mainly rhetorical, undermined by 
the ongoing commitment of EU institutions to reductionist understandings of 
scientific risk.369 This could indicate scepticism as to whether government is actually 
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listening, perhaps exacerbated by a governmental need to avoid accusations of bias 
by having PES exercises conducted independently.370 
Finally, the existence of such a strong link between increased engagement and 
transparency and increased public confidence in decision-making has been 
criticised as perhaps creating more criticism and scepticism.371 Indeed, instead of 
generating the much-desired consensus, public engagement can uncover areas of 
dissensus and provoke more questions about trust; a social or political benefit but 
perhaps an unexpected inconvenience for the funding institutions.372  
4.2 Unfinished business 
The above initiatives have not received resounding approval in the social science 
literature reviewed here. It is acknowledged that PES can be used both to open up 
and close down discussion over science,373 with consequences for realising its 
potential to legitimise and improve decision-making. 
Despite the, at least rhetorical, rejection of the cognitive deficit model and efforts 
to cultivate public trust in science and innovation, new incarnations of the deficit 
model appear. For example, there is now the perception of a ‘deficit’ of public 
trust.374 Arguments that PES has failed to stop the development of public mistrust 
cite, as a reason for its persistence, the failure of this approach to engender critical 
and reflexive learning among the scientific institutions involved.375 Wynne argues 
that the institutional scientific learning about its culture and assumptions, which 
was supposed to form half of the two-way process of new scientific governance has 
failed.376 The impact of the absence of institutional self-reflection has been the 
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maintaining of various assumptions regarding risk, science, expert knowledge and 
the public and the perpetuation of the dichotomies between facts/values, or 
rational science/irrational publics, discussed in Chapter Five. For example, 
embarking on public engagement to regain trust may again be based on dismissing 
the genuineness of public concerns and defining the problem as ‘lack of trust rather 
than lack of trustworthiness’.377 
Another incarnation is the ‘public deficit of understanding of the scientific process’. 
This purports to explain public opposition to technological innovation as a desire 
for science to provide absolute certainty and safety, which, when it becomes 
apparent that this is asking too much of science, also results in mistrust.378 As 
discussed above, however, the public are in fact able to accept, and act under, 
uncertain conditions. Wynne has described all forms of the deficit model as 
‘institutional alibis’, employed by scientific institutions to avoid taking responsibility 
for their role in creating the mistrust. It also allows them to avoid engaging in the 
necessary self-reflection and to continue viewing all public concerns as scientific 
matters.379 He argues that the proper description of ‘public rejection of science’ is 
‘public rejection of commitments based on value commitments that are 
misunderstood and misrepresented by scientists and policy experts as if solely 
scientifically determined’.380 This lack of self-reflection contributes to public 
mistrust by denying firstly, the contingencies of scientific knowledge, secondly, the 
limits of scientific knowledge and its lack of predictive control381 and thirdly, the 
fact that scientific methods are as much based on assumptions, biases and 
preferences as are public attitudes to risk. 
Secondly, public dissatisfaction at the reduction of their valid concerns to scientific 
issues has been cited as a separate cause of public mistrust.382 While public 
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concerns are given short shrift, expert positions have been presented as 
incontestable, reinforcing the traditional divide between experts and the lay public, 
and elevating the former relative to the latter.383 So, it is concluded, public mistrust 
stems from the behaviour of the institutions responsible for innovation, regulation 
and engagement and their relationship with the public.384 Indeed, mistrust may 
relate not so much to science but rather to its governance.385  
Thirdly, while research has revealed that one of the key factors in the development 
of public attitudes to risk is the benefits of the technology in question, it has been 
argued that ‘social benefits are simply assumed by dint of someone’s wish to 
advance a product for approval through the regulatory process’.386 Thus, highly 
arguable benefits are excluded from discussion and public trust is damaged through 
the lack of acknowledgement of the ‘provocatively exaggerated role for science as 
provider of public meaning’.387 
5. Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrates the inadequacy of risk assessment as sole 
authority and knowledge-provider for regulatory decision-making and the weight 
of issues risk has inappropriately been required to support. It shows the huge range 
of other factors and concerns which have a bearing on any regulatory decision 
regarding technologies. Many considerations have been identified as composing 
public attitudes to risk and, while this approach has been criticised for reinforcing 
the notion that the question is always all about risk, these considerations do need 
to be factored into regulatory decisions. Furthermore, public attitudes and their 
component concerns may not exist as an isolated object of study but rather as a 
reaction to institutional behaviour and the characterisation of those same publics 
and their concerns, which raises deeper questions of trust between actors and the 
purposes of research. Again, both are matters which are relevant in decision-
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making and which risk assessment is unable to read. In addition, the criticism of risk 
assessment in terms of its claimed objectivity and its inability to tackle various types 
of uncertainty further highlight its limitations. 
These are the arguments for reviewing and adapting the way decisions are made in 
the regulation of technology and which, politically, the EU broadly acknowledges, 
as discussed in Chapter Three. As argued, progress has been made in recognising 
and adopting some of the findings of social science. However, clearly more is 
needed. New developments are afoot, in particular in innovation governance, both 
academically and at EU level, also discussed further in Chapter Three. These are the 
arguments too which, despite acknowledgement in policy, play a muted and 
diminished role (if any) in practice, as I aim to show and analyse in the remainder 
of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three – The EU’s policy commitment 
1. Introduction 
This chapter serves two purposes. Firstly, it sets out the EU’s general intentions to 
look beyond safety concerns, as established by regulatory science, in governing 
innovation, science and technology. Section 2 fulfils this purpose and concentrates 
on the EU’s current policy mission to construct a framework for innovation 
governance founded on responsibility. This discussion supports a more general 
appreciation of EU policy ambitions relevant to enhancing socio-technical 
integration. It also provides context for the more specific policies, examined in the 
remainder of this chapter, pertaining to the two example technologies explored in 
this thesis. 
The most important purpose of this chapter, then, is to set out and discuss the 
policy frameworks for the two example technologies and their regulatory regimes 
examined in Section II. Both frameworks stem from discourses with strong potential 
for introducing concerns and values, other than those relating to safety, into 
decision-making which could counter narrow commercial or market values.  
In section 3, I examine the EU’s policy ambition to open up research and decision-
making relating to synthetic biology. I focus, in particular, on specific initiatives to 
govern research in accordance with the principles of Responsible Research and 
Innovation (RRI, sometimes referred to as ‘Responsible Innovation’ or ‘RI’) and its 
potential to enhance socio-technical integration. I argue that both synthetic biology 
itself and its policy exhibit an explicit commitment to openness; to other 
perspectives, participants and collectively defined goals. It is against this 
commitment that I assess the regulatory regime in Chapter Five.  
In section 4, I examine EU policy on the sustainable use of pesticides. I discuss the 
policy ambition to achieve sustainable use in the context of broader academic and 
political discourse on sustainability. I argue that this policy ambition and the 
expectations which the phrase ‘sustainable use’ imports by virtue of the discourse 
on sustainable development and sustainability indicate genuine potential to 
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enhance socio-technical integration here. It is against this potential that I assess the 
regulation of pesticide use in Chapter Four. 
For simplicity, I refer throughout the chapter to the ‘EU’ and the ‘Commission’ as 
originators of the policy discussed, though I acknowledge that neither is monolithic, 
nor always univocal. 
2. EU science and innovation policy 
2.1 Risk regulation, innovation governance and their relationship 
European policy seeking to better integrate a societal and/or ethical dimension into 
‘science’ (in its broadest possible terms) can be dated as far back as 1987 and the 
Second Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development.388 
Apparently responding to the findings and recommendations of research discussed 
in Chapter Two, subsequent research policy has increasingly demanded enhanced 
socio-technical integration.389 
The tenor and intentions of EU science policy until the present have remained, in 
many ways, consistent with this original vision to extend the gaze of science, 
innovation and its governance to ‘non-safety’ concerns, as seen in the new 
emphasis on shared responsibility and cooperation discernible in EU science 
policy,390 discussed below. However, the location has shifted from a focus split 
between research science and regulatory science to concentration on opening 
upstream research and innovation systems, as recommended by the hefty 2007 
Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously,391 in recognition of the necessity of 
                                                          
 
388 Hannot Rodríguez, Erik Fisher and Daan Schuurbiers, ‘Integrating Science and Society in 
European Framework Programmes: Trends in Project-Level Solicitations’ (2013) 42 Research 
Policy 1126, 1127. 
389 ibid 1127–1128; early examples include: Commission, Science and Society (n 349); 
TRUSTNET 2, ‘Towards Inclusive Risk Governance’ (2004) EUR 21024/1; Commission, 
‘Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe’ (2000) Commission Working Document 
SEC(2000) 1973. 
390 Council Decision establishing the specific programme implementing Horizon 2020 - the 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) [2013] OJ L347/965 pt V 
(Horizon 2020 - specific programme). 
391 EGSG (n 6). 
78 
 
debating not only the implications of science and innovation but also their 
processes and trajectories.392 
There are various reasons for this shift in focus. It is a response to the 
transformative potential of science and technology which generates and sustains 
Ulrich Beck’s risk society,393 and the shortcomings of traditional methods of 
managing risks which have frequently failed to predict such profound impacts,394 
prompting reassessment of ‘linear models of science and innovation policy and the 
social contract for science’.395 This, it is argued, requires anticipatory governance, 
including participatory debate on the world we are creating with innovation.396 It 
explicitly links risk to responsibility397 and reimagines responsibility in 
(environmental) regulation or governance as future-orientated care and 
‘responsiveness’.398 This constitutes a shift from mechanisms of retrospective 
liability and accountability, including risk-based regulation,399 codes of conduct and 
ethical review;400 the traditional framework for ensuring responsibility in scientific 
research, which struggles to cope with the complexity and uncertainty (in all its 
forms) of technological innovation risks and environmental problems.401 
Responsiveness is characterised by openness to the commitments, concerns and 
perspectives of others and a willingness to rethink one’s own,402 usually precluded 
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by current approaches to governing science and innovation.403 It is inclusive404 and, 
it is argued, better able to accommodate uncertainty and reflection on the 
purposes and values underlying research and innovation.405 It recognises further 
that risk, as originating in technological and social systems,406 demands 
responsibility shared among scientists, funders, innovators and others,407 and that 
innovation raises questions which are trans-scientific, i.e. they extend beyond 
issues of risk to fundamental questions about direction, application and control.408 
While responsibility sharing may not remove risk, it may ‘negate extreme 
opposition to innovation’ and ‘enhance anticipatory governance by conferring 
greater legitimacy’.409 
This thesis focuses on the use of regulatory science in decision-making, in other 
words, ‘downstream’ regulation. However, the growing focus on upstream 
governance of innovation invites attention for several reasons. Firstly, as discussed, 
this is now the object of much policy and scholarly energy and optimism. Secondly, 
as a reaction to the shortcomings of traditional risk regulation, it forms essential 
context for discussing current approaches to risk regulation in the EU. Thirdly, for 
this reason, it represents, in principle, a commitment to acknowledging these 
shortcomings and an acceptance of the worth of contributions from sources 
external to professional scientific communities. Finally, this recognition-in-principle 
creates a reasonable expectation that it should be reflected in other areas of 
technology governance and regulation. After all, regulatory science is still science 
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and as such, for example, remains subject to frequent policy calls for ‘ongoing’ 
engagement410 or deliberation for their alleged benefits, discussed in Chapter Two.  
Policy and scholarship on innovation governance, along with the parade it has 
spurred of projects, initiatives, codes, guidelines, declarations etc., are rarely 
explicit about their implications for risk regulation. However, risk regulation is 
acknowledged to be an important part of responsible innovation, despite its 
limitations411 and it is likely that responsible innovation will require the adaptation 
of downstream regulation.412 Self-regulation or soft law, for example, may be a 
good place to start by encouraging anticipation, ‘proactive management of 
emerging risks’ and flexibility, leading eventually to hard regulation on the basis of 
the knowledge gained.413 Indeed, the two may often be interdependent and the 
latter preferred for its ability to generate stability and certainty in complex and 
uncertain situations, although the prior existence of hard legislative frameworks 
may in fact constrain the ability of the former to challenge the regulatory status 
quo.414 
Innovation governance explicitly assumes responsibility for anticipating and 
responding to the potential impacts of innovation. That responsibility, currently 
shouldered by risk regulation, is no lighter a burden when borne upstream. 
Innovation governance itself has limits relating to, for example, scale, speed of 
innovation and the timing and purpose of engagement.415 Ultimately, innovation 
governance and risk regulation are part of the same continuum. Each diverse 
opportunity for intervention, equally valuable yet insufficient, requires a bespoke 
                                                          
 
410 For example, Commission, Life Sciences and Biotechnology - A Strategy for Europe (EUR-
OP 2002) 20 (Life Sciences Strategy); Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions 
and Roadmap of 26 November 2002 for a Strategy on Life Sciences and Biotechnology 
(2003/C 39/05)’ para IA (Life Sciences Roadmap). Ozoliņa and others (n 10) 16 and 
references therein. 
411 Owen and others, ‘A Framework for Responsible Innovation’ (n 395) 32. 
412 Lee and Petts (n 408) 160. 
413 ibid 154–155; Lee, ‘Look at Mother Nature’ (n 396) 116. 
414 Elen Stokes, ‘Demand for Command: Responding to Technological Risks and Scientific 
Uncertainties’ (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 11. 
415 Lee and Petts (n 408) 158–160. 
81 
 
governance toolkit ‘responsive to changing societal views and expectations about 
technologies’.416  
Various upstream tools now gathered under the banner of innovation governance 
(for example, constructive and real-time technology assessment417) were 
developed to complement downstream regulation418 and enable the necessary 
burden-sharing by coupling, for example, more anticipatory activities such as 
‘horizon scanning’ with risk governance mechanisms. Horizon scanning and risk 
analysis should, ideally, be inter alia continuous and framed ‘socially’, for example 
through stakeholder engagement.419 Furthermore, wider, soft governance 
mechanisms work with hard law regulation throughout the innovation 
process/system.420 Finally, where the relevant regulation allows ‘other legitimate 
factors’ to be considered in decision-making,421 the outcomes of innovation 
governance activities could be expressed in this context.422 There seems to be 
genuine potential, then, for an uninterrupted and coherent flow throughout the 
innovation-regulation governance ‘stream’; an appropriate response too, to 
Collingridge’s dilemma of control423 in which action – neither upstream nor 
downstream alone – is sufficient to achieve a desirable level of social control. 
More pragmatically, while nascent innovation governance and senescent risk 
governance co-exist (as discussed, in particular, in Chapter Five) they should 
operate according to a consistent set of principles. This thesis therefore proceeds 
on the assumption that, as much of the discourse on innovation governance aims 
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to reform the relationship between science and society and open up the 
assumptions and commitments underlying ‘ostensibly ‘neutral’, ‘objective’, 
scientific activities’,424 its precepts should apply equally to regulatory science,425 
though the risks associated with technological innovation are by no means its 
starting point.426 Crucially, governance upstream should not be used as a distraction 
from the persistently thorny problems of risk regulation. In other words, we should 
see a commitment to the principles explored below in downstream regulation, both 
in recognition of its potential benefits and in the interests of consistency 
throughout the innovation-governance stream. 
2.2 EU policy on innovation, science and society 
Perhaps the most prominent policy commitment is to using science and innovation 
to tackle grand societal challenges.427 The EU also commits to pursuing research 
and innovation in accordance with societal goals and ethical values.428 The 
emphasis on tackling grand challenges to justify investment in research and 
innovation is novel in the EU.429 It responds to questions often raised, but raised 
too late, during risk regulation about the purposes of the research, the need for the 
innovation and its alleged benefits. These questions are likely to influence public 
tolerance of uncertainty and risk, as discussed in Chapter Two. Indeed, the 
Commission’s 2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principle, recognised this 
with its reference ‘to the relevance of ‘all pertinent factors’ in situations of scientific 
uncertainty’ including ‘“socio-economic information, technological perspectives”, 
and perception of risk, efficiency or social acceptability…’.430 
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Secondly, the EU commits to espousing openness and inclusion in innovation and 
science.431 With respect to innovation, for the EU this means combining ideas and 
knowledge from different actors to co-create products and find solutions to societal 
needs, creating shared economic and social values based on a citizen and user-
centric approach.432 This approach, in principle, acknowledges public capacity to 
define ‘the public interest and social benefit in technoscientific domains’433 (inching 
towards unifying science and society previously dichotomised as 
experts/innovators and consumers of innovation) and the socially-distributed 
nature of knowledge,434 a recognition lacking in current models of risk 
assessment.435 With respect to science, this includes, for example, making science 
more responsive to societal and economic expectations,436 an aim closely linked to 
targeting grand challenges, and wider circulation of knowledge437 potentially 
enhancing societal responses to unexpected turns of events438 and, perhaps, the 
opening up of risk assessment. 
The EU also commits, via its ‘Science with and for Society’ (SwafS) programme, 
firstly to broader engagement between the public, policy-makers and scientists, 
particularly in relation to future and emerging technologies,439 as a means to 
‘anticipate and clarify political, societal and ethical issues’440 and secondly, to 
reflection and debate to aid understanding of the place of science and technology 
in society.441 Again, this is linked to a desire to involve all sections of society in 
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setting the research agenda.442 The Life Sciences Strategy called for societal scrutiny 
and open dialogue on research in the life sciences and biotechnology.443 The EU 
promises, furthermore, that ’[s]afety assessment and the management of overall 
risks in the deployment of [nanotechnology and biotechnology] will be 
systematically addressed’.444 With respect to the implications of these policies 
specifically for risk assessment, while ‘systematically addressed’ is vague, overall 
they do indicate an appetite for opening up the current expert-driven, safety-
focused risk assessment to being more sensitive to collaboratively defined risks. 
The EU also recognises the diversity of ethical acceptability among Member 
States445 and confirms the value of dialogue on research ethics.446 References to 
ethics abound, particularly to support from the European Group on Ethics,447 
although its influence on the negotiation of legislation or the regulatory process in 
the context of nanotechnology, at least, appears to have been slight.448 
These commitments are reinforced, generally, by the diffusion of RRI throughout 
EU policy.449 RRI will be discussed in greater detail in relation to synthetic biology. 
For now, however, it acts to some extent, as an umbrella concept for the policy 
intentions and mechanisms discussed here, including transformation of institutions 
on risk (as well as ethics and innovation) from expert-domination to open 
deliberation.450 
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2.3 Summary 
As discussed in Chapter One, the gap between policy and practice in risk regulation 
is problematic. While much of the EU’s most up-to-date science policy refrains from 
explicit discussion of its intentions vis-à-vis the regulation of emerging 
technologies, clear and applicable principles emerge. These include openness and 
inclusion, collaboration and cooperation in defining societal needs, research 
trajectories and risks, shared responsibility, anticipation and (ideally continuous) 
deliberation for its ability to enhance the legitimacy of research funding.451 The 
emanation of these principles from an area of science policy pertaining to 
innovation and science-society interactions further upstream and the fact that 
extraordinary energy and resources are being thrown behind changing innovation 
systems arguably casts risk regulation as outmoded by comparison, renders the gap 
more acute, and intensifies the imperative for moulding the contours of risk 
assessment to fit this new governance jigsaw puzzle. This is all the more so because 
there are specific commitments to upstream engagement on risks, the outcomes of 
which should work to (re)shape downstream risk regulation.  
3. Enhancing socio-technical integration in synthetic biology: EU policy and RRI 
3.1 The open ethos of synthetic biology 
Aside from the difference in approach to genetic engineering that characterises 
synthetic biology (see Chapter Five), the discipline often distinguishes itself by 
adopting ‘openness’ as a guiding principle. This openness manifests in two distinct 
respects; in relation to intellectual property rights and engagement with publics. 
Briefly, with respect to the former, the difficulties posed to research by the 
presence of patents are known452 and various initiatives respond to these 
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difficulties by establishing synthetic biology as an open-source discipline and by 
fostering an ethos of sharing (of information, knowhow and biological ‘parts’) 
amongst researchers.453  
With respect to the latter, for many in the synthetic biology community, a 
community publicly perceived as inaccessible and aloof,454 public engagement is the 
sine qua non of continuing research.455 The BioBricks Foundation, for example 
pursues a mission to engineer biology in ‘an open and ethical manner to benefit all 
people and planet’.456 The iGEM competition too has been at the forefront of the 
move to embed public engagement in synthetic biology research. Its website 
declares ‘the field of synthetic biology demands thoughtful public engagement and 
dialogue, educating while inviting public input to shape the direction of research’. 
Thus undergraduate teams competing to create biological machines are 
encouraged to go ‘beyond the bench’ to incorporate ethics, sustainability, social 
justice and education in their projects.457 
In the EU, the move to a more open ethos can be seen in the adoption of RRI as a 
framework for the governance of synthetic biology research. RRI is a specific 
manifestation of the policy shift described in section 2 and grows out of the fertile 
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STS research of the previous few decades.458 René von Schomberg proposes the 
following definition: 
Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by 
which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other 
with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of 
the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper 
embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society).459 
RRI has four dimensions: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness.460 
Anticipation involves considering ‘contingency, what is known, what is likely, what 
is plausible and what is possible’ through, inter alia upstream engagement.461 
Reflexivity requires actors and institutions to reflect on their ‘own activities, 
commitments and assumptions, [be] aware of the limits of knowledge and [be] 
mindful that a particular framing of an issue may not be universally held’.462 
Inclusion, as the term suggests, establishes a place for public engagement, 
deliberation and dialogue in the governance of innovation.463 Responsiveness 
requires that research and innovation ‘change shape or direction in response to 
stakeholder and public values and changing circumstances’ aided by work in the 
previous three dimensions464 and directly challenges the policy discourse which 
indiscriminately demands more research to spur economic growth.465 These four 
dimensions, delineated in scholarship, have metamorphosed, in the EU’s hands, 
into requiring research and innovation that is: diverse and inclusive; anticipative 
and reflective; open and transparent; and responsive and adaptive to change.466 
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Openness is an emerging feature of RRI467 and the explicit emphasis again 
reinforces the European policy goal to open up its science and innovation.  
3.2 EU policy on synthetic biology 
RRI has been enthusiastically adopted in EU policy on synthetic biology, most 
notably its SYNENERGENE project on the governance of synthetic biology, and many 
of its aims reflect the broad dimensions defined above. Speaking to inclusion, 
citizens are regarded as ‘co-creators’ of responsible research and innovation in 
synthetic biology,468 echoing the EU’s overarching policy goal of open innovation 
and reflecting the collective nature of both innovation and responsibility.469 This 
project also emphasises early and open dialogue, engagement and mutual learning 
processes with a wide variety of stakeholders,470 the results of which will be made 
available to policy makers so that the views of citizens are systematically taken into 
account.471 Elsewhere, the need is emphasised for participation at ‘all levels dealing 
with the planning, implementation, dissemination and use of synthetic biology 
research’.472 The benefits of early public engagement are familiar.473 Specifically, 
however, inclusion aims to address a persistent sense of powerlessness amongst 
publics over, for example, which kinds of research receive funding and for whose 
interests, though it is questionable how much progress intensified institutional 
efforts to include have made.474 It should also demand not just involvement of 
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diverse groups but that the topics up for discussion ‘reflect the full range of 
aspirations and concerns’ held by the participants and the way the dialogue is 
framed, for example the breadth of questions and range of alternatives.475  
Demonstrating a commitment to anticipation, SYNENERGENE aims to be strongly 
future-orientated.476 It has, for example, collaborated with iGEM by stimulating 
teams to consider future opportunities for innovation (and their impacts) in the 
context of societal problems by employing different innovation governance 
‘tools’.477 The value of mechanisms for anticipation lies in their ability to prompt 
consideration of contingencies, likely, plausible, possible and desirable futures 
alongside ‘recognition of the complexities and uncertainties of science and society’s 
co-evolution’.478 Anticipation also contributes to shaping ‘agendas for socially-
robust risk research’479 and products.480 Foresight exercises such as technology 
assessment, particularly if deliberative, could help identify the ‘right impacts’ (or 
negative impacts)481 or knowledge gaps or improve the decision-making process482 
in order to ‘reduce the human cost of trial and error’.483  
Reflexivity appears in the desire to encourage scientists to consider their purposes 
and motivations as well as alternatives to a synthetic biology approach.484 
Furthermore, it is not just research in which stakeholders participate as co-creators, 
but in regulatory frameworks themselves in ensuring they are ‘aligned with societal 
needs and expectations’.485 This perhaps follows proposals to move towards 
‘governing in the public interest’ as an antidote to unreflective use by policy-makers 
of new science governance procedures for instrumental ends and a recognition that 
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public concerns often relate to how science is governed as opposed, simply, to 
individual technologies per se.486 Public engagement may be fruitful in engendering 
reflexivity throughout the innovation-regulation stream by confronting researchers 
and policy-makers with alternative value-framings challenging ‘assumptions of 
scientific amorality and agnosticism’.487 Alternative methods exist too, for example, 
the EPSRC’s pilot requirement for ‘risk registers’ in nanoscience funding 
applications, in which applicants reflect on the wider implications of their research 
and assess potential risks, and which aim to embed anticipatory and participatory 
approaches and early adaptive management without squashing research.488  
The quest for the ‘right impacts’ appears in the desire to foster responsiveness in 
considering how to shape research and innovation according to societal needs, how 
to define those needs (recognising that societal challenges, for example may be 
contested489), and how to embed social aims in research.490 It aims to understand 
public concerns, is collaborative and seeks to align processes and outputs with the 
needs, values and expectations of society.491 Responding to evolving public values 
or circumstances492 may occur for example through midstream modulation493 or 
checkpoints at each developmental stage of research.494  
Even without RRI, policy emphasises socio-technical integration throughout 
synthetic biology research,495 including downstream where regulation may need to 
be adapted.496 Timely and reflexive consideration of the ethical aspects of 
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innovation is regarded as beneficial for its capacity to aid ‘value-sensitive’ 
technological design. Where ethical concerns are raised early enough, they may be 
incorporated as a design factor, for example in ICT where privacy is becoming a 
design principle,497 and prevent expensive rejection of insufficiently value-sensitive 
technologies.498 David Guston argues that anticipation should encompass 
‘speculative ethics’, that is, enquiring of a particular line of research/innovation 
‘why might it be done, and if it is to be done, how best to do it’ and creatively 
contemplating its possible, uncertain futures, before its material outputs (and their 
potential implications) are likely or imminent, in order to focus discussion on 
responsibility.499 More profoundly, without broad engagement in speculative 
ethics, definition of the emergent field may be ceded to an exclusive cadre of 
established participants whose vision may (wittingly) perpetuate present 
injustices.500  
Uncertainty and the place of precaution are also acknowledged.501 In an RRI 
context,502 the precautionary principle can be seen not as dampening innovation 
but as a goad to action, aiding consideration of alternatives,503 pursing new risk 
research or identifying knowledge gaps.504 In Chapter Five, I argue that downstream 
regulation can influence upstream innovation and governance systems. The 
precautionary principle operating as an incentive to create safe and sustainable 
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products505 could stand as an example of this effect. Furthermore, anticipatory 
engagement in the context of uncertain and unpredictable innovation is argued to 
reframe the ethical model governing innovation from consequentialist to virtue 
ethics in terms both of the innovator and the values instilled in the innovation, 
opening up discussion on purposes and space for uncertainty.506 
4. Enhancing socio-technical integration in pesticide use: EU policy and 
sustainability507 
EU policy on regulating pesticides has long been framed in terms of achieving 
sustainability. The 1993 Fifth Environmental Action Programme (5EAP), the first 
European sustainable development strategy in all but name,508 recognised the 
problems, in terms of cost and pollution, of systematic use of pesticides509 and 
sought reduction to the point where none of the processes indispensable for 
sustainable agriculture and important for nature conservation were affected.510 
Overall, the 5EAP pushed towards an ambitious conception of sustainability which 
entailed ‘continued economic and social development without detriment to the 
environment’, sensitivity to the ‘real socio-economic effects and values of 
consumption and conservation’, ‘equitable distribution and use of resources’ and 
socio-economic well-being across generations.511 It acknowledged, furthermore, 
that political, economic and social trends all contribute to environmental problems 
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and that human values and behaviour are the root cause.512 The Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme (6EAP) contained a more reductive vision of the 
sustainable use of pesticides, confined principally to mitigating the impacts of 
pesticide use on human health and the environment, though this was expressed as 
a separate policy goal to generally achieving ‘more sustainable use of pesticides’ 
which implied something more ambitious, albeit vague.513 
The 2002 Communication Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of 
Pesticides reiterated this objective, similarly formulated.514 The underlying policy 
goals are primarily safety-orientated,515 although there is a call to develop ‘a plant 
protection practise [sic] that fits into the concept of sustainable agriculture 
including social and economic dimensions’,516 recognising both the multi-
functionality of agriculture517 and the relevance of factors outside the realm of 
safety, though in the absence of further detail we are left to speculate what 
precisely this goal entails. The socio-economic benefits of pesticides and the costs 
to the environment and human health are rehearsed.518 These impacts and their 
asymmetric characterisation (goods are socio-economic; bads are 
environmental/health-related) are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. For 
now however, the point is that, though safety is prime, the non-safety dimension 
(including the distribution of risks and benefits, the uncertainty haunting 
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assessments of pesticide risk519 and the dependence of agriculture on chemical 
inputs520) is at least recognised. Finally, policy acknowledges the value of broad 
participation in developing risk/use reduction plans,521 discussed further in Chapter 
Four. 
Although sometimes in vague terms, then, the multi-dimensionality and social 
embeddedness of pesticide use is recognised. This is reinforced, to a certain extent, 
by general EU policy on sustainable development. For example, the 6EAP explicitly 
acknowledges the relevance of the social and economic alongside the 
environmental522 and the value of broad societal participation.523 Four years later, 
the Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy asserted the importance of 
solidarity within and between generations, public participation in decision-making, 
the integration of the three pillars of sustainable development into regulation524 
and of further research into the interplay between social, economic and ecological 
systems.525 Similar, if vague, commitments re-emerge in the Commission’s latest 
Communication on sustainable development526 which seeks to implement the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.527 
The adoption of sustainable development as an overarching policy goal and the 
range of concerns addressed in the policy framework leave no doubt that non-
safety goals are firmly within the EU’s sights. There is more, however. The language 
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of sustainability houses a rich content inherited from the previous several decades 
of discourse which could form the foundations of a regime in which the myriad 
concerns raised by pesticide use are considered and addressed. In order to fully 
realise the potential of sustainability in the regulation of pesticides then, full 
engagement with this discourse should attend the EU’s employment of the 
language of sustainability in the relevant policy and legislation. It is this potential 
which the remainder of this section discusses. While there is, of course, much more 
to sustainability and sustainable development beyond the elements I discuss 
below,528 I highlight those which, I argue, demonstrate its usefulness in regulating 
pesticide use. These are: its three dimensions, its normativity and the centrality of 
inter- and intra-generational equity. Much of the discourse relating to sustainability 
uses the terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ interchangeably, or 
without delineating a boundary between the two.529 I use the term ‘sustainability’, 
but have drawn on literature which employs both terms, in analysing the EU’s law 
and policy on ‘sustainable use’ of pesticides. Ultimately, the policy develops a 
decreasingly ambitious concept of sustainability as applied to pesticide use until 
reaching the vision of sustainable use in the SUD which, as argued in Chapter Four, 
bears little resemblance to the early policy ambitions530 and the rich content 
explored below.  
4.1 The three dimensions 
The overarching draw of sustainability, with respect to the regulation of pesticide 
use, is its acknowledgement of the relevance of social, economic and 
environmental dimensions. Sustainability arose in the 1980s to ‘dissolve the 
conflicts between environmental and economic values’531 and its popularity stems 
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from its optimistic linking of the environment and development532 by ‘bundling 
together environmental, social and economic policy strands’.533 Much debate over 
sustainable development has focused on the three ‘mutually reinforcing’ pillars of 
social well-being, economic growth and environmental protection, whether they 
are equal or whether one, particularly the environment pillar, enjoys priority.534 
Although there is no overall consensus as to the meaning of sustainable 
development535 (or sustainability), the ‘official’ policy view, in the EU and 
internationally, appears to endorse equality between the pillars,536 encouraging the 
balancing and prioritisation of aims, during decision-making, in response to given 
circumstances. The EU Court of Justice has, to a certain extent, demonstrated 
willingness to engage in balancing exercises where commercial economic interests 
are involved. For example, in First Corporate Shipping, AG Léger opined that 
sustainable development did not mean that the environment should always prevail 
over other interests but rather that interests should be balanced and reconciled.537 
However, consideration of such commercial economic issues does not guarantee 
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that the court will take into account broader economic or distributive issues. Nor 
does it address the difficulty of calculating the costs of a particular activity. 
Sustainability’s economic dimension should encourage careful and open 
consideration of the range of costs of pesticide use, acknowledging the inevitable 
uncertainties. The social dimension of sustainability should likewise encourage 
consideration of the social implications of pesticide use.538 
Even if the changing priority, or the equal strength, of the three dimensions, leaves 
sustainability without a clear direction,539 this is a question of hierarchy, not a 
challenge to the fundamental relevance of each dimension. The discussion here 
does not take a view on this point, but simply highlights the value of sustainability 
for its treatment of all these dimensions (as opposed to, for example, the 
environment alone) as relevant in decision-making. Mere relevance of these 
dimensions may seem to be a normatively weak position if the aim is to require 
technology regulation, often dominated by risk and safety considerations,540 
genuinely to engage with the broader social and economic impacts of the 
technology in question. Furthermore, from an environmental perspective, 
sustainability may not necessarily lead to a greener outcome as it can increase the 
importance of economic considerations relative to environmental 
considerations.541 However, decision-making guided by a principle which explicitly 
treats a broader range of considerations as relevant, and which construes such 
considerations themselves broadly, would represent progress towards greater 
socio-technical integration, provided it included, with respect to pesticides, all 
impacts of use and the social, economic and environmental interests of society.  
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4.2 Sustainability and values 
The regulatory pursuit of ‘sustainable use’ immediately raises the question: ‘what 
is sustainable and how should it be achieved and judged?’ It has been asserted that 
what is sustainable can be determined and measured scientifically,542 by 
establishing ecological limits, thresholds etc., and/or by using economic models 
which measure growth.543 This is the approach adopted throughout much of 
European environmental policy-making. For example, the Seventh Environmental 
Action Programme (7EAP) aims to be based on scientific knowledge,544 and the 
analysis in the Commission’s Impact Assessment of the Thematic Strategy on the 
Sustainable Use of Pesticides has a strong economic bent.545 Despite the inclusion 
of references to citizen involvement in the 7EAP,546 the need to understand socio-
economic and environmental factors and individual and societal behaviour is 
expressed as a technical exercise of filling a data gap.547 Full public debate is 
reserved for the later risk management stage of regulation.548 
Sustainability is not just a question of science or economics; it is political and value-
based.549 Measuring sustainability has been interpreted as depending on what we 
think matters. What we think matters is the thing whose value must be 
maintained.550 The point is illustrated by Andrew Dobson’s discussion of thresholds, 
in which he argues that science can identify whether a particular practice will 
breach a particular threshold, but not whether the element to which the threshold 
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applies ‘matters’.551 The latter judgment is a question of values. In other words, the 
fruits of scientific research and economic data about growth and welfare levels, 
though vital, are purely descriptive and cannot resolve fundamental ideological 
disagreements over what needs to be maintained in order to achieve 
sustainability.552 Disagreement is further exacerbated by the presence of 
uncertainty over, for example, the impacts of human activity553 or the way natural 
capital stocks work554 (if indeed we agree on sustaining natural capital to achieve 
sustainability), or the behaviour of pesticides. This uncertainty limits the utility of 
tools such as indicators and technical expertise. 
Determining what constitutes ‘sustainable use of pesticides’ must involve scientific 
expertise for sure, but expertise should be prised open and applied using the tools 
and principles described in sections 2 and 3. For example, open, early and reflective 
dialogue between experts, stakeholders and publics, on the meaning of 
sustainability as applied to pesticide use, the outcomes of which could guide, 
examine and challenge expert advice or develop indicators, a key tool for 
implementing and measuring progress under the SUD.555 Furthermore, decision-
making should look beyond establishing numerical values for sustainability, 
towards the context of, and the range of considerations bearing on, the use of 
pesticides, to ensure breadth in regulation. This could also be addressed, pre-
legislation, through inclusive deliberation, perhaps alongside a report specifically 
commissioned to examine, for example, distributive socio-economic impacts of 
pesticides use and the attitudes of different publics to pesticide use and their 
values. Such initiatives are precisely what I argue the three dimensions of 
sustainability in decision-making are designed to promote and support.  
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Debate over what matters in relation to pesticide use should include broad political 
discussion of the level and type of pesticide use which equates to sustainable use 
and the practices and goals required to achieve it. It should also be acknowledged 
that values transform over time and legislation should be able to adapt to evolution 
in the meaning of sustainable use and society’s changing values and priorities, not 
just advances in technology and science. (Indeed, taking a leaf out of the innovation 
governance book, developments in pesticide technology should adapt too.) 
Member States and the Commission, for example, could be required to revisit the 
conclusions of any public dialogue on which the prevailing interpretation of 
sustainable use was based and assess whether they hold in the light of any changes 
in attitudes, or developments in pesticide use and its regulation. 
4.3 Inter-generational and intra-generational equity 
The principle of sustainable use has traditionally been associated with conservation 
of natural resources so as to prolong their exploitation.556 Applying the term to 
pesticides then is, in some ways, a paradox. On the one hand, the intention may 
not be to eke out a scarce resource, nor to ensure that pesticide use can continue 
forever, especially since the SUD also aims to reduce pesticide use.557 On the other 
hand, a non-pesticide-resistant insect population is an important resource to 
preserve.558 However, with respect to pesticides generally, the search for 
sustainability focuses primarily on ensuring that the sustained existence and 
welfare of everything pesticides touch (people, nature, agriculture, communities, 
public finances etc.) is not adversely affected.559  
As discussed above, there is debate over what we should maintain for the purposes 
of sustainability, fuelled by our ignorance of what future generations will value and 
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indeed the often unknowable impacts of pesticide use. There is a convincing case 
that equality of opportunities must be maintained such that future generations may 
live according to their conceptions of ‘the good life’, by not foreclosing options 
now.560 Edith Brown Weiss makes a similar argument561 and advocates a conception 
of inter-generational equity based on the conservation of options (the diversity of 
the resource base), quality (the condition in which the natural and cultural 
environment is passed on) and access (obliging each generation to ensure equitable 
access to this legacy).562 This last principle is important for future intra-generational 
equity, as preserving options does not necessarily ensure their equitable 
distribution in the future.563 
Aspects of pesticide use which raise questions of inter-generational justice include 
the following. Firstly, the contribution that diversity makes to robustness is key to 
the principle of conservation of options.564 Dependence solely on the use of 
agrochemicals for crop protection, and indeed, the monocultures partly supported 
by pesticides, may breach this principle. Secondly and closely related, the negative 
impact on the environment and biodiversity can narrow the resource base, 
resulting in loss of options, for example for developing new products, maintaining 
the planet’s health and for enabling future generations to address their own 
problems.565 Finally, the persistence of pesticide damage shifts the costs of 
remediation onto future generations, who are unable to reap any associated 
benefits.566 There is, moreover, no guarantee that remediation will be cheaper in 
the future. These are all issues which the requirements of inter-generational equity 
could address. Indeed, the strong moral undercurrent of inter-generational equity 
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could provide an ethical context in which to evaluate the ability of current policies 
to pursue sustainability.567 
A more general problem, still relevant to pesticides, is that the lack of 
representation of future (both younger and unborn) generations in decision-
making processes means that ‘potential trade-offs between the preferences of 
present and future generations are usually ignored’.568 The particular problems 
associated with inter-generational equity should find formal expression in the 
regulation of pesticides. Despite the reference to sustainability, a large part of the 
SUD’s approach to the regulation of pesticides is risk-based, as discussed in Chapter 
Four. Technical assessments have little to say about the above, and other ‘justice’-
related questions, including inter-generational equity, a position exacerbated by 
the gaps in our knowledge about the distribution of environmental goods and 
bads.569 However, if the question of inter-generational equity becomes the object 
of genuine attention in pesticide use decision-making, it could challenge our 
technocratic decision-making procedures, or even our ways of life.570 Whether this 
occurs may depend on the openness of any discussion over sustainability under the 
auspices of the SUD and whether this endows the concept of sustainability with the 
necessary moral content. 
In terms of intra-generational equity, as discussed, the uneven distribution of the 
costs and benefits of pesticide use among members of the present generation 
deserves consideration through the social and economic dimensions of 
sustainability. Furthermore, there exists an essential connection between social 
justice and the environment,571 and this underpins more specific environmental 
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policy.572 The Commission does acknowledge the distribution problem but goes no 
further.573 The starkest examples are those of local residents bearing the burden of 
pesticide spraying in the form of air pollution, excessive spraying by one farmer 
leading to pest resistance which affects neighbouring famers or crop losses due to 
pesticides drifting to non-target crops574 and burdens can be felt far more remotely, 
by all actors in the food distribution chain.575 
Pesticides also raise questions of land use. Crop protection activities which, for 
example, unreasonably exclude members of the public from recreational use or 
aesthetic enjoyment of land may fall foul of Brown Weiss’s principle of conservation 
of access which grants members of the present generation ‘a reasonable, non-
discriminatory right of access to the natural and cultural resources of our planet’.576 
On the other hand, if transition to low-pesticide input requires extensification of 
farming (i.e. reducing inputs, such as agro-chemicals, while increasing the area of 
land farmed to maintain yields), this too has implications for land allocation.  
Finally, pesticide use affects the structure of our agricultural systems. It has 
supported continuous, simplified, large-scale farming577 and reduced the need for 
labour.578 While the Commission has characterised minimisation of labour input as 
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beneficial,579 it also recognises the importance of employment.580 Alternative 
agricultural structures exist. For example, the benefits of organic farming for 
sustainable development, consumers and social and economic development of 
rural communities, have been recognised.581 Sustainability, and the concept of 
intra-generational equity in particular, could prompt exploration of such 
alternatives to address some of the concerns related to the distributive impacts of 
pesticide use. 
5. Conclusion 
The policy areas examined above at a minimum demonstrate an openness towards 
holistic consideration of all aspects and implications of research and technological 
innovation. The discourse and policy on innovation governance, and specifically 
RRI, encompass ambitious elements and great potential for changing the conduct 
of research and innovation to address some or all of the types of societal concerns 
expressed in relation to technological innovation582 and specifically synthetic 
biology. These developments upstream have the attendant potential both to 
complement and become mirrored in downstream risk regulation. Likewise, the 
three elements of sustainability discussed above have the potential to respond to 
many of the concerns related to pesticide use, if genuinely and carefully 
implemented in legislation. Either individually or in combination, they could 
address the distribution of the impacts of pesticide use between and within 
generations, the diversity of actors involved, the importance of values when 
determining what counts as ‘sustainable’ in pesticide use and the distribution of 
information about pesticide use throughout society. They also highlight a wealth of 
means, beyond risk assessment, available to appraise this particular technology 
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(and indeed others). How far these policy ambitions are reproduced in the relevant 
regulation is the question to which the following two chapters now turn. 
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Chapter Four – European regulation of pesticides: an unambitious 
approach to sustainability583 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Three, several decades of scholarship and policy have 
populated the concept of sustainability with various, now familiar, elements. Even 
while significant details remain subject to debate, one may see, at minimum, a 
loose consensus on their relevance to sustainability. That chapter argued 
furthermore, that when used, for example in legislation or policy, sustainability 
should raise expectations that these elements will exist and exert influence.  
This chapter considers how successfully the Sustainable Use Directive (SUD) 
incorporates elements of sustainability and uses them to address the complexities 
of pesticide use, and thus, how successfully it meets expectations associated with 
sustainability. A wholesale adoption of ‘sustainability’ as a framework on which to 
hang European regulation of pesticides could provide a real spur for ambitiously 
opening up decision-making to a broad range of issues and contributions from a 
variety of sources. It thereby presents an opportunity to depart from the narrow, 
predominantly risk-based, approach commonly applied to regulation of risky 
technologies in the EU, discussed in Chapter One, and to enhance socio-technical 
integration. In terms of the overall thesis, this chapter presents a detailed analysis 
of one manifestation of the policy-practice gap and reasons for its persistence. It 
focuses on how decision-making techniques, in this context, exclude consideration 
of information other than that concerning the risks of pesticide use and values 
other than ensuring safety and environmental protection despite their relevance, 
as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Pesticides display a constellation of considerations, many, if not all, of which should 
be visible through the regulator’s telescope. I discuss these in section 2. The SUD is 
a framework directive, acknowledging the vast diversity of national conditions in 
the EU with respect to the structure of the agricultural sector, climate, geography 
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and existing national legislation.584 It is the culmination of a long period of 
development and consultation set in motion in 2002 by the 6EAP585 and operates 
alongside the 2009 Plant Protection Product Regulation.586 In section 3, I evaluate 
the SUD in light of the key elements of sustainability discussed in Chapter Three. I 
argue that the label ‘sustainable’ conceals an approach which falls far short of 
adopting such elements, and consequently realising the potential of sustainability.  
In section 4, I offer some explanations for the EU’s lack of ambition in this area. The 
SUD, I argue, contains a reductive and unimaginative approach to the 
implementation of sustainable use, which ignores the richness and ambition of the 
discourse on sustainability and its well-established elements. This potential, I argue 
further, is overlooked in favour of an approach primarily aimed at achieving 
‘efficiency’ by managing and reducing risks to human health and the environment. 
This safety-orientated approach and its unambitious ethos of ‘doing the status quo 
better’ stifles the potential of sustainability to enhance socio-technical integration 
in the EU’s regulation of pesticides. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The pesticide question 
Pesticides occupy a unique place in modern society. They are substances,587 
acknowledged to be inherently toxic, that are deliberately released into the 
environment588 both in spite of and because of their toxic properties, in pursuit of 
socio-economic benefits such as crop protection. These benefits also include the 
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production of high-quality, affordable fruit and vegetables,589 the reduction of 
labour (and labour costs) and freedom from dependence on crop rotation.590 
Overall, pesticides ‘make a significant contribution to maintaining world food 
production’.591 
Regarding the risks and costs of pesticides, those to the environment and public 
health are the most immediately obvious. Intensive agriculture, including pesticide 
use, has led to serious environmental degradation.592 The potential impacts on 
human health are well-documented,593 and include risks of direct exposure of 
workers, indirect exposure of consumers and bystanders and possible 
bioaccumulation and persistence, carcinogenicity, mutagenicity and endocrine 
disruption.594 
Regulation, for example the landmark595 adoption of the Plant Protection Product 
Directive,596 and improvements in the pesticide products themselves,597 have 
improved safety.598 However, one need only look at events within the last few years 
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in relation to neonicotinoids,599 glyphosate600 and developments in EU policy 
relating to endocrine disrupting chemicals601 to see that the impacts of pesticides 
are still sources of serious concern. More generally, other problems persist. For 
example, pesticides and their metabolites are ubiquitous; persistent 
organochlorines have been found in ecosystems distant from any industrial or 
agricultural source, raising concerns about their potential ecological effects on 
pristine ecosystems, and increasing numbers of species are developing 
resistance.602 In addition, agricultural produce still contains residues which exceed 
limit values603 and pesticides residues in water are a concern.604 
The largest battleground regarding the pesticide question is the impact on health 
and the environment. However, these impacts have repercussions beyond purely 
physical damage. One is the socio-economic costs of the intensive cultivation of a 
small variety of crops in large monocultures partially facilitated by low-cost 
pesticides; for example, the growing operating costs for farmers attempting to 
increase production.605 At the same time, distribution of the overall costs of 
pesticide use raises questions of equity.606 Farmers incur a capital outlay on 
pesticides, but the environmental and health impacts of use are borne off-site. For 
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example, consumers pay costs incurred by water companies to clean water.607 
Workers, bystanders and local residents may also sustain uncompensated damage. 
This is not just a question of intra-generational equity but also inter-generational 
equity since pesticides persist long after the associated benefits have been 
consumed.608 These distributive questions have an ethical dimension.609 To take an 
extreme example, the weight attributed to the various benefits of pesticide use, for 
example cosmetic appearance, and the various risks, for example loss of human life, 
requires ethical scrutiny.610 Likewise the eradication of, for example, entire bird 
species and bequeathing to future generations an ecologically impoverished 
world.611 
In addition, pesticides can be ineffective. For example, modern insecticides must 
be sprayed repeatedly to maintain control, sometimes leading to resistance and 
exacerbating a pest problem by killing natural enemies.612 This leads to inefficiency, 
reducing the economic return on investment in the pesticide.613 
A related concern is the level of knowledge and visibility of the costs and benefits 
of maintaining or reducing pesticide use.614 There is little data on the health and 
environmental costs of use on other sectors and interests, although the 
Commission has conducted an Impact Assessment of the Thematic Strategy on the 
Sustainable Use of Pesticides.615 There may be economic benefits to reducing 
pesticide use, for example, reduced input costs.616 However, there may also be 
disadvantages; if food prices increase, the poor will be hit worst617 and more 
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extensive agriculture may be required,618 potentially absorbing land previously 
used for other purposes, such as recreation. Visibility of such costs and benefits is 
clearly an important concern, not just in terms of economic efficiency, but in terms 
of building a clear picture of the economic distributional landscape on which to 
found a fair regulatory regime. The economic context for these trade-offs is the size 
and importance of the plant protection industry to Europe and the benefits that it 
brings in terms of, for example, employment.619 However, the consolidation of the 
agrochemical industry (including the seed industry) around the turn of the 
century,620 partly driven by more stringent regulation and consequent increased 
R&D costs,621 may also raise concerns regarding corporate control over food 
supply.622 There are also fears that industry may influence regulatory design and 
guidelines in their favour.623 
Uncertainty and indeterminacy (using Wynne’s taxonomy,624 as discussed in 
Chapter Two) characterise the environmental and health impacts (as well as costs) 
of pesticides. We still have limited knowledge about causal relationships between 
harmful products and damage to health and the environment,625 or indirect or 
cumulative effects on ecosystems. Knowledge of these effects accrues slowly and 
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can still surprise us.626 Our ignorance extends further, to the ‘underlying 
interdependencies, structures and driving forces’627 which influence pesticide use. 
Indeterminacy also extends to the social sphere. Decisions regarding pesticide 
application made by individual farmers and their actual use are absent from ex ante 
evaluation of chemicals at authorisation.628 As such, there have been calls for better 
understanding of farmer decision-making and the wide variety of factors that 
influence it, for the benefit of policy-making and regulation.629 
The relative maturity of pesticide technology is, in some ways, still important. We 
are not teetering on the edge of a technological precipice as we are with, for 
example, synthetic biology or quantum computing. Sheila Jasanoff perhaps 
encapsulates the state of play with respect to pesticides and their entrenchment in 
modern societies:  
The argument from political economy suggests how technologies can be made to 
seem apolitical. Artifacts – social no less than material ones – can become so 
hardened through design and use that the ways in which they incorporate 
political choice or economic power cease to be visible… Once a technology has 
been blackboxed and put to use, it takes unusual convulsions to make the 
underlying social choices apparent again: like a… powerful lobby of organic food 
consumers that creates a market for things grown certifiably without the aid of 
agricultural biotechnology.630  
Unlike emerging technologies, pesticides are not disruptive of our current mode of 
living, but rather constitutive of it, down to our apparent preference for 
cosmetically perfect produce. It is, for many reasons, extremely difficult to change 
course, for example away from chemical inputs towards lower input pest control 
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techniques such as integrated pest management (IPM).631 Protection of human 
health and the environment are unquestionably important.632 However, as the 
foregoing discussion illustrates, these concerns do not form the entire picture with 
respect to pesticides. According to Jasanoff, ‘the element of choice so often 
becomes invisible once a technology assumes its working form’.633 However, even 
with a well-established technology such as pesticides, we still have a choice.634 The 
opportunity to revisit our choices here depends on the ambition with which 
sustainability is conceived and implemented. 
3. The Sustainable Use Directive and European policy on sustainable pesticide use 
3.1 The meaning of ‘use’ 
Chapter Three demonstrated the potential of sustainability by discussing three of 
its elements in detail. These were a) sustainability as consisting of three 
dimensions: the social, economic and environmental; b) the importance of values 
in defining sustainability; and c) inter- and intra-generational equity. Legislation 
seeking sustainable use should exhibit at least a commitment to these elements 
and it is against these elements that I assess the SUD.  
Before proceeding to discuss the SUD’s implementation of these elements, the 
meaning of ‘use’ deserves attention. The Oxford Dictionary of English635 defines 
‘use’ as ‘take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving 
something’, with the additional meanings of ‘employ’, ‘exploit’ or ‘consume’. Use is 
a fundamental human activity and humans achieve and maintain sustenance, 
shelter, health and well-being, work and enjoyment through using their 
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surroundings. However, our methods of use are not preordained and immutable 
but reflect the values of the individual users and their societies. As with ‘sustainable 
agriculture’,636 the meaning of ‘sustainable use’ is not obvious. The meaning 
attributed to it will shape the ambition of the regime established. For example, use 
could be exclusive or common, profligate or parsimonious. Ultimately, individuals 
and societies have a choice about their patterns and objects of use and those 
choices will have, amongst others, social, economic and environmental 
consequences. 
Traditionally, ‘sustainable development’ as applied to agriculture has often simply 
meant ‘optimising (or reducing) the use of synthetic pesticides and minimising 
environmental impact’,637 or increasing ‘efficiency’.638 However, given the multi-
functionality of agriculture, the complex drivers of pesticide use,639 the existence of 
multiple considerations beyond safety and the thorough embedding of pesticide 
use in modern society, it may be reasonable to ask: is this a fitting response to the 
intricacies of pesticide use? Construing the problems of pesticide use as narrow risk 
problems and considering them in isolation of contiguous policy spheres would 
surely eviscerate sustainability of much of its content. 
My point is that pesticide use has consequences which policy and law, by adopting 
sustainability as guiding principle, seek to shape. These consequences extend 
beyond damage to health and the environment. Attaching a narrow risk- or 
efficiency-based understanding of sustainability to pesticide use fails both to 
respond to these diverse consequences and reflect what sustainability is and what 
sustainable use could be. 
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Turning to the SUD, Article 1 states that the SUD aims ‘…to achieve a sustainable 
use of pesticides’. Achievement of sustainable pesticide use rests on two sub-aims. 
Firstly, reducing the risks and impacts of pesticide use on human health and the 
environment. Secondly, promoting IPM and other alternatives to chemical 
pesticides. IPM is a pest management technique which uses all plant protection 
methods to discourage the development of pests, keeping the use of pesticides to 
‘levels that are economically and ecologically justified’ and involves minimising 
disruption of agro-ecosystems and encouragement of natural pest control.640 
The rest of the SUD provides the legislative armoury to achieve one or both of these 
sub-aims and includes requirements relating to the training and certification of 
professional users, distributors and advisors, aerial spraying, reduction of risks in 
specific protected areas and the adoption of harmonised risk indicators. However, 
the key mechanism, representing the greatest opportunity to implement the 
principles of sustainability, is the obligation, in Article 4, on each Member State to 
produce a National Action Plan (NAP) specifying how it plans to implement the 
other provisions in the Directive.641 The NAPs are shared with the Commission and 
other Member States and must be reviewed every five years.642 
3.2 Three dimensions 
As discussed above, human health and environmental impacts of pesticide use 
dominate debate, notwithstanding the clear presence of other issues. The 
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Commission’s Impact Assessment, possibly the most detailed and complex 
European document on the subject, is perhaps a qualified exception in that it does, 
sporadically and partially, consider dimensions of pesticide use beyond health and 
the environment. On the social and economic front it highlights, for example, the 
costs of damage by pesticides to health and the environment, competition and 
consumer issues and the economic impact of a ban on industry and jobs.643 
However, it is important to remember that this is an assessment of the impacts of 
regulating, not of pesticide use itself. There is some treatment, in the Impact 
Assessment, of the status quo but the asymmetry of the treatment is clear. On the 
one hand, social, economic and environmental benefits are attributed to pesticide 
use (and indeed keenly emphasised elsewhere by industry which highlights the 
economic benefits pesticides produce in terms of food production644). On the other 
hand, the types of risks acknowledged tend to be solely environmental and health-
related.645 This position is reflected in Commission Communications on the subject, 
Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides646 (Towards a 
Thematic Strategy) and A Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides647 
(The Thematic Strategy), both of which present a rather asymmetrical analysis of 
the impacts of pesticide use, focusing on the socio-economic benefits and the 
health- and environment-related harms. 
Perhaps understandably, while acknowledging the difficulty of valuing and 
measuring certain impacts of pesticide use and its regulation,648 the impacts and 
benefits of regulation are nonetheless quantified, almost exclusively, in monetary 
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terms in the Impact Assessment.649 The overall result is a detailed, but narrow and 
one-sided, numerical analysis of a complex problem. This selection of numerical 
values as a focal point over less quantifiable impacts again illustrates a general 
danger for more nuanced, open socio-economic assessments (of either the baseline 
or impacts of regulation) to become closed, technical exercises.650 Furthermore, if 
beneficial aspects of the status quo are characterised as predominantly social or 
economic and negative aspects as predominantly environmental or health-
related,651 we are left with an unbalanced and flawed basis on which to proceed, in 
which certain types of values are permanently pitched against each other.652 If 
taken seriously, sustainability could address this tendency. It could, for example, 
explicitly demand a comprehensive analysis of all impacts of pesticide use - 
beneficial, questionable and harmful - and thereby introduce some symmetry into 
the analysis of the current baseline (i.e. an analysis of all types of impacts in all 
dimensions). The same could apply to assessment of the impacts of regulating. 
There is no specific requirement, in the SUD, for the three dimensions of 
sustainability, discussed in Chapter Three, to be considered in relation to the 
impacts of pesticide use, with the aim of fully comprehending the status quo. All 
impacts of use mentioned relate either to health or the environment alone. This 
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lack is reflected overall in the infrequency in the SUD with which the term 
‘sustainable’ appears. ‘Sustainable development’ appears only once,653 and 
‘sustainable use’, substantively only once too.654 The discussion above argues that 
consideration of these elements in Commission documents prior to the 
introduction of the SUD was shallow, and, with no provision in the legislation, it 
looks unlikely to occur. By contrast, Article 4(1), fourth paragraph requires Member 
States, during their national planning processes, to consider the ‘health, social, 
economic and environmental impacts of the measures considered’. While 
acknowledgement of the relevance of these dimensions is welcome, their 
consideration is directed towards impacts of regulation, rather than actual use, and 
so not aimed at generating an understanding of the full consequences of pesticide 
use which could then be fed into decision-making. In this respect, the provision, and 
its asymmetry, may be likened to the power in REACH, discussed in Chapter One, 
to authorise substances of very high concern (which might otherwise be restricted) 
where the ‘socio-economic benefits outweigh the risks to human health or the 
environment arising from the use of the substance’.655 Here too, the broader socio-
economic impacts of regulating are considered relevant, but acknowledgement of 
these aspects of the status quo is absent. That said, consideration of such issues is 
not explicitly prohibited by the SUD and so, due to the flexibility of the national 
planning process (discussed below), could still occur.   
Instead of the three dimensions of sustainability, the emphasis in the SUD is clearly 
on risk reduction and the pursuit thereby of more efficient pesticide use, in line 
with the traditional application of sustainability to agriculture. After the mention, 
in Article 1, of the SUD’s aim to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides, elsewhere 
its purpose, for example in Articles 4 and 15(2)(c), is described as risk (or 
occasionally dependence or use) reduction. Furthermore, its other provisions, for 
example on training, inspections, protection of water, storage, do seem primarily 
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aimed at reducing risks through implementing risk management measures.656 
(Economic and social) questions beyond risk are part of the policy mix but 
predominantly through myopic acknowledgement of economic and social benefits 
of pesticide use, isolated from less commercial, distributive questions.657 Overall, 
the SUD perhaps reflects this policy imbalance and exhibits a structural favouring 
of certain economic interests: limiting reasons for regulation to risk may reduce 
opportunities to introduce restraints on economic activity. 
3.3 Sustainability and values  
As discussed, the SUD declares its aim to be the sustainable use of pesticides, to be 
achieved through the sub-aims of risk and impact reduction and promotion of non-
chemical alternatives to pesticides. Despite a lengthy consultation process,658 this 
aim appears to have been present since the early 2000s with its appearance, in a 
slightly different linguistic formulation, in Recital 26 and Article 7(1) 6EAP. These 
provide for a more sustainable use of pesticides which reduces the risks and 
impacts of pesticides on human health and the environment. In Towards a 
Thematic Strategy, which initiated public consultation on the sustainable use of 
pesticides,659 ‘sustainable use’ is deemed to require the minimisation of hazards 
and risks to health and the environment from pesticide use,660 and seems to 
conform to the traditional understanding of sustainability as applied to agriculture, 
identified above, in its pursuit of enhanced efficiency of pesticide use. There were 
major disagreements among the responses, including from stakeholders, individual 
members of the public, consultants and European institutions, throughout the 
consultation process. These disagreements centred on whether sustainable use of 
pesticides could best be achieved by risk reduction (supported by industry)661 or 
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use reduction (supported by NGOs).662 In my view, neither genuinely reflects the 
demands of sustainability. However, this was by and large the extent to which the 
content of ‘sustainable use’ with respect to pesticides was explored. There was little 
room to articulate and understand the values behind these positions, which may 
have reflected deeper disagreements and convictions about, for example, the 
viability of our current agricultural systems.663 In the end, risk, use and dependence 
reduction appear in the SUD,664 continuing and reflecting political disagreements, 
discussed further in Chapter Nine. This may add flexibility but also perhaps 
confusion as to the SUD’s direction, although risk reduction does still dominate. 
By the time the SUD came into force, the understanding of ‘sustainable use’ as 
primarily risk reduction had existed for seven years: since the 6EAP and Towards a 
Thematic Strategy in 2002 and the understanding of ‘sustainable use’ assumed 
therein, as discussed above. The subsequent consultation was narrow and did little 
to genuinely open up this assumption as to the content of sustainable use to more 
profound reflection through debate or political definition. As discussed above, ‘use’ 
is complex and requires normative engagement. Sustainability is normative too and 
has the potential to incorporate concerns other than safety and environmental 
protection into how we use resources. However, the lack of opportunity to 
challenge this assumption and decide collectively whether sustainable use in the 
context of pesticides should mean primarily risk reduction and efficient use, or 
something else or something more, already has the potential to impoverish the SUD 
in terms of its founding principle. 
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Keeney (eds), Bugs in the System: Redesigning the Pesticide Industry for Sustainable 
Agriculture (Routledge 1998) 174. 
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The Impact Assessment contains tacit value-judgments,665 but rarely grapples with 
questions of values or conflicts head-on, preferring expression in numerical and 
monetary terms. Sustainability could help infuse the narrower, numerical 
calculations of the Impact Assessment with more openly considered preferences 
and values by specifically challenging these tacit value-judgments and assumptions 
or encouraging public involvement.666 Furthermore, a balanced picture of the 
impacts of pesticide use, for which I argued above, could generate a more detailed 
value landscape with the potential to enable a more nuanced discussion of, and 
response to, conflicts between priorities in the question of what to sustain. 
The removal, from broader debate, of the normativity of sustainable use, is 
reinforced by its absence from Article 4 (on national planning), the SUD’s main 
provision for decision-making and participation. However, Member States are still 
left with a significant degree of autonomy regarding the content and emphasis of 
their NAPs. They are directed, in Article 4(1), to focus on various aspects of pesticide 
use, which seem, at face value, perhaps self-explanatory and uncontroversial. 
However, these aspects all hinge on significant value judgments. This potential (and 
arguably, need) for value judgments provides a welcome layer of flexibility which, 
combined with the requirement to involve the public in the planning process,667 
could enable access to some areas of decision-making typically off-limits. For 
example, Article 4(1) requires NAPs to contain ‘quantitative objectives, targets, 
measures and timetables to reduce risks and impacts of pesticide use on human 
health the environment’. Which ‘risks and impacts’ are not specified, nor are the 
structure and stringency of the objectives etc. These can be decided politically. 
There are some suggested ‘areas of concern’ for the targets to cover but the list is 
not exhaustive.668 Again, politics and values can weigh in.  
                                                          
 
665 For example, ‘the relative importance of impacts’ is identified as a principle of the 
methodology of the impact assessment without further explanation as to how ‘relative 
importance’ will be judged, Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’ (n 545) 84. 
666 For a discussion of participation and sustainable development see, Meadowcroft (n 334). 
667 Recital 7 and Art. 4(5) SUD. 
668 There is little official guidance to Member States on such aspects of the SUD. 
123 
 
NAPs must include ‘indicators to monitor the use of plant protection products 
containing active substances of particular concern’.669 Neither the active 
substances nor the indicators are specified, leaving it open for the Member States 
to decide on the basis of public attitudes to the diverse risks associated with 
pesticides, or other concerns perhaps. Furthermore, Member States are required 
to establish ‘timetables and targets for the reduction of use…, in particular if the 
reduction of use constitutes an appropriate means to achieve risk reduction with 
regard to priority items…’.670 This provision requires a host of value judgments, 
relating to the types of timetables and targets, whether use reduction is an 
appropriate means to achieve risk reduction, and which items should be prioritised. 
The requirement to ‘take account of the health, social, economic and 
environmental impacts of the measures envisaged, of specific national, regional 
and local conditions and all relevant stakeholder groups’671 is an invitation for a 
debate over trade-offs, reflecting the priorities and values of the participants. 
Finally, the requirement672 that Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating 
to the environment673 is to apply to the ‘preparation and modification’ of NAPs 
represents an openness to different values and opinions. 
If implemented well, this national planning process could prompt honest, 
challenging and inclusive reflection on the purpose of pesticide policy, the role of 
pesticides in agriculture and society, and perhaps even the kind of agricultural 
systems we should be supporting.674 While ‘sustainable use’ as a normative aim is 
                                                          
 
669 Art. 4(1) second sub-paragraph SUD. 
670 Art. 4(1) third sub-paragraph SUD. These priority items are those, identified by Member 
States, ‘such as active substances, crops, regions or practices, that require particular 
attention’, Art. 15(2)(c). Very few have set such targets and timetables, PAN-Europe, 
‘Reducing Pesticide Use Across the EU’ (Undated) 8. 
671 Art. 4(1) fourth sub-paragraph SUD. 
672 Art. 4(5) SUD. 
673 [2003] OJ L156/17. 
674 Some argue that ‘some rethinking of what constitutes agriculture’ is required to move 
away from the current model based on ‘agrochemicals, mechanical and petrochemical 
energy and genetic modification’, Erick Fernandes, Alice Pell and Norman Uphoff, 
‘Rethinking Agriculture for New Opportunities’ in Jules Pretty (ed), The Earthscan Reader in 
Sustainable Agriculture (Earthscan 2005); Thompson (n 632) 32. 
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not explicitly up for debate, flexibility in relation to national objectives, timetables 
etc., may allow national assertion of ‘what matters’ through alternative routes. 
Responsibility therefore shifts to Member States to draw up ambitious NAPs and to 
the Commission to ensure Member States implement their commitments.675 
There is also a requirement to establish harmonised risk indicators.676 This raises 
three points. Firstly, the requirement to ‘calculate harmonised risk indicators… by 
using statistical data collected in accordance with’677 the EU’s pesticide statistics 
regulation678 (PSR), implies a technical, expert-driven approach, which could close 
down discussion of broader values or alternative courses of action679 and may 
struggle to reflect reality.680 Secondly, the indicators are harmonised681 and so may 
display limited sensitivity towards local conditions or national priorities and values 
and attitudes towards risks perhaps reflective of a commitment in the EU to the 
idea of a universal regulatory science.682 Although Member States are allowed to 
retain their own national indicators or adopt others in addition to the harmonised 
ones,683 the harmonisation here perhaps seems somewhat at odds with the SUD’s 
accommodation of national diversity. Thirdly, though potentially extremely 
                                                          
 
675 Commission action on the content of NAPs is, as yet, lacking, PAN-Europe, ‘Letter to 
Commissioner Borg’ (27 March 2014) <www.pan-
europe.info/Campaigns/documents/NAPS/letter%20borg%20-
%20SUD%20implementation%20Mar%202014.pdf> accessed 30 April 2017. 
676 Art. 15(1) SUD. 
677 Art. 15(2)(a) SUD. 
678 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1185/2009/EC concerning statistics on 
pesticides [2009] OJ L324/1. 
679 Stirling, ‘“Opening Up” and “Closing Down”’ (n 9) 279. Although, Recital 12 PSR provides 
that it should apply without prejudice to European Parliament and Council Directive 
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ L41/26 and to 
European Parliament and Council Regulation 1367/2006/EC on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention [2006] OJ L264/13. 
680 Gabriele Sacchettini and others, ‘New Risk Indicator Approach for Operators, Workers, 
Bystanders and Residents for a Sustainable Use of Plant Protection Products’ (2015) 22 
Environmental Science and Pollution Research 17586, 17588, 17593. 
681 The exact distribution of labour here is unclear in the SUD but both Member States (Arts 
15(1) and 15(2)(a)) and the Commission (Art. 15(4)) appear to be obliged to calculate risk 
indicators on the basis of data collected by Member States under the PSR. 
682 Rothstein and others (n 623) 252. 
683 Art. 15(1) first sub-paragraph SUD. 
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valuable,684 wider civil society involvement in establishing these EU-wide, 
harmonised indicators is not provided for which again may block ingress of points 
of view not represented through the narrow expertise required by this activity and 
limits the potential for non-experts to challenge the judgments applied in this 
process.685 The absence in either the legislation or prior consultation process of a 
mechanism which directly elicits and explores values in relation to pesticide use 
may lead to the articulation of indicators uninformed by values, based on 
unchallenged expert assumptions. The selection of indicators is an ‘unavoidably 
value-based activity’ and the reasons for preferring a particular indicator and the 
availability of alternatives should perhaps be clear.686 Although Member States are 
required to take account of social, economic, environmental etc. impacts of 
regulating, this exercise arguably happens both too late (assessment of regulation 
rather than status quo) and at the wrong level (national, rather than European) to 
inform development of these EU-level indicators. 
Finally, while there are provisions enabling amendment and updating of the SUD to 
reflect scientific and technical progress,687 there is no scope for updating the 
Directive to correspond to changing public values or attitudes to pesticide use. The 
required five-yearly review of NAPs688 could be used to ensure any such changes 
are reflected in national policy and the ability of the Commission to propose 
amendments to the SUD based on Member State reports,689 could perform a similar 
function at EU level, but there is no obligation to use these provisions thus. 
                                                          
 
684 PCR Gray and PM Wiedemann, ‘Risk Management and Sustainable Development: Mutual 
Lessons from Approaches to the Use of Indicators’ (1999) 2 Journal of Risk Research 201, 
215; Sacchettini and others (n 680) 17587. 
685 No EU-wide indicators have been established yet and the project has been put on hold, 
Eurostat, ‘Agri-Environmental Indicator - Pesticide Risk - Statistics Explained’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agri-
environmental_indicator_-_pesticide_risk> accessed 30 April 2017 although the EU has 
developed a software tool, HAIR2014 (Harmonised environmental Indicators for pesticide 
Risk), for calculating indicators to evaluate performance of, for example, an NAP, 
<www.pesticidemodels.eu/hair/home> accessed 30 April 2017. 
686 Gray and Wiedemann (n 684) 213. 
687 For example, Arts 5(3) and 8(7) SUD. 
688 Art. 4(2) second sub-paragraph SUD. 
689 Art. 16 SUD. 
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3.4 Equity 
While Towards a Thematic Strategy showed some evidence of long-term 
thinking,690 and the 7EAP aims at ‘farming with a sense of responsibility for future 
generations’,691 broader acknowledgment, in the SUD, of the impacts of pesticide 
use on future generations, or a moral obligation to bequeath a less toxic planet, are 
conspicuously absent, although Sweden’s NAP does seek this goal.692 Room for 
explicit consideration of ethical questions in general is also absent, as evident from 
the lack of opportunity in the SUD for a more normative discussion of sustainable 
use, discussed above. Likewise any opportunity for the present generation to 
articulate the values they are willing to commit to for future generations,693 other 
than reduced risks from pesticide use, is lacking. Furthermore, the SUD does not 
explicitly foster a long-term view. There are indications that the Directive is 
intended to regulate for the foreseeable future given the requirements to review 
NAPs every five years and the Commission’s powers to amend the legislation, going 
forward. However, this is hardly a bold statement that the SUD is prioritising 
concern for future generations or using inter-generational equity as a moral guide 
for developing and implementing measures. 
Focusing primarily on risk reduction may maintain equal opportunities across 
generations, but it means a lot rides on being right about the risks and managing 
them correctly. If the approach is wanting in any way, it could narrow the resource 
base for future generations before the mistake is discovered. The fact that the SUD 
is not firmer in its obligations to reduce dependence on pesticides may also raise 
concerns for inter-generational equity in terms of bequeathing diverse and robust 
agricultural systems. There is no explicit694 requirement in the SUD to consider the 
                                                          
 
690 Commission, ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy’ (n 514) 25, 30, 34. This mainly relates to 
long-term risks and impacts of pesticides and the need for more research. Long-term 
planning or regard for the future is lacking. 
691 Commission and others (n 514) para 20. 
692 Ministry for Rural Affairs, ‘National Action Plan for the Sustainable Use of Plant 
Protection Products for the Period 2013–2017’ (2013) 65–66. 
693 Norton (n 543) 58–59. 
694 One could interpret ‘all relevant stakeholder groups’, Art. 4(1) fourth sub-paragraph SUD, 
to include future generations. 
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interests of future generations, for example, in the obligation on Member States to 
produce NAPs. Notably, despite having had an Ombudsman for Future Generations 
at the relevant time,695 Hungary’s NAP does not refer to this aim or indicate that its 
Ombudsman was consulted in the negotiation of its NAP.696 
In terms of intra-generational equity, as with inter-generational equity, there is no 
obvious scope to raise ethical questions. Risk reduction may have a social aim 
insofar as it may minimise the costs of pesticide use inflicted off-field, perhaps 
supporting a more equitable (re-)distribution of costs. This dimension of the policy 
is far from explicit, although cross-compliance provisions under the Common 
Agriculture Policy will apply,697 which presents a form of financial incentive. 
Allocation of ‘goods’ does, however, surface in the SUD’s provisions requiring 
prohibition or minimisation of pesticide use in certain areas, such as parks, 
recreation and school grounds and playgrounds and in areas protected under EU 
conservation laws.698 This provision specifically cordons off land for, amongst other 
things, recreation and recognises the need to protect the more vulnerable 
members of society and more sensitive parts of the environment. It thus supports 
Brown Weiss’s principle of conservation of access. In addition, the provisions 
supporting participation, information and awareness raising, if carried out 
sensitively, could enhance education, leading to a more knowledgeable and 
engaged society with benefits for the level and quality of participation and 
potentially implementation.699 
PAN-Europe notes the potential of NAPs to stimulate rural employment, for 
example through organic farming,700 entailing social benefits. It may be possible to 
pursue such ends, but it is hardly highlighted in the SUD. As discussed above, in 
addition to such potential benefits, there are also potential distributional 
                                                          
 
695 Now abolished: <http://jno.hu/en/> accessed 6 January 2017. 
696 Ministry of Rural Development, ‘National Plant Protection Action Plan’ (2012). 
697 Commission, ‘CAP Reform – an Explanation of the Main Elements MEMO/13/621’ 6. 
698 Art. 12 SUD. 
699 Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 178–179. 
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drawbacks to reduced pesticide use, such as harm to the less well-off by increased 
food prices. However, beyond the requirement to consider the ‘health, social, 
economic and environmental impacts of the measures envisaged’,701 nowhere is 
this highlighted as a concern. This may hinder progress towards greater 
sustainability generally as inequality can undermine the mutual trust and 
willingness to cooperate arguably required for such progress.702 While there is some 
flexibility for the consideration or pursuit of a broad range of concerns in the SUD, 
its primary focus is still safety and environmental protection and depends on the 
commitment of the individual Member States.  
4. Sustainable use and sustainable development in the EU 
In sum, there are promising aspects of the SUD, which genuinely do reflect some of 
the elements of sustainability identified in Chapter Three and which are employed 
to address some of the concerns raised in section 2. The national planning process 
constitutes a valuable opportunity for broad involvement in shaping a Member 
State’s approach to pesticide use and the potential to consider the social, economic 
and environmental (and other) impacts of pesticide use along with societal values 
surrounding pesticide use. It also acknowledges the diversity of actors involved in, 
or affected by, pesticide use. Both of these aspects, however, could be stronger. 
The importance of the three dimensions to analysing the impacts of pesticide use 
could also be made more explicit, as could the relevance of inter- and intra-
generational equity. Both of these are largely implicit, if in existence at all. 
I have argued that the overarching goal of the SUD is that of risk reduction in pursuit 
of greater efficiency of pesticide use. This is a far less ambitious goal than 
sustainability in its fullest sense, in that it is less about examining and challenging 
pesticide use in a holistic and inclusive way and more about making the current 
patterns of use safer, thereby accommodating the status quo. The difficulty with 
                                                          
 
701 Art. 4(1) fourth sub-paragraph SUD. 
702 Nicolas Kosoy and others, ‘Pillars for a Flourishing Earth: Planetary Boundaries, Economic 
Growth Delusion and Green Economy’ (2012) 4 Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 74, 76. 
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pursuing risk reduction is that it commits us to an approach to regulation based on 
technical probabilistic assessments, which is problematic, not least due to 
uncertainty703 and the difficulty in determining, or agreeing on, things like 
acceptable exposure and cumulative effects.704 Characterising sustainable use as 
the reduction of risk does not answer any questions; it merely hides one set of 
unexamined assumptions behind another and avoids one normative judgment by 
substituting another. It may work, but only perhaps until we develop more sensitive 
measurement tools. Furthermore, unlike sustainability as characterised in Chapter 
Three, risk management tends to imply maintenance of the existing state of affairs 
or practices rather than driving change, providing limited insight into the overall 
direction technological development should take.705 Therefore, from a more 
ambitious point of view, it may not constitute a sufficiently disruptive force to send 
transformative ripples through the rest of our current crop protection or 
agricultural systems, by prompting deeper reflection on the desirability of our 
intensive, monoculture-based farming models which the use of pesticides 
supports706 and which are rarely questioned.707 Nor may it challenge the decision-
making status quo, which I argue, referring back to Jasanoff’s diagnosis in relation 
to highly socially-embedded technologies, is needed. In essence, it implements the 
traditional model of sustainable development as applied to agriculture. 
This criticism is partly to do with the extent to which we care about language. 
According to Bob Pepperman Taylor, writing about the tendency of some to reduce 
sustainability to meaning ‘efficiency’ (or ‘eco-efficiency’708), we could apply the 
                                                          
 
703 Richard Owen and others, ‘Conclusions: Pollutants, Risk and Society’ in Jane A Plant, 
Nikolaos Voulvoulis and K Vala Ragnarsdottir (eds), Pollutants, Human Health and the 
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term ‘sustainable’ to anything we want to. But, he asks, what would be the benefit 
of doing this?709 We already have other words and discourses to describe and 
explore these concepts; as with efficiency, so with risk reduction and risk 
management. Applying the title of sustainability to a risk reduction programme 
adds little. Instead it creates ambiguity710 and ultimately confines the potential of 
sustainability to less ambitious purposes. If sustainability is applied to policy and 
regulation, its integrity should be maintained and its own content respected.  
A partial explanation as to why sustainability is so reduced may lie in the current 
weakness of sustainable development in the EU. The 1993 5EAP711 was ambitious. 
For example, the ultimate aim of the 5EAP is proclaimed to be ‘transforming the 
patterns of growth in the Community in such a way as to reach a sustainable 
development path’.712 The 6EAP, which represented the basis for the 
environmental dimension of the European sustainable development strategy, 
presented a milder approach than its predecessor, commuting the rhetoric of 
transformation to the softer language of de-linking economic growth from 
environmental damage.713 Two European instruments which contribute to the EU’s 
current sustainable development strategy (such as it is) are the 7EAP and Europe 
2020.714 The rhetoric of change and transformation does appear in the 7EAP.715 
However, overall transformation is linked to a different object – the ‘reductionist’716 
notion of a green economy. This emphasises the narrower question of compatibility 
between environmental protection and economic growth,717 arguably prioritising 
                                                          
 
Industrial Water-Service Systems: Assessing Options with Stakeholders’ (2014) 69 Water 
Science & Technology 2113, 2113. 
709 Bob Pepperman Taylor, ‘Comments on Sustainability’ in John Martin Gillroy and Joe 
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710 ibid 304. 
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715 For example, Commission and others (n 514) para 43(c). 
716 Pallemaerts (n 508) 361. 
717 Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 70. 
131 
 
the economic over the social and environmental,718 and the availability of 
technological solutions for increasing resource efficiency which may paradoxically 
increase consumption, while ignoring the complex drivers of economic-socio-
ecological problems.719 Europe 2020, regarded by the Commission as the main 
instrument for implementing sustainable development,720 following Rio+20,721 
similarly advocates an omnipotent ‘resource efficient, sustainable and competitive 
economy’.722 Furthermore, running throughout all the above policy there may be 
seen an emphasis on ‘efficiency’,723 which may be hard to dislodge given its 
endurance as a principle of resource management dating back to the early 
twentieth century conservation movement and association with the growth and 
development of (some forms of) environmentalism and sustainability.724 Indeed, an 
‘eco-efficiency’ account of sustainability supported claims regarding the 
environmental safety and other benefits of GM crops, for example in terms of 
reducing pesticide use, in the face of competing accounts of sustainability 
emphasising other values.725 
Overall, the place of sustainable development in EU environmental policy currently 
seems uncertain.726 In light of this state of affairs, locating a robust basis for 
transformation in a particular area of policy may be difficult in practice. Particularly 
since ‘sustainable development’, due to its vagueness, could easily slip into 
denoting the status quo’s ‘sustained economic growth’.727 There is little in the EU’s 
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most recent Communication on sustainability728 to suggest a radically different 
approach to these matters, despite a vague call to take the three pillars of 
sustainability into account.729 The emphasis remains on the preservation of natural 
capital and resource efficiency both delivered now by a ‘circular economy’ which 
will stimulate competitiveness and innovation and reconcile economic growth with 
environmental protection.730 Innovation appears as unambiguous solver of 
problems, discussed further in Chapter Eight, rather than as sometime generator of 
complex and controversial implications which perhaps require a more prudential 
approach. 
Klaus Bosselmann encapsulates sustainable development’s frozen potency in the 
EU by describing the EU as both model of governance for sustainability, in that it 
shows states can reorganise their sovereignty, and also a model of failure,731 
arguing that economic growth and competitiveness are still in ascendency.732 
Economic competitiveness (discussed further in Chapter Eight) tends to mean 
‘productive efficiency of intensive monoculture’733 and may therefore conflict with 
the broader values potentially encompassed by ‘sustainable agriculture’.734 
Sustainability, for all sorts of reasons, may not yet encourage a wide range of 
considerations and opinions to be aired in decision-making and there often seems 
to be a sizeable lacuna between potential and reality. This, combined with the 
recent economic crisis and its consequences,735 poses a significant challenge to any 
potential for disrupting the status quo. However, a potential is still a potential, even 
if reality looks unpromising. 
Finally, it cannot be said that the SUD offers no opportunities to implement 
sustainability ambitiously, at least on paper. It depends primarily, however, on the 
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Member State and the contributions of participants during the national planning 
process. Unfortunately, PAN-Europe diagnoses a generally unambitious approach 
in most Member State NAPs, out of kilter with what it defines as the SUD’s 
philosophy of going beyond other instruments.736 The UK NAP, for example, is fairly 
narrow, with little potential to challenge the status quo, focusing on risk reduction, 
improving agricultural competitiveness and reducing regulatory burdens737 with no 
mention of either sustainable development or sustainable agriculture. The 
Hungarian and Swedish NAPs are more ambitious and encompass a greater range 
of considerations. The former is fairly holistic, providing detail on measures to 
support more ‘ecological’ methods of farming738 and referring to changes in 
consumption.739 The latter refers to Sweden’s ambitious aim to achieve a non-toxic 
environment by 2020. It also links plant protection policy to sustainable rural 
development740 and aims to achieve ‘cost-effective, environmentally friendly and 
socially sustainable’ plant protection.741 In sum, commitments to using 
sustainability to open up decision-making may vary significantly across the EU.  
Ultimately, the picture of sustainable use embedded in the rest of the SUD may not 
support a particularly strong challenge to the European economic order since, 
outside the NAPs, it does little to open up decision-making or address the pesticide 
question beyond narrowly conceived issues of protection of human health and the 
environment. This is partly due to the lack of ambition in implementing 
sustainability and the elements discussed in Chapter Three. It is also perhaps due 
to the fact that the question of what ‘sustainable pesticide use’ actually means and 
requires was never sufficiently opened up to deliberation. The preconceived notion 
of sustainable use as risk reduction or increased efficiency and the narrow 
consultation process left fundamental disagreements unexplored, leading to an 
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ambiguous and unambitious piece of legislation. The broader consequences of this 
are that firstly, there is little chance of systematically addressing all the issues 
relating to pesticide use, and secondly the scope of decision-making in this field 
remains restricted, by and large, to safety, environmental protection and risk 
management. 
5. Conclusion 
Part of the promise of sustainability is that it could provide a means to enhance 
socio-technical integration by incorporating diverse considerations into decision-
making processes, however hard they may be to implement. This promise exists 
despite disagreements over its internal structure or the correct distribution of 
weight between its various dimensions. It has the potential to prompt ambitious 
policy and legislation, by, amongst other things, opening up decision-making to 
explicit consideration of the future and a wide range of other issues. Realisation of 
its potential depends on the manner in which it is employed in policy and 
legislation. Due to its emphasis on risk, the SUD establishes a reductive and 
unambitious approach to the implementation of sustainable use which fails to 
realise the potential of sustainability and instead leaves its initial promise rather 
hollow. It does provide some flexibility for Member States to choose the 
appropriate level of ambition. This flexibility is a good thing in terms of Member 
State autonomy and enabling the generation of plans tailored to specific national 
conditions. However, a more far-sighted impetus from the centre could perhaps 
have achieved more, given the minimalism of many NAPs. Possible reasons for this 
lack of ambition at both EU, and national, level include the narrowness of the 
procedures through which the SUD and NAPs were developed. Finally, the lack of a 
more ambitious approach may simply be a reflection of the current fragility of 
sustainable development in the EU. 
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Chapter Five – European regulation of synthetic biology: regulating 
an emerging technology 
1. Introduction 
Chapter Three discussed the open ethos promoted by a significant portion of EU 
policy towards research into, and governance of, synthetic biology largely under 
the heading of ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI). I argued that the 
European policy ‘vision’ for participation in relation to synthetic biology espouses, 
to a great extent, the promise of engagement and mutual learning between 
scientists and stakeholders, including publics. 
This chapter looks beyond that policy to some of the legislation which applies to 
synthetic biology in the EU. Out of the 39 Directives and Regulations potentially 
applicable to different synthetic biology applications,742 I focus on two: the 
Contained Use Directive (CUD)743 and the Deliberate Release Directive (DRD),744 
both of which contain authorisation procedures likely to apply (as discussed in 
section 3) to various types of organisms resulting from synthetic biology research, 
or substances produced by such organisms. This legislation predates much of the 
policy discussed in Chapter Three. The question therefore concerns its potential to 
realise the EU’s rhetorical ‘vision’ for a governance framework for synthetic biology 
based on the principles of RRI.  
Chapter Three makes clear that RRI is more than public engagement. However, due 
to provisions for public participation presenting most potential, the primary 
(though not exclusive) focus of my discussion below is on public participation and 
openness. In this context, ‘governance’ extends beyond regulating the risks 
associated with an end product to the processes of innovation too.745 As argued in 
Chapter Three, the full burden of realising the EU’s ambitions does not therefore 
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rest on these downstream authorisation procedures, though they should support 
the overall spirit of synthetic biology governance and operate according to 
consistent principles. While RRI aims at broader opening-up, and creation of a 
shared sense of responsibility for, innovation trajectories, participation in risk 
regulation could support and complement RRI by providing an opportunity to 
reflect on specific material outputs of those trajectories. 
Section 2 briefly considers synthetic biology research and the challenge of defining 
its potential benefits and risks. Section 3 examines application of the DRD and CUD 
and in particular their potential to facilitate RRI. Section 4 assesses that potential 
against the ‘vision’ for participation and openness discussed in Chapter Three. I 
argue that, despite isolated potential, the current regulatory regime is not 
equipped to implement the policy ambitions discussed in Chapter Three. In 
section 5, I analyse that deficiency on two fronts. Firstly, I argue that underlying 
much of the policy and legislation is a drive to enable passage of synthetic biology 
to the market, suggesting a lack of political will towards opening up, in general, 
applicable decision-making procedures. Secondly, I argue that the regulatory 
regime, originally designed for genetically modified organisms, faces the challenges 
of ‘inherited regulation’.746 Section 6 concludes. 
2. Synthetic biology, its promises and risks 
Synthetic biology eludes straightforward definition.747 Essentially it involves the 
application of engineering principles to biology.748 It is ‘the rational design and 
construction of new biological parts, devices and systems with predictable and 
reliable functional behaviour that do not exist in nature, and the re-design of 
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existing, natural biological systems for basic research and useful purposes’,749 for 
example for social or commercial benefit.750 Research in the field of synthetic 
biology is profoundly interdisciplinary751 and covers a range of approaches, some of 
which may eventually involve the creation of life from non-living materials.752  
Much of synthetic biology involves working with nucleic acids, the building blocks 
of genes, and therefore exhibits strong links with genetic modification (GM), 
prompting controversy over whether it is in fact a new technology or simply a new 
label.753 What distinguishes it then is arguably less its techniques and processes 
(though developments in techniques increase the extent to which biological 
systems can be manipulated754) but its conceptual framework; its philosophy, 
assumptions and ambitions, complete with epic narratives about ‘creating life’.755 
With synthetic biology, ‘engineering stops being a metaphor to become a veritable 
methodology…’ thus, instead of thinking in terms of DNA, RNA and proteins, 
synthetic biologists think in terms of parts, devices and systems.756 This constitutes 
a shift in conceptual framing away from the trial and error of traditional 
biotechnology towards rational design on the assumption that the component 
parts employed are predictable.757 This in turn suggests an ontological blurring 
between organism and machine (encapsulated in the metaphor ‘living machine’758) 
and perhaps therefore a fading of the distinction from which ethical values are 
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derived.759 This chapter treats synthetic biology as different to GM and for this 
reason I use the term ‘synthetic organism’ (SO) to acknowledge that approach, 
despite the fact that many SOs are technically ‘genetically modified’. 
Synthetic biology promises multiple, diverse outputs including biosensors, 
biomaterials, biofuels, biomedicine, food ingredients and fine chemicals, improving 
nutrition, healthcare and decontaminating the environment.760 Specific outputs 
include artemisinic acid, a precursor to the anti-malarial drug artemisinin, vanillin, 
fragrances, palm oil, spider silk and biological adhesives. Agricultural applications 
include modifying plants to photosynthesise and use water and nitrogen more 
efficiently while increasing yields and reducing CO2 emissions, to enhance product 
quality (in terms of flavour, fibre etc.), improve processing characteristics or create 
in planta production of raw materials, for example sugar, cellulose, starch etc.761  
Much of the field remains at a basic research phase,762 is contained and mostly 
involves the use of well-characterised micro-organisms and genetic material, 
although longer-term developments may result in the production of SOs which 
fundamentally differ from naturally occurring organisms.763 It will be some time 
before an SO will be ready for introduction into the environment, or available as a 
commercial environmental application.764 Concerns often relate to the release of 
poorly characterised and unpredictable new biological machines, their numerous 
potential hazardous qualities and possible effects on the environment or human 
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health, exacerbated by unpredictable multiplication rates.765 There is, for example, 
the potential for horizontal transfer of synthetic genes to other organisms or the 
colonisation and take-over of natural microbial communities766 which further 
challenge risk assessment processes.  
These risks exist alongside equally important questions regarding socio-economic 
and ethical implications, the correct approach to intellectual property rights in the 
processes and products of synthetic biology and the distribution of risks and 
benefits. For example, there is concern that mass synthesis of vanillin will put vanilla 
producers in developing countries out of work.767 A bioeconomy which increases 
demand for biomass to process into industrial products could encourage land grab 
in the search for farmland to meet demand and destroy biodiversity at the expense 
of local communities.768 Synthetic biology’s promise of speed, efficiency and ease 
in doing so in particular could exacerbate problems with food security already 
associated with competition between biofuels and food.769 The distribution of 
power between corporations and Western and developing nations is a concern. For 
example, a shift from cultivated to synthetic artemisinin could, inter alia, 
concentrate power in western pharmaceutical companies by shifting formerly local 
production westwards,770 while intellectual property frameworks could prevent 
developing countries accessing the benefits they produce.771 The implications of 
synthetic biology for the relationship between man and nature,772 or the distinction 
between man and machine773 raise ethical concerns. Finally, the inherently 
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industrial and commercial end of synthetic biology774 leads to questions about the 
kind of world we are trying to create, how widely shared visions of the future are 
and the purpose of this research.775  
3. Uncharted territories: regulating synthetic biology 
3.1 Scope and definition 
While not uncontroversial (as elaborated below), the EU’s position appears to be 
that current EU regulation is capable of assessing and managing the risks of short-
term synthetic biology applications and thereby ensuring safety,776 though in the 
mid- to long-term this regime will require adaptation.777 Application of the two 
instruments examined in this chapter to SOs depends on the definitions contained 
in the CUD, of ‘genetically modified micro-organism’ (GMM)778 and in the DRD, of 
‘genetically modified organism’ (GMO).779  
Like GM, synthetic biology encompasses a collection of methods for creating 
synthetic versions of existing materials or re-designed or entirely novel organisms. 
Synthetic biology currently falls within the definitions because the methods 
employed and the products of synthetic biology most likely to appear in the shorter 
term, are not yet too dissimilar to familiar GM techniques.780 The CUD concerns the 
use of GMMs in laboratory-based research involving the GM techniques listed in 
Annex I Part A, including rDNA techniques. Non-food/feed GM products781 destined 
for trade on the internal market ‘as or in products’,782 e.g. seeds for cultivation, 
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biosensors or SOs intended for environmental decontamination, require 
authorisation under the DRD, discussed below.  
The definitions of GMM/GMO may not necessarily encompass some longer-term 
developments in synthetic biology.783 For example, organisms not capable of self-
replication could escape the legislative definitions and fall outside the regulatory 
regime.784 The most present implication of this gap relates to risk assessment. Risk 
assessment under the current regime is partially based on a comparative analysis 
between the GMO (or SO) and existing non-GM counterparts.785 The more artificial 
the organism and the corresponding unavailability of natural comparators, the 
more difficult it is to characterise risk, and the more unreliable comparative risk 
assessment becomes.786 Furthermore, an organism composed of non-natural DNA 
molecules may not be classified as ‘genetically modified’ and therefore may fall 
outside the regulation.787 Indeed, the language of risk assessment developed for 
genetic engineering may become meaningless with advances in synthetic biology788 
as, for example, concepts of ‘donor’ and ‘acceptor’ organisms become obsolete789 
for some SOs. Even the distinction between ‘contained use’ and ‘deliberate release’ 
is blurred.790 
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3.2 The Contained Use Directive 
The CUD provides for the application of containment measures to activities 
involving GMMs ‘to limit their contact with, and to provide a high level of safety for, 
the general population and the environment’, with certain limitations and 
exclusions.791 
The Directive aims to establish ‘common measures for the contained use of 
genetically modified micro-organisms with a view to protecting human health and 
the environment’.792 These common measures are justified by reference to certain 
over-arching political motivations. Firstly, the EU’s interest in developing 
biotechnology for economic gain.793 Secondly, the likelihood that micro-organisms, 
once released into the environment, will reproduce and spread across national 
boundaries,794 requiring common measures to evaluate and reduce the potential 
risks of contained use of GMMs795 to ensure the safe development of biotechnology 
in the EU. Clearly, the regime’s foundational principles are: facilitating economic 
progress in Europe and ensuring safety. The EU’s direction, i.e. towards 
technological progress, is assumed, as discussed below. 
Under Article 4, the contained use in question is assessed and classified according 
to its level of risk and a level of containment is assigned. Containment and other 
protective measures are selected on the basis of the level identified, taking into 
account three further considerations. These are: (i) ‘the characteristics of the 
environment likely to be exposed’, for example the existence of vulnerable biota; 
(ii) ‘the characteristics of the activity’, for example its scale; and (iii) ‘any non-
standard operations’. The legislation anticipates that consideration of these three 
variables may alter the level of risk identified.796 This analysis results in assigning 
the activity in question to a particular risk class.797 Article 4(4) introduces an 
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element of precaution by providing that where the appropriate risk class is in doubt, 
‘the more stringent protective measures shall be applied’ unless agreed with the 
competent authority that ‘there is sufficient evidence to justify the application of 
less stringent measures’. 
Acknowledging the rapid development in this field of research, measures must be 
reviewed periodically or, for example, where ‘there is reason to suspect that the 
assessment is no longer appropriate judged in the light of new scientific or technical 
knowledge’.798 Premises in which contained uses occur are licensed according to 
their risk classification by the national competent authority to which notifications 
of the contained use are sent.799 Higher risk contained uses trigger enhanced 
information obligations in the notification including the purpose and expected 
results of the contained use.800 Such uses require the prior consent of the 
competent authority. There is provision to suspend, terminate or adjust the 
conditions of the contained use where it poses risks which may have significant 
consequences.801 
Article 12 allows Member States, where they consider it appropriate, to provide for 
public consultation on ‘aspects of the proposed contained use’, subject to the 
confidentiality provisions in Article 18.  
3.3 The Deliberate Release Directive 
Article 1 of the DRD states that its purpose is ‘to approximate the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States and to protect human health 
and the environment’. This aim is to be accomplished ‘[i]n accordance with the 
precautionary principle’ and applies to two specific activities: firstly, deliberate 
release into the environment of GMOs for non-commercial, experimental 
purposes802 and, secondly, placing on the market of GMOs. Like the CUD, the 
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principles underlying the DRD relate to facilitating industrial development and 
ensuring safety. Living organisms released into the environment may reproduce 
and cross national borders,803 implying that this is best dealt with at EU level. 
Approximation of Member State laws is also required to ‘ensure the safe 
development of industrial products utilising GMOs’,804 emphasising both the 
economic and safety advantages of harmonised regulation in relation to GMOs.  
Part B sets out the procedure for seeking authorisation to deliberately release a 
GMO into the environment. Notifications are sent to the competent authority of 
the Member State in which release is intended containing, inter alia an 
environmental risk assessment (ERA).805 Having considered any observations made 
by other Member States,806 the competent authority indicates whether the release 
may proceed or not.807 Member States must conduct public consultations on the 
proposed release over a reasonable time-period ‘in order to give the public or 
groups the opportunity to express an opinion’.808  
Part C establishes a separate authorisation procedure for placing a GMO ‘as or in 
products’ on the market. Under Article 13, a notifier must submit a notification to 
the competent authority of the Member State in which it intends to market the 
GMO. The notification must contain inter alia information on the diversity of sites 
in which the GMO is to be used and data from releases carried out for research, an 
ERA, the conditions for placing it on the market including conditions of use and 
handling, a proposed period for the consent, a monitoring plan and proposals for 
labelling and packaging.809 A summary of the notification must also be included.810 
The Member State must compile an assessment report stating whether or not the 
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GMO should be placed on the market.811 Both this and the summary must be made 
available to the public which has 30 days to make comments to the Commission.812 
Following receipt of an assessment report, the Commission and competent 
authorities may request further information, make comments or present reasoned 
objections.813 They may discuss outstanding issues with a view to achieving 
agreement,814 failing which, the decision goes to comitology.815 The Commission 
must consult EFSA, including at the request of a Member State if there is an 
objection regarding the risks of GMOs to human health or the environment.816 
There is no obligation to take its opinion into account or make it publicly available. 
Consultation of an ethics committee is permitted (though Member States retain 
competence here), the outcome of which must be publicly accessible.817  
Partly in response to deficiencies in the GMO regulatory framework including 
chronic deadlock in comitology818 and to provide Member States with enhanced 
flexibility to respond to their specific circumstances,819 Directive 2015/412820 
amended the DRD. It introduced a new Article 26b, governing Member State rights 
to restrict cultivation. A Member State may, during the authorisation procedure, 
‘demand that the geographical scope of the… authorisation be adjusted to the 
effect that all or part of [its] territory… is to be excluded from cultivation’.821 
Alternatively, following authorisation under Part C, Members States may restrict or 
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prohibit the cultivation of a single or group of GMOs in all or part of their 
territory.822 Such measures must conform with EU law (most importantly free 
movement provisions, discussed in Chapter Six), be ‘reasoned, proportional and 
non-discriminatory… and based on compelling grounds’ for example environmental 
policy objectives, socio-economic impacts and public policy. Measures must not 
conflict with the ERA conducted under either the DRD or the Food and Feed 
Regulation823.824 The opt-out does ‘not affect the free circulation of authorised 
GMOs as, or in, products’.825 
4. Reality vs rhetoric: assessing the legislation 
4.1 Upstream potential  
Given that much synthetic biology remains at the research and development stage 
and that few products of synthetic biology are likely to be ready for deliberate 
release or marketing in the EU for some time, the legislation currently most 
pertinent is the CUD. If the principles of RRI are to operate, the CUD would seem to 
be an appropriate player. It is, however, an instrument of very limited scope. The 
classification of contained uses is conducted almost entirely through the medium 
of a tightly drawn scientific risk assessment, making it a narrow, closed and 
technocratic procedure.  
Risk assessment and the licensing of premises are the minimum requirements 
enabling research to proceed. As discussed in section 2, there may be other 
research-related concerns. However, there is currently no obvious connection 
between the regulated contained use and the wider discussions conducted, 
presumably often simultaneously, under the policy discussed in Chapter Three. 
Where hard law is concerned only with ensuring safety, it could create a hierarchy 
of concerns in which safety matters are perhaps the only matters researchers must 
genuinely heed at that stage, when in fact a little lab-based anticipation of potential 
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consequences and reflection on research aims and endeavours could be salutary. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the techniques exist.826 
Member States are under no obligation to consult the public and where they do, 
they may select the aspects of the matter on which to focus the consultation. 
Where concerns are expressed, there is no obligation on the Member State to take 
the results of the consultation into account in its decision regarding the proposed 
contained use. This power to consult implies the provision of information but 
nowhere is this stated explicitly, although it is still subject to a confidentiality 
exclusion.827 Clearly, public involvement in decision-making under the CUD was not 
high on the policy agenda. Inclusion is limited therefore, and with it opportunity to 
anticipate and reflect. 
It could be regarded as inappropriate, at this stage, to have publics ‘interfering’ with 
‘contained’ research which poses minimal risk and which does not directly and 
immediately affect them; containing technology can be as much about containing 
public fear.828 Indeed, the CUD may well not be the best instrument through which 
to institute change; tighter or laxer containment measures are not necessarily apt 
to respond to concerns over socio-economic or ethical implications. However, the 
consequences of excluding publics or other upstream opportunities to reflect on 
research are demonstrated by the limitations of downstream participation829 and 
the dilemma of control.830 If the EU is genuine about implementing RRI including 
upstream public engagement then it is during the stages of research governed by 
this Directive (and Part B DRD and perhaps earlier) that at least part of that 
programme should occur. This would provide the best chance of shaping the 
innovation and research arc, on the assumption that many new products that are 
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destined for commercial release start life in controlled laboratory conditions831 and 
that part of the point of anticipation is that it should take place before research 
materialises in products. It would enhance the consistency of the EU’s innovation 
governance vision and could be supported by a mechanism in the CUD providing 
for consideration of, for example, outputs of projects like SYNENERGENE during risk 
assessment. Potentially burdensome but the alternative is futile engagement and 
isolated research and development processes until commercialisation. In this 
model, any debate that might have appropriately occurred earlier and might 
genuinely have helped shape the research, is squeezed into the final authorisation 
process. At this stage, it is often too late for publics to exert influence or they must 
compete with the weight of investment in research and development driving 
towards marketing and generation of a return. Ultimately, the broader 
participatory ambitions of EU innovation governance policy are unrealised. 
4.2 Downstream influence 
Article 24 DRD enables the public to make comments to the Commission on 
proposals to place an SO on the market and on the Member State’s assessment 
report. Part of the purpose of public engagement and deliberation is to open up 
and improve decision-making, as discussed in Chapter Two, and it is promoted as a 
means to serve democracy.832 However, that opening-up will not result, 
automatically, from any mechanism for engagement.833 
While the lack of opportunities for public involvement was a flaw in the previous 
regime which the current regime attempted to improve upon,834 the provisions for 
consultation remain narrow, restrictive and unambitious. Firstly, the 30-day time 
limit for responses to applications to place on the market is insufficient for a 
member of the public to inform themselves, form an opinion and respond, 
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especially when compared with the applicant who will have invested huge 
resources, time and money, in producing the information supporting its 
application.835 This is perhaps compounded by the vague836 information-sharing 
provisions.837 Applicants provide the majority of the information required during 
the authorisation process and, while there are reasonable, resource-related 
reasons for requiring so,838 their control over this information raises concerns.839 
The completeness of the information available to the public may be in question, 
due to confidentiality provisions840 and perhaps due to the potential for selective 
reporting of evidence and information.841 Inadequate information can hinder 
participation.842 In terms of quality, publics may be excluded by the technical nature 
of the information, which may simultaneously be insufficiently detailed for analysis 
by external experts.843 Indeed, the structural linking of the legal framework to the 
‘state of the art in science and technology’ tends to exclude non-specialist actors.844  
Secondly, while notification under Part C occurs earlier than under the previous 
Directive,845 potentially allowing discussion between Member States ‘before 
positions are entrenched’,846 consultation only takes place following the 
environmental risk assessment (contained in the initial notification)847 and the 
Member State assessment report. This structure does not foster an exchange of 
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views on risks between publics and experts848 so as to reflect the policy ambition 
expressed for dialogue on risk or the recognition that attitudes to risk vary 
throughout society and merit expression during expert assessments of risk. Nor do 
the procedures seem to envisage that participants will change their preferences as 
a result of engaging in the consultation process as one would hope from genuinely 
deliberative debate.849 Instead each presents their case before a final judgment is 
made by a national or European arbiter.850 Although there is provision for some 
exchange of views between Member States on a notification for placing on the 
market,851 there is no direct link between the public views and their expression on 
this level. There is, in addition, no consultation on the Commission’s draft 
authorisation provisions, despite Recital 46 providing that public comments should 
be taken into account in such measures. 
Thirdly, within the consultation procedures themselves, public comments are only 
permitted on the information contained in the summary of the notification.852 
Ethical or political issues fall outside the scope of the consultation process, raising 
questions about whether this procedure is fully equipped to capture public 
concerns.853 Moreover, engaging the public in decisions where assessments of risk 
are at issue, should be in explicit recognition of the contingency of expert 
evaluations of risk and the existence and validity of public evaluations of risk, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, otherwise much of its potential benefit could be lost. The 
DRD does recognise the importance of non-technical values, for example in its 
acknowledgment of the relevance of ethics.854 However, the overall emphasis on 
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expert risk assessment and narrowness of the consultation exercise means that 
concerns not founded on science will probably struggle to be heard.855 
Fourthly, outcomes of participation exercises at national level under Article 9 are 
difficult to feed into EU level decision-making, partly due to qualified majority 
voting during comitology, and may therefore have limited impact.856 Member 
States and the Commission are free to take the comments into account if they wish. 
However, there is no formal requirement that they explain how they have taken 
any comments into account if they choose to do so.857 As such, and in the absence 
of any legal mechanism to challenge a decision if the comments are ignored, neither 
consultation procedure is likely to have much influence. It is even unclear what 
should happen to public comments, once made.858 Ultimately, this weak version of 
the ‘due consideration model’859 seems unlikely to prompt anything close to the 
policy ambition to create a dialogue.860 
Finally, the provisions do not seem intended to implement any particular model of 
public participation861 but rather evince a legislative ambivalence to 
participation.862 Furthermore, due to the poor information provisions and difficulty 
for comments to affect decisions, the DRD does little to enhance democracy.863 
These deficiencies and weaknesses appear to stem from the confused motives 
behind increasing public participation in EC law864 which include an instrumental 
desire to overcome public opposition to GMOs and to increase the ‘democratic 
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legitimacy’ of decisions,865 and the unambitious, business-as-usual EU policy 
context for public participation in which the DRD was born.866  
The pattern of rhetoric in favour of civil society involvement under an EU-wide 
strategy867 but minimal provision in regulation, originally in relation to GM, is now 
repeated with synthetic biology. The difference here is that synthetic biology has 
been part of huge, technology-specific projects to promote RRI (a large part of 
which involves public engagement and deliberation) and, as argued in Chapter 
Three, inclusion and openness seem part of the field’s principles and ethos in the 
way that they never were with GM. However, as the scale of the EU’s ambitions and 
upstream deliberative activity increases, the stasis of the narrow downstream 
participation provisions widens the gap between policy and practice yet further and 
decreases the credibility of the EU’s grand rhetoric on innovation governance. 
Deliberation perhaps works best upstream, where more meaningful discussion of 
the economic, environmental and social impact of proposed initiatives may be 
easier.868 However, eventually, a decision is required. It is the narrow and closed 
nature of risk assessment at this stage and regulatory reliance on it which is of 
particular concern. While there are limits to the views and concerns that can 
meaningfully be expressed in relation to a single product pre-marketing, there are 
also limits upstream, given the level of abstraction and generalisation necessary.869 
Both are necessary and complementary, as argued in Chapter Three. At the very 
least, there should be a means by which the results of ‘innovation governance’ 
activities should feed into authorisation procedures, for, at present, innovation 
governance and risk regulation seem to operate in isolation of one another. 
Otherwise, the limitations of risk assessment (as discussed in Chapter Two) persist 
and the drive to enhance socio-technical integration founders. 
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This chapter has so far focused on opportunities to enhance socio-technical 
integration through participation. However, other mechanisms of 
regulation/governance can contribute and the new Article 26b DRD is perhaps one. 
The granting of a procedurally flexible, wide competence to Member States to 
restrict cultivation on numerous grounds without the need for supporting scientific 
evidence,870 though limited, is potentially significant both for its recognition of 
diverse (sub)-national interests and values871 and as an attempt to embed that 
political dimension in the regulatory process.872 Though controversial, the reform 
should be welcomed as a response to the typically narrow grounds for regulation 
criticised in Chapters One and Two, especially if it eliminates the need for 
arguments over safety as proxy for objections based on other values in favour of 
honest expression of reasons for regulation.  
There is still concern, though, that the reform seeks to protect the sanctity of EU 
risk assessment in decisions regarding placing on the market by arrogating 
consideration of safety concerns solely to EU level and comitology as separate from, 
and untainted by, ‘other concerns’, now assigned to Member States.873 However, 
these risk assessments have caused much conflict between Member States and 
EFSA.874 While Directive 2015/412 recognises the need to improve risk 
assessment,875 the approach chosen accepts neither competing national risk 
assessments nor criticism of EFSA’s risk assessment.876 Member States may only 
rely on grounds to regulate ‘impacts which are distinct from and complementary 
to’ EFSA’s assessment of the risks to health and the environment.877 According to 
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Nicolas de Sadeleer, this allows Member States to conduct additional assessments 
of risks not covered by EFSA’s imperfect risk assessments and to regulate in 
response to potential health and environmental impacts thereby disclosed.878 
However, the boundaries drawn by the legislation between EFSA’s science and the 
science behind national restrictions and their respective protection goals may be 
hard to maintain879 and could risk becoming battle lines. 
In essence, while the reform could enhance socio-technical integration in some 
areas of regulation,880 it ignores that imperative with respect to risk assessment 
itself, thereby preserving many of its problems, principally the unacknowledged 
influence of values, commitments and assumptions on purportedly objective 
assessments and diverse attitudes to biotechnology and its risks among the 
Member States881 bound by its conclusions.882 Largely excluding political, normative 
debate and other perspectives in favour of a single universal definition of safety 
here may further strengthen the technocratic nature of the EU’s approach to 
authorisations of GMOs/SOs, entrench artificial dichotomies between facts and 
values, de-politicise decisions which are profoundly political883 and ultimately 
reinforce the gap between policy and practice. Furthermore, given that Article 26b 
applies only to cultivation, it does little to accommodate diverse national values and 
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interests in the majority of applications not seeking authorisation for cultivation, 
deadlocked in comitology.884 
Member States regulating on the grounds contained in Article 26b(3) must ensure 
their regulation complies with the requirements of internal market law, including 
proportionality and non-discrimination, and will need to provide supporting 
evidence in the event of a challenge. The application of internal market law could 
place significant restraints on this new flexibility,885 perhaps reasonably so given the 
potential destabilising risks of multiple opt-outs feared by some.886 The hope is that 
the CJEU should respect the spirit of Directive 2015/412 and resist too strict an 
approach to adjudicating national opt-outs.887 Likewise, while Member States 
would likely need to present a more convincing case than Poland,888 ‘diverse 
evidence should be acceptable’.889 However, the reform is capable of encouraging 
equally reductive and expertise-driven methodologies as risk assessment to 
generate the necessary evidence and the Commission’s current indications of 
acceptable evidence do not suggest opening up decision-making overall.890 
Regarding the extent to which the reformed DRD could otherwise further RRI, there 
is cause for moderate optimism. Though applicable post-authorisation rather than 
during development, the list of ‘compelling grounds’ in Article 26b(3) clearly 
responds to a wide range of concerns about the implications of biotechnological 
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innovation. While Article 26b(3) omits public opposition as a compelling ground and 
makes no explicit provision for public participation, the Commission does anticipate 
that Member States will use the reform to respond to its citizens’ concerns and 
increase public involvement in national and regional decision-making.891 Thus the 
reform perhaps encourages inclusion and reflexivity and inches towards enhanced 
responsiveness, at the national level at least. Further encouragement for inclusion 
and reflexivity may result from the need for Member States to collaborate with 
industry, each other and the EU institutions during and after authorisation, which 
could help create space for political debate.892 However, the fact that these 
activities take place very ‘downstream’ could act as a major limit on this potential. 
These questions, if raised, would arguably be raised too late, though that need not 
rule out positive effects upstream, discussed below.  
Most importantly perhaps, the reform is designed to facilitate authorisation for 
trade and the ‘smooth functioning of the internal market’,893 potentially 
extinguishing space for deliberation on deeper questions such as the need for the 
technology and the kind of society they could create, especially where, as seems 
likely, EFSA’s epistemic authority persists.894 Retaining regulation of placing on the 
market and import of GMOs at EU level to preserve the internal market895 suggests 
the retention too of the DRD’s fundamental market logic, guaranteed by EFSA’s 
centralised and less politicised scientific safety assessments.896 Finally, if Member 
State regulations breach WTO rules, the opt-outs may be less flexible than they 
appear.897 
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5. Policy and practice un-synthesised   
The provisions examined above are ill-equipped to support the realisation of the 
EU’s broader policy on governance of synthetic biology specifically, or, more 
generally, its overarching policy on innovation governance discussed in Chapter 
Three. Clearly, authorisation procedures do not permit the luxury of months’ worth 
of ethical deliberation. Many scientists do not naturally think about the big picture, 
incentives to do so are absent898 and ultimately, embedding dialogue into 
governance is difficult.899 However, the legislative reticence over information and 
the limited opportunities for participation again illustrate the gap between these 
and the open, broad and deliberative ideal envisaged in the adoption of RRI as 
governance framework for synthetic biology. Moreover, the available procedures 
do not really enable challenges to the dominance of (probabilistic) risk assessment 
or the commercial imperative. This section considers the role of policy and the 
regulatory regime itself in maintaining the gap. 
5.1 A closer look at policy 
5.1.1 Synthesising public acceptance 
To support the EU’s vision for RRI and deliberation in the governance of synthetic 
biology and to reflect the open and inclusive ethos of synthetic biology right up until 
authorisation decisions, significant changes to the legislation are required. 
However, sufficient clarity in the political vision or a genuine political will to realise 
such changes are largely absent. The EU’s rhetoric enthusiastically promotes 
dialogue to open up governance of synthetic biology. However, for all the potential 
of public engagement to do so by, for example, enabling consideration of broader 
social values and interests and challenging the dominance of traditional expert 
analysis in the governance of technology, it may be used instrumentally, reinforcing 
pre-determined policy commitments, and operate as reductively as expert analysis 
itself.900 As argued by Sherry Arnstein, for example, there are many different 
                                                          
 
898 Bhattachary, Pascall Calitz and Hunter (n 775) 48. 
899 Sykes and Macnaghten (n 474) 101. 
900 Stirling, ‘“Opening Up” and “Closing Down”’ (n 9). 
158 
 
models of participation, offering various levels of citizen control over decision 
making, many of which are tokenistic.901 (Upstream) participation may be 
employed as risk management902 or in hopes of definitively dispelling 
controversy,903 and even the stream metaphor itself suggests unidirectional, 
deterministic technological progress.904 As argued below, much of the EU’s policy 
ultimately emphasises such processes of closing down, displaying motivations 
which confuse or contradict the express purpose of allowing societal concerns and 
values to shape synthetic biology research and its governance. 
Support for participation seems to stem from an instrumental desire to achieve 
certain ends: primarily overcoming opposition to facilitate the marketing and use 
of synthetic biology. Chiara Armeni has described two different models of public 
engagement in the context of technological development.905 ‘Participatory models’, 
on the one hand, are characterised by open debate over multiple available options 
in which the views and knowledges of publics are both valued and genuinely able 
to influence decisions. ‘Acceptance models’, on the other, involve top-down 
attempts to educate the presumed irrational and ignorant public and persuade it 
to ‘accept’ and validate pre-made decisions. Publics defer to experts while their 
own values and knowledges hold minimal sway. Such models seek to ‘enhance 
social awareness and support to accelerate implementation and facilitate 
compliance’.906 An acceptance model dominates EU policy on synthetic biology, 
according to which the public is brought on board907 by having its concerns 
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identified908 and addressed/overcome,909 rather than respected and responded to 
or treated as a valid challenge to current research trajectories or evaluations of 
risks.910 Policy states, for example, that it is important ‘to address ethical and safety 
concerns, and to address potential or perceived risks of synthetic biology…, so that 
future development work can be done in conditions of public trust’.911 The public is 
encouraged to imagine a world where synthetic biology is commonplace as part of 
the future ‘bioeconomy’912 and warned against the stifling consequences of 
‘excessive regulation’ for scientific progress.913 But such models cannot capture all 
the nuances of concern, intensified by the profound surrounding uncertainty.914 
They can mislead publics over the matters truly open to debate and the degree of 
public influence in decision-making.915 Ultimately, they ‘make the normative and 
substantive justification of the decision inevitably more fragile’.916 
This desire to persuade is infused with fear, amongst policy-makers and 
researchers, of, for example, alarmism and inaccuracy in media reporting of 
synthetic biology and of the resurrection of narratives of technological doom917 of 
the kind seen with respect to GM. There is a sense that the grand destiny for 
synthetic biology to ‘heal us, feed us and fuel us’ risks subversion by ‘public 
perceptions and fear’, engendering the paradox that public attitudes are getting in 
the way of public benefits.918 Formal participation is frequently based on 
construction of publics and a futile search for a pure, unpartisan public, open to 
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‘rational’ education919 and adoption of the consensus view. Here, the fear of public 
fear, or ‘synbiophobia-phobia’,920 stems from constructions of the publics involved 
as irrationally fearful and concerned primarily with narrow risks and benefits for 
their own interests; if they express other concerns, they are off-topic and ‘politically 
motivated’, and so definitions of publics become self-fulfilling.921 Such ‘folk 
theories’ of scientists and technologists often rest on little evidence and instead 
represent hyper-sensitivity towards any (including projected) opposition which 
persists despite attempts to explain the new technology.922 
Thus, the undimmable flame of the deficit model burns, evidenced too by the 
language of ‘public perceptions’923 and a desire to exercise control over the debate 
by controlling the information on which it is based. For example, policy promotes 
accessible and accurate information about synthetic biology as necessary to inform 
debate. It cautions that ‘public acceptance… is compromised through perceptions 
that have little basis in fact’924 and seeks to help the public ‘realistically assess fears 
expressed in more sensationalist accounts’,925 by calling for the presentation of 
synthetic biology ‘in ways that explain the risks and benefits to ordinary citizens’.926 
It warns against the potential for emotive language to damage ‘calm and rational 
discussion’.927 Concerns over creating life are acknowledged but accompanied by 
an assessment of science outstripping current ethical frameworks and a somewhat 
patronising call ‘to develop a more sophisticated appreciation of what is meant by 
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‘life’ than is current in popular discourse’.928 While public engagement is regarded 
as useful to ensure publics understand how synthetic biology will provide societal 
benefits and that potential risks are not exaggerated, there is no recognition that 
deliberation may aid definition of benefits and risks and no advocacy of debate 
where people could disagree about what is at stake.929 This casting of science 
simultaneously as all-purpose problem solver and provider of all necessary 
understanding leaves minimal room for public evaluation, reinforcing the deficit 
model930 and reducing socio-technical integration. It is this imaginary which is also 
reinforced by the narrow participation procedures of the DRD, its privileging of 
technical, over ‘other’, discourses and difficulties of communication between the 
different discourses.931 
The predominantly instrumental rationale permeating much of this policy surfaces 
too in its focus on ‘trusting participants’ (here, the public and attempts to secure 
its trust) rather than ‘trustworthy objects’, i.e. the qualities of the particular 
technologies or institutions in question.932 Inclusiveness and information sharing 
are highlighted as critical ‘as opinions based on misperceptions can undermine trust 
and hamper innovation’, as is dialogue in order to lower uncertainty and secure 
investments.933 While trust and accountability are important, this rationale can 
frame participation ‘within the boundaries of established agency practices and 
policy objectives’ inhibiting the influence of diverse knowledges and values on the 
final decision.934 
Policy, then, seems to offer a compromise in its emphasis on the pursuit of ‘public 
acceptability’ for the applications and risks of synthetic biology,935 defining success 
as contingent on the ability of synthetic biology to make products that are needed 
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by, or acceptable to, the public and/or other stakeholders.936 This approach defines 
the public firmly as consumers, rather than as citizens capable of expressing 
themselves other than at the checkout. It also sets up scientific research as ‘an 
endeavour independent from society producing a stream of bitter pills society 
might be expected to swallow until point of nonacceptance’.937 Despite frequent 
calls to discuss ethical implications, both public acceptance and the success of 
synthetic biology research is ultimately seen as conditional upon understanding and 
managing risks938 due to the misinterpretation of public concerns as desire for more 
robust risk regulation and consideration of downstream moral and ethical issues.939 
However, public acceptance is far more complex; it exists on a continuum, is 
contingent and context-dependent and cannot be reduced to ‘politics’ or 
nimbyism.940 It relates to the formation of attitudes to risk and is relevant to the 
definition and assessment of what is ‘biosafe’ and ‘biosecure’ enough, rather than 
something to be moulded by expert-defined and -conducted procedures. This blind 
spot and the absence of any recognition that public concerns vis-à-vis emerging 
technologies ‘tend to focus on the process of research, rather than the products’941 
speaks to the overall closing down of appraisals of risk itself to other values and 
other conceptions of risk. Furthermore, if biosafety and biosecurity are already 
treated in the policy as the main issues it raises doubt as to how much room there 
is for other concerns expressed by publics and whether engagement will have any 
significant impact on the content of the debate at all. Ultimately, debate should 
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extend beyond narrowly defined questions of biosafety and biosecurity typically 
discussed942 to the many dimensions encompassed by RRI.943 
5.1.2 Assumed futures  
Behind the drive for acceptance lies a cast iron conviction that synthetic biology 
represents an unmissable opportunity to enhance Europe’s competitiveness; ‘[i]t is 
obvious that Europe should invest in this area…’.944 Its beneficial contribution to the 
future bioeconomy is assumed945 and its potential to deliver products and solutions 
more quickly and thus provide an early return on investment is emphasised.946 The 
EU wishes to lead in synthetic biology research,947 illustrating its general desire for 
any innovation,948 discussed further in Chapter Eight. The deficient and hostile 
public,949 again, is viewed as being in the way.950 As with GM, this fear of missing 
out on a great opportunity may explain EU ambivalence towards the messy politics 
of participation.951 
In addition, despite the (at least superficial) openness and inclusivity of synthetic 
biology research and policy, as an engineering discipline, it is still inherently 
industrial and these two sides to its character may not necessarily co-exist 
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harmoniously. For example, the desire to stimulate commercial investment by 
providing regulatory certainty952 or demonstrating proximity of products to the 
market and their benefit to consumers,953 or generally to accelerate market-
wards954 so as to, for example, achieve an early return on investment,955 all 
represent somewhat conflicting aspirations. There is no mention of public 
engagement in these contexts and the rhetorical commitments elsewhere, 
examined in Chapter Three, would seem to be undermined by these directions to 
speed up achievement of synthetic biology’s commercial destiny, especially since 
the speed and direction of synthetic biology itself is a public concern.956  
5.1.3 Interrupted flows 
Reference is often made to public dialogue influencing funding and the way science 
is conducted. For example,957 funded organisations are encouraged to show they 
have given due consideration to potential ethical and social issues and 
environmental and other risks958 and to make the outcomes of public dialogue 
available to policy makers, other stakeholders and the public.959 However, 
indications that such dialogue should influence regulatory decisions are rare. The 
enthusiasm for upstream participation found in much of the policy may further 
exacerbate the gap between policy and regulation, perhaps allowing the EU to point 
to its energetic upstream dialogue and other RRI activities and deny therefore, the 
need to revise and open up its downstream authorisation procedures on the basis 
that all relevant issues have already been resolved.  
I argued in Chapter Three that innovation governance and risk regulation are part 
of the same continuum, that they should operate according to consistent principles 
and that encouraging the former should not detract attention from opening up the 
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latter. They should support and complement one other. However, if the governance 
of innovation and the authorisation procedures which regulate risk operate in 
isolation to one another, it will be difficult to verify whether all relevant issues have 
in fact been resolved. There are significant numbers of potential applicants under 
this regime. Even with meaningful public dialogue, there is no guarantee that a 
particular applicant under the DRD or CUD will have engaged in RRI or will have 
adapted its project to reflect the outcomes such that the relevant SO does not need 
to undergo further societal scrutiny before authorisation, but just needs 
confirmation of safety. With no monitoring or reporting requirements on industry 
on their part in these activities, there is no way, currently, to transmit any of this 
information, if it exists, to decision-makers.  
Essentially, participation in such activities is voluntary and, as such, the absence of 
sanctions may mean low participation.960 Furthermore, industry may be deterred 
from participating if, for example, it perceives any threat to the confidentiality of 
commercially sensitive information.961 Ultimately, plans are vague and so far there 
is little indication that the outcomes of any upstream governance activities are 
expected, or will be allowed, to reach or influence decision-makers. If this is so, it 
could undermine realisation of any potential substantive or problem-solving 
benefits of deliberative activities, discussed in Chapter Two, at this stage of 
decision-making. 
Altogether, the fear amongst policy-makers, the attempted control of debate and 
the presumption in favour of commercialisation creates the impression that the EU 
is engaged in selling synthetic biology to the public rather than engaging with the 
public. Specifically, its apparent ambitions for strong public participation are 
tempered significantly by a desire to control the information on which debate is 
based and the scope of the debate so as not to challenge the direction set out for 
scientific research or Europe's leadership in that research.962 Ultimately, this 
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suggests that even if there were space for expression of any concerns the public 
may have during authorisation, they may not necessarily be taken seriously.  
5.2 Inherited regulation 
The conflicting aspirations of policy, consequential closing down of debate and 
separation between innovation governance and regulation identified above are 
perhaps intensified by the fact that synthetic biology has inherited an old regulatory 
regime, designed for a different technology. ‘Inherited regulation’ refers to the idea 
that a piece of legislation is born out of the values salient at the time it was 
negotiated and drafted and reflects a contemporaneous set of principles and 
assumptions. When those old rules are applied to new products, the underlying 
policies, aims, assumptions and priorities of those rules are transferred to the new 
product when they may not be appropriate.963 As such, synthetic biology inherits a 
framework of regulatory values, goals, intentions, priorities and powers and 
interpretive practices and in fact the whole broader policy setting,964 designed to 
regulate the products of genetic engineering which may struggle to respond to 
challenges posed by the new technology unanticipated at the time the regulation 
was drafted.965  
To contextualise, the EU's core project is the internal market and safeguarding its 
integrity is paramount.966 The two prominent narratives running through the 
Directives examined here reflect the position that ‘[t]ypically the starting point of 
regulation is the potential of new technology to open markets and create wealth, 
and to position jurisdictions as a competitive and dynamic knowledge society’.967 
Public involvement always started from the acceptability of growing GMOs in the 
EU, subject only to ERA.968 The EU's policy towards biotechnology at the turn of the 
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century, when the DRD was drafted, demonstrates its clear interest in 
commercialising the products of biotech quickly, improving the situation of 
European biotechnology research and its concern about global economic 
competition.969 
As discussed, some processes and products of synthetic biology research are not 
covered by the CUD and DRD as they currently stand and the only potential changes 
to the regulation discussed seriously relate to risk assessment procedures to ensure 
biosafety. Inquiries into whether existing regulation covers emerging, high risk, 
technologies focus on health, safety and the environment in order to establish 
regulatory connection. Regulatory disconnection can occur where ‘the original 
regulatory purposes no longer provide clear justificatory cover for the uses to which 
the technology is now put’.970 This arguably describes the regulation of synthetic 
biology where connection is established through definitions971 but where its many 
potential negative implications derive not from the specifics of synthetic biology 
but from its global applications,972 meaning the purpose of the regulation is ill-
equipped to respond to the possible consequences. 
Treating the application of the old rules to synthetic biology as a technical question 
of definition bypasses the democratic processes associated with legislating.973 By 
contrast, the potential openness and inclusion of synthetic biology, along with its 
philosophy and assumptions and the socio-economic or ethical concerns 
highlighted above and perhaps discoverable through RRI, might have indicated that 
the current regulatory regime was neither adequate nor appropriate. For example, 
evaluations of the reliability of risk assessment of SOs are liable to vary depending 
on the evaluator’s level of commitment to synthetic biology’s core assumption of 
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predictability.974 EFSA’s uncertainty intolerance already propagates the 
‘uncertainty paradox’,975 which may become further entrenched if claims to 
predictability increase demands that science provide certainty on uncertain risks 
while synthetic biology’s increasingly profound manipulation, or even creation, of 
life perhaps increases uncertainty. 
In other words, policy-makers could assume that those other socio-economic or 
ethical questions, or values, which might actually be different to those associated 
with genetic engineering, or which have evolved, or intensified,976 in the 16 years 
since the DRD was negotiated, had already been dealt with in the negotiation and 
implementation of that legislation. For example, much of the debate around 
genetic engineering focused on bioethics. For all the enthusiasm to cover ethics in 
discussions, in other places, socio-ethical questions involving recombinant DNA are 
passed over because they are considered to be stable and already settled,977 
despite the profound (and novel) ethical implications of synthetic biology’s core 
metaphor, ‘living machines’, discussed above and, ironically, despite ongoing 
controversy surrounding GMOs. Technoscientific development is still viewed as the 
driver of change indicating the priority of technical questions,978 despite the 
argument above that the distinguishing features of synthetic biology are its 
philosophy, assumptions and ambitions, all of which deserve open scrutiny. The 
belief that the products of synthetic biology should be regulated by the same 
regulatory framework as products from other sources979 further indicates that such 
socio-ethical discussions are perhaps simultaneously expected to have no impact. 
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While there are good practical reasons not to re-legislate for every emerging 
technology,980 the open ethos of synthetic biology, its promises to address multiple 
diverse problems and the energy put into its governance – in essence its 
disruptiveness – should entail review, involving publics, of existing regulatory 
structures, priorities and definitions of our assumed futures.981 A similar straight-
jacketing of issues within existing structures is also visible in policy. Indeed, while 
we are sometimes warned that the novelty of synthetic biology represents a 
significant challenge to regulation, more specific examination of regulation results 
in arguments that provision is in fact sufficient.982 Furthermore, there is a tendency 
to frame problems with synthetic biology to match established policy categories, so 
that governance involves fitting into readily available solutions, for example, that 
governance must be based on sound scientific evidence and that ’other’ concerns 
can be dealt with separately, downstream.983 
A presumption that the legislation applies on the basis of technical coverage further 
undermines ambitious implementation of policy on RRI and participation in two 
ways. Firstly, the existing regulations condition the terms of the debate, such as it 
is; synthetic biology is seen through the lens of the DRD and the CUD.984 This is 
important because downstream regulation can influence research and innovation 
upstream,985 discussed below. Secondly, ‘it makes questioning the desirability of 
new, innovative products difficult since their introduction into the market becomes 
an inevitable and incontrovertible consequence of their supposed regulation’, 
provided the products are ‘safe’.986 It also prevents an ambitious regulatory shift 
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commensurate with the alleged disruptive potential of synthetic biology 
products987 because of the narrow circularity of current legislation-contingent 
exercises in defining synthetic biology, and the adaptation and legitimisation of 
current legislation by understanding synthetic biology ‘as a variant of established 
practices of biotechnology’.988 The above observations correlate to a broader trend 
with synthetic biology as identifier and solver of societal challenges, in which 
democratic institutions defer to science to define plausible futures and matters 
warranting societal attention. Science acts; society reacts, and normative, socio-
ethical questions ‘are rendered subsidiary to – and are often silenced by – expert 
assessments of novelty’.989 
Though not explicitly addressed to developments in synthetic biology specifically, 
the new Article 26b DRD could help alleviate these deficiencies. Member States 
have more flexibility to adapt their regulation to such new developments. Their new 
power could indirectly mandate reflection amongst synthetic biologists, who 
presumably want their research outcomes authorised, on the processes and 
trajectories of their research and development, in line with RRI. Directive 2015/412 
is clear that national regulation under Article 26b should not prevent biotechnology 
research but, interestingly, it requires ‘that the activity does not undermine the 
respect of the grounds on which the restriction or prohibition has been 
introduced’,990 perhaps demanding sensitivity amongst researchers towards the 
national values and concerns motivating the measure. Though Member States’ 
hard legal rights are limited to regulating cultivation, this provision perhaps enables 
their exercise to send ripples upstream and percolate more deeply through 
innovation systems.  
More specifically, knowing the range of grounds on which Member States may 
regulate cultivation, or even the mere fact that such concerns are deemed valid, 
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could provide a framework for encouraging RRI. For example, and more specifically, 
it could encourage upstream anticipation of the plausible and possible directions of 
synthetic biology, reflection on commitments and the likely concerns of Member 
States and their citizens, greater willingness to engage with these actors and/or 
greater responsiveness to the outcomes of that engagement.991 If an applicant 
under the DRD has engaged with or responded poorly to public concerns about a 
modified organism intended for cultivation, perhaps that behaviour can be cited as 
evidence in support of a restriction on one of the grounds, or a ground itself if the 
resulting organism falls short of claims and promises made of it upstream. That the 
list of compelling grounds in Article 26b(3) is open is a further help. One of the most 
prominent policy commitments discussed in Chapter Three is to use science and 
technology to tackle grand societal challenges and pursue research and innovation 
in accordance with societal goals and ethical values. The lack of need for, or social 
benefit of, a modification is not a compelling ground992 but nothing prevents 
Member States from relying on other such justifications.993 Indeed, given the 
prominence of the commitment to targeting societal challenges with science and 
innovation in accordance with societal goals and values, denial of the relevance of 
a societal need for a technology at this stage would appear irrational and 
inconsistent. However, the absence of societal need as a compelling ground raises 
reasonable questions regarding the coherence of the EU’s overarching vision for 
innovation governance/regulation, what the EU thinks RRI, for example, is actually 
for and whether the policy-practice gap remains as wide as before. 
Furthermore, the reform seeks to increase authorisations and ‘the role of GMOs in 
EU agriculture’.994 In addition, the maintenance of a harmonised authorisation 
procedure, risk assessment and level of protection facilitates trade within the 
internal market, benefiting commercial actors.995 Overall, the commercial 
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imperative stands and the quest for potential to inspire deeper change in synthetic 
biology research and innovation systems occurs in a reform ultimately designed to 
facilitate that imperative. This raises questions about how genuinely the EU 
believes in its own policy ambitions relating to participation at each stage of 
innovation governance and risk regulation. It also reinforces the impression that no 
matter how forceful the conclusions coming out of earlier participation exercises 
are, they are likely to wield little influence in regulatory decision-making or on the 
values on which regulation itself should be based. 
6. Conclusion 
The policy and legislative matrix in relation to synthetic biology is exquisitely 
complex. The conflicting sentiments and contradictory aims of policy make it 
impossible to ascertain, for certain, what the EU’s true intentions are. At times 
policy seems to support ambitiously opening up governance to public values and 
debate. At other times, instrumental approaches to participation, attempts to 
control the debate, a focus on public acceptability, the assumption that 
commercialisation will automatically produce societal benefits and the centripetal 
force of risk undermine any more ambitious visions for participation expressed 
elsewhere. The embracing of public engagement by the synthetic biology 
community is perhaps prompted by synbiophobia-phobia. This is ‘a belief system 
that closes down, rather than opens up, the politics of knowledge and power in 
technology choice’ and which reinforces ‘entrenched modes of managing 
controversy’ which postpones conflict until products begin to reach market.996 
If this is really how the EU views engagement, then it seems unlikely that it would 
regard any outcomes of participation as requiring change to the legislation, 
including the participation provisions during authorisation, or as influential in 
individual authorisation decisions. The legislation, as it currently stands, with its 
restrictive provisions on participation and narrow authorisation procedures, gives 
the EU a degree of control, which it seems to be aiming for in its sponsored dialogue 
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exercises, and which it is therefore unlikely, perhaps, to want to relinquish. This 
structure of the regulation, moreover, fails to strike a reasonable balance between 
the participatory and industrial aspirations of synthetic biology.  
The uncertainty of the EU’s policy vision is further exacerbated by the presence and 
application of a regime designed for a different technology. This creates the 
impression that the kinds of social, ethical, distributive or other issues relating to 
synthetic biology, which would be discussed in a broad and open participation 
exercise, have already been settled, meaning that anything more than the 
narrowest of participation exercises is otiose. It also provides a restrictive frame for 
the conduct of any deliberative activities upstream which could stifle any potential 
challenges to existing regulation.997 Article 26b may do little to change this. 
Ultimately, the regulatory regime is inadequate to support the EU’s policy vision for 
RRI and especially dialogue in synthetic biology and it seems unlikely to be 
otherwise in the near future, at least. This is not a criticism of the attempts to 
engage publics, which may be run by individuals who are committed to the ideals 
of public engagement, nor of attempts to use the outcomes of that engagement to 
shape research. The problem lies more in the inflexibility of some aspects of the 
regulatory structure and a political unwillingness to relinquish enough control to 
enable genuine participation, with the potential to influence decision-making, 
during all stages of governance and regulation. The unfortunate results are that the 
promising open ethos of synthetic biology does not reach as far as regulation, that 
any discussions not related to the adequacy of the regulatory risk assessment 
procedures appear to be drowned in the flow downstream and that alternative 
views remain, by and large, silent during a critical decision-making procedure. 
 
                                                          
 
997 Stokes, ‘Demand for Command’ (n 414). 
174 
 
 
 
 
SECTION III – NOT WALKING THE WALK: WHY CLOSING THE POLICY-
PRACTICE GAP IS SO DIFFICULT 
 
175 
 
Chapter Six – The role of the EU internal market in maintaining the 
gap between policy and practice 
1. Introduction  
Science plays a crucial role in establishing the lawfulness of regulation which claims 
to ensure safety (as opposed to being a cover for protectionism) by showing that 
there is a risk to human health or the environment, enabling safety or 
environmental protection to prevail over interests in economic freedom. However, 
‘safety’ is ambiguous and, as discussed in Chapter Two, there are many non-safety 
concerns associated with such technologies which regulatory science cannot 
explicitly demonstrate. These concerns may still influence societal attitudes to risk 
or constitute valid, if not necessarily lawful, reasons to regulate a risky technology 
independent of scientific ‘proof’ of a risk. This chapter examines the extent to which 
non-safety concerns as well as diverse understandings of risk or safety can compete 
with economic interests in the context of the EU’s internal market.998  
Sections I and II examined concerns peculiar to risky technologies; peculiar that is, 
for the characteristic entanglement of moral, social, economic and 
environmental/health concerns, which perhaps explain the very existence of the 
discourse on socio-technical integration in their governance and regulation.999 All 
technologies differ in the detail of their implications.1000 However, regardless of the 
technology, familiar concerns, which citizens and Member States may wish to 
address through regulation, are clear. The following would ideally be recognised by 
internal market law as valid reasons for introducing trade-restrictive measures: 
concerns over the potential negative impacts of technologies and their uncertain, 
unknown or indeterminate severity; doubt over an uncertain, perhaps illusory, 
                                                          
 
998 I have avoided casting these as trade and non-trade values in this and the next chapter 
and recognise that their boundaries may be fluid, Andrew Lang, ‘Reflecting on “Linkage”: 
Cognitive and Institutional Change in The International Trading System’ (2007) 70 Modern 
Law Review 523. 
999 EGSG (n 6); Owen, Macnaghten and Stilgoe (n 350) 751–752. 
1000 Roger Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on Regulating 
Technologies’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal 
Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart 2008) 30. 
176 
 
need for the technology; concerns over consequences for society or the economy 
beyond those to the environment and/or human health; concerns over the 
distribution of impacts within and between generations which may be 
unpredictable and regressive; concerns over ownership structure – who owns the 
intellectual property rights behind the technology, the openness of the structure 
and whether it tends towards consolidation or distribution of market power; ethical 
or religious concerns; the direction and speed of technological innovation; the 
likelihood of further commoditisation, mechanisation or control of nature; whether 
a technology undermines human dignity or certain relationships and boundaries, 
for example that between man and nature or between man and machine, 
respectively; its tendency to preserve, alter or erode a culture, tradition or social 
structure; whether it threatens or promotes diversity; its impact on consumers and 
employment; and its compatibility with a more or less open society, or a centralised 
or de-centralised style of government.  
This chapter considers the role internal market law plays in preventing greater 
socio-technical integration in the regulation of risky technologies, as committed to 
in EU policy (see Chapter Three). To that end, it examines the extent to which the 
above types of concerns could constitute valid reasons to regulate under internal 
market law. While the EU has increasingly pursued areas of social policy,1001 the 
internal market remains its core project.1002 The fulfilment of certain desirable goals 
for the EU, including increased growth and economic competitiveness and myriad 
other consequential social benefits are regarded as contingent upon its 
completion.1003 The EU does however, for example through exceptions to free 
movement discussed below, recognise that certain policy goals may not necessarily 
be achieved through the elimination of barriers to trade and that some trade-
restrictive measures may be necessary to achieve those goals. It is at least arguable, 
though, whether the fundamental non-negotiability of the EU’s economic goals and 
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the dominance of risk assessment ultimately provide a structure which can 
recognise and accommodate non-economic interests;1004 specifically here the 
infinitely subtle concerns over risky technologies. 
Chapter Two discussed the political incentives for using regulatory science to justify 
decisions. There may also be significant legal incentives for decision-makers in an 
EU context to justify decisions to regulate technologies on the basis of a 
scientifically-diagnosed risk to safety, despite the salience of other concerns.1005 
Furthermore, the predominant vision driving market integration in the EU – i.e. the 
removal of barriers to free movement and distortions to competition – perhaps 
tends to favour uniformity in standards protecting consumers and the environment 
and ‘prizes market efficiency and Europe-wide neutrality of competition above 
other competing values’1006 also perhaps placing certain policy goals beyond 
reach.1007 To those arguments I add the observation that where a technology could 
pose risks inter alia of harm to the environment or human health, the EU 
institutions often treat the existence of a problem as an epistemic question, 
granting science priority of agency in determining whether a problem justifying 
regulation actually exists.1008 The effect, I argue, is to pre-empt any alternative lens 
(for example, moral, distributional etc.) through which to discern and articulate a 
problem, thereby precluding the application of justifications for measures which 
ostensibly seek to protect interests other than safety, despite their in-principle 
availability. I argue, furthermore, that the type of regulatory science required in 
support of such measures is strictly defined, restricting scope for diverse framings 
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of even the underlying epistemic question (i.e. whether there is a threat to safety) 
as influenced by specific values or concerns.  
Ultimately, this reinforces the ‘facts-then-values’ order prescribed for decision-
making where risky technologies are concerned, as discussed in Chapter Two. Little 
opportunity remains then, to justify trade-restrictive measures on the basis of 
either values other than the protection of human health and/or the environment 
independently of a technology’s safety profile, or regulatory science conducted 
according to a frame shaped by such values. In other words (perhaps as an example 
of the potential of internal market law to depoliticise social questions1009 such as 
those raised by risky technology) the arrangement further stifles socio-technical 
integration.  
This has implications for the kind of evidence which may substantiate the need for 
a trade-restrictive measure. Omnipresent uncertainty over the implications of a 
technology raises further challenges to providing convincing evidence of a reason 
to regulate. As the problem of uncertainty pervades the regulation of risky 
technologies, I begin with a brief discussion of its treatment in the EU. Section 3 
considers the justifications available for restricting free movement under Article 36 
TFEU and the public interest requirements doctrine.1010 I argue that while case law 
indicates that those justifications could cover many of the concerns associated with 
risky technologies,1011 they are likely to be unavailable where a risk to human health 
and/or the environment has not already been scientifically diagnosed. These 
justifications do not apply where the relevant area of law has been harmonised at 
EU level.1012 However, the harmonisation status of an area of law can be unclear1013 
and it is possible that instruments which harmonise the law with respect to 
environmental/human health protection leave unharmonised concerns other than 
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safety.1014 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Five, other concerns have now 
been de-harmonised under Article 26b DRD.1015 Section 4 considers the 
justifications for derogating from harmonised EU measures. In all three areas, I 
argue that recourse to some form of scientific or technical expertise, reasoning or 
information pre-empts employment of other, value-driven, forms of reasoned 
inquiry into the existence of a problem justifying regulation and eliminates 
opportunity to adduce such evidence. In these ways, the EU’s approach to 
disciplining trade-restrictive measures curtails fulfilment of its commitment to 
greater socio-technical integration in regulatory decision-making. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Uncertainty and precaution  
As discussed in Sections I and II, technologies, and the systems (natural and social) 
with which they interact are inherently unpredictable.1016 In addition to risk and 
uncertainty, knowledge about their behaviour and impacts on society is 
characterised by ignorance, indeterminacy and contingency.1017 Risk assessment is 
unable to tame this uncertainty. This presents a challenge in terms of assembling 
evidence to justify a trade-restrictive measure designed to ensure safety, indicating 
the wisdom of reference to other factors in determining a course of action in 
situations of uncertainty.1018 
The precautionary principle1019 is designed to assist in such situations of 
uncertainty. Though it may (and perhaps should) operate differently in different 
contexts within the EU,1020 that operation has perhaps become more tightly 
controlled. The EU judiciary has reserved its most intense judicial review for the 
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Commission’s application of the precautionary principle perhaps in an effort to 
ensure against arbitrary trade restrictions1021 which the principle is feared to 
enable.1022 
The landmark cases, Pfizer1023 and Alpharma,1024 marked a milestone in the EU’s 
approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty.1025 Prior to these cases, the Court 
took a slightly lighter approach to measures designed to deal with uncertainty.1026 
In Sandoz, without mentioning the precautionary principle, the Court recognised 
the uncertainties surrounding consumption of vitamins and held that, in the 
absence of harmonisation, Member States had discretion to decide their own level 
of public health protection.1027 In Fedesa, the Court was satisfied that the existence 
of divergent Member State appraisals regarding the impacts of using certain 
hormones in meat production leading to different regulation, justified the Council 
instituting an EU-wide prohibition of five such hormones. In UK v Commission (BSE), 
new scientific evidence indicating (but not proving) the possibility that BSE was 
transmissible to humans constituted a sufficient basis for a temporary ban on the 
transport of bovine animals and derived products from the UK.1028 
However, since Pfizer/Alpharma, precautionary regulation must be based on ‘the 
best scientific information available’1029 and ‘as thorough a scientific risk 
assessment as possible’1030 such that the regulator can ‘reasonably’ conclude there 
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is a risk of harm, or that preventative measures are required.1031 In addition, risk 
assessment must be conducted ‘on the basis of scientific advice founded on the 
principles of excellence, transparency and independence… to ensure the scientific 
objectivity of the measures adopted’.1032 These principles are elaborated in the 
General Food Law1033 and the Commission’s White Paper on Food Safety1034 and 
aim to raise confidence in the EU’s risk assessment procedures. Transparency, 
conceived as entailing openness and public consultation,1035 in particular could 
suggest potential for socio-technical integration in this context. However, Chapter 
Five illustrates that we are still far from achieving these goals and ‘scientific 
objectivity’, as discussed in Chapter Two, is not straightforward. Overall, it is not 
clear that such measures could diffuse tensions between scientific and lay reason 
or successfully integrate both in decision-making.1036  
The cases mark a proceduralisation of precaution1037 and, in contrast to the pre-
Alpharma/Pfizer approach, the development of a certain rigour in the Courts in 
demanding the steps set out be followed. Flexibility is retained in various respects. 
A public authority can take precautionary measures despite the impossibility of 
conducting a full scientific risk assessment due to inadequate available scientific 
data.1038 Indeed, the ‘cases do not seem to set a particularly high threshold for 
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legitimate intervention with precautionary measures’.1039 In addition, EU 
institutions are not bound by the conclusions of scientific committees1040 although 
where they do depart from such advice, they must provide a statement of reasons 
‘of a scientific level at least commensurate with that of the opinion in question’.1041 
This may form a significant legal incentive to justify decisions with scientific 
reasons1042 and perhaps marks a departure from a less constraining test previously 
indicated by the Commission which would also consider ‘for example economic, 
societal, traditional, ethical or environmental factors, as well as the feasibility of 
controls’.1043 EU institutions also have a broad discretion in determining the level of 
risk deemed unacceptable for society and in establishing the factual basis of its 
action such that the scope of judicial review is limited,1044 although its intensity may 
still vary unpredictably.1045 
In addition, the General Court held that ‘a preventive measure cannot properly be 
based on a purely hypothetical approach to the risk… which has not been 
scientifically verified’. Though the ‘reality and extent’ of the risk need not be fully 
and conclusively demonstrated, the risk still needed to be ‘adequately backed up 
by the scientific data’ at the time the measure was taken. The Court rejects 
hypothetical risk as a basis for regulating due to the impossibility of proving, 
scientifically, the existence of ‘zero risk’.1046 
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The Court’s approach is reasonable; a fixation in decision-making on hypothetical 
risk or proof of ‘zero risk’ would surely lead to stagnation.1047 And the Court is 
frequently faced with the delicate task of reconciling discretion with protection 
against arbitrary decision-making.1048 However, limiting the application of the 
precautionary principle to scientific uncertainty, as if uncertainty is amenable to 
scientific scrutiny,1049 reinforces an understanding of risk as constituting solely 
threats to health or environmental concerns by requiring regulation to be justified 
by scientifically identifiable concerns.1050 Our ignorance relates to both potential 
social impacts and health or environmental impacts, the latter being the province 
of scientific investigation and emphasised by the Courts to the exclusion of the 
former. A lesser requirement that the fact of our ignorance be weighed in the 
balance could sufficiently acknowledge the question without distorting the entire 
process.1051 Indeed, as we become increasingly aware of our own ignorance, not 
doing so may be culpable.1052 There is certainly evidence that pursuing 
technological innovation in ignorance of all its implications can be harmful.1053 
Though we should beware of over comparison,1054 the mistakes and unintended 
consequences of the Green Revolution for example, could prove salutary in defining 
a sensitive approach to certain risks of GM crops,1055 or agricultural applications of 
synthetic biology. 
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The Court’s observation, in Pfizer, that ‘scientific legitimacy is not a sufficient basis 
for the exercise of public authority’,1056 recognises that regulation can be 
political1057 and hence the need for political legitimacy.1058 However, the Court 
appears to take political legitimacy for granted1059 and apparently ignores the fact 
that even its scientific legitimacy may be deeply contested due to the shortcomings 
of regulatory science, discussed in Chapter Two. Overall, the general emphasis on 
scientific evaluation does not indicate an appetite for opening up either risk 
assessment or the decision-making process as a whole. Indeed, the Court has stated 
explicitly that the principle that protection of public health takes precedence over 
economic considerations requires inter alia ‘taking account exclusively of 
considerations relating to the protection of public health’,1060 but fails to 
acknowledge that the need to protect in the first place may be contested. 
There is not necessarily a lack of acknowledgement of the existence of various 
shades of uncertainty amongst EU institutions. But, as the cases on precaution 
arguably demonstrate, it is not unquestionably a lack of acknowledgement alone 
which stifles a response befitting this more accurate understanding of the nature 
of technology. However, the requirement for a scientific risk assessment even in 
situations of uncertainty extends the influence of scientific reasoning such that its 
terms ‘are still to be used to guide disputes’1061 importing a facts-before-values 
logic. This denies the possibility that uncertainty (including hypothetical risk and 
past experience) in combination with, for example, consumer concerns or moral 
objections could form a valid reason for a regulatory measure.1062 Without science 
to specify a problem, there seems to be a presumption that other sensibilities have 
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no right to take umbrage such as to justify intervention in the market, despite the 
wisdom of factoring other concerns into decisions in situations of uncertainty.1063 
3. Exceptions to free movement: Article 36 TFEU and public interest requirements 
Much of the legislation examined in Section II provides for the positive 
harmonisation of the areas to which it applies, save for the recently de-harmonised 
provisions relating to the cultivation of GMOs, discussed in Chapter Five. This 
section presents a more in-depth discussion of the justifications for restricting free 
movement so as to achieve policy goals other than safety. Vital though this clearly 
is, the argument that other interests and concerns can and should also justify 
regulation of risky technologies is central to this thesis. 
3.1 Justifications for restricting free movement 
Article 34 TFEU provides the primary legislative instrument for creating and 
maintaining the EU’s internal market in relation to goods and prohibits 
‘Quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect’ (MEE). The ECJ 
initially interpreted ‘MEE’ broadly1064 and subsequently extended the reach of 
Article 34 yet further to indistinctly applicable national measures.1065 
The counterbalances to the breadth of Article 34 are found in Article 36 which 
allows Member States to prohibit or restrict imports (or exports) if ‘justified on 
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants…’ amongst other things. The Court in Cassis 
de Dijon provided an additional, non-exhaustive list of grounds for maintaining non-
discriminatory prohibitions or restrictions, which included, inter alia: ‘the 
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the 
defence of the consumer’.1066 These grounds have been expanded subsequently to 
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include, for example, fundamental rights, as enshrined in the European Convention 
on Human Rights or the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1067  
Case law clearly demonstrates the Court’s willingness to accept environmental 
protection as a justification for restricting free movement,1068 including a 
combination of both environmental or human health protection and other factors 
such as ease of administration of the relevant rules1069 and the geographical 
circumstances of a Member State.1070 In addition, within those broad justifications, 
the Court has recognised multiple reasons justifying trade restrictions, which do not 
relate to ensuring safety, many of which could apply, directly or by analogy, to 
concerns commonly expressed regarding risky technologies, summarised above. 
With respect to public morality, the ECJ granted a broad discretion to Member 
States ‘to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form 
selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory’.1071 This should 
encompass moral concerns regarding for example, increased control over nature, 
the manipulation of life or the relationship between humans and machines.  
The protection of young persons,1072 vulnerable sections of the population and the 
prevention of potential disruption to certain areas from the establishment of sex 
shops1073 were recognised as lawful reasons for restricting trade. Protection of 
future generations or the cultural or social status quo from the potentially 
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disruptive effects of a technology could therefore plausibly constitute valid reasons. 
More generally, the Court relied on the requirement under (then) Community law 
to respect human dignity as justification for a German prohibition on laser games 
which simulated homicide.1074 The acceptance of that justification should therefore 
indicate its applicability to implications for human dignity of technological 
innovation. 
The Court accepted the need to maintain a domestic supply of petroleum products 
as vital to public security and the existence of a country.1075 The recognition of this 
policy goal as a lawful reason to restrict trade, could seem in some senses analogous 
to a policy goal to protect food supply by, for example, restricting use of pesticides 
harmful to bees. 
Restrictions on lotteries have been upheld on the basis of the protection of 
consumers and the maintenance of order in society. More detailed justifications 
included preventing the generation of private profit from the exploitation of 
addiction1076 and its damaging individual and social consequences.1077 Acceptance 
by the Court of such reasons indicates a sensitivity towards distributive concerns, 
specifically private benefit and socialisation of risk, a common concern with respect 
to the distribution of the risks and benefits of technological innovation.  
The language of fundamental rights in the context of free movement has been 
described as ‘highly significant in showing the permeation of trade law by wider 
values’.1078 For example, the Court has recognised the maintenance of press 
diversity (and thereby freedom of expression) through protecting small publishers 
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from damaging competition as lawful reasons for restricting trade.1079 While not 
linked to freedom of expression, concern over consolidation of market power and 
the ownership structure of the relevant commercial entities is often expressed in 
relation to risky technologies. In the context of free movement of capital, the Court, 
in Ospelt, accepted the social objectives pursued by an Austrian law which 
regulated transfers of agricultural land. These objectives included: ‘preserving 
agricultural communities, maintaining a distribution of land ownership which 
allows the development of viable farms and sympathetic management of green 
spaces and the countryside as well as encouraging a reasonable use of the available 
land by resisting pressure on land, and preventing natural disasters…’.1080 Many of 
the objectives in Ospelt speak to concerns raised in connection with the effect 
certain risky technologies may have on social structures, for example rural 
communities, the intensification of agriculture supported by pesticide use and 
biotechnology and again, the distribution of costs and benefits. 
Finally, the Court in Torfaen, expressed respect for ‘certain political and economic 
choices… [and] national or regional socio-cultural characteristics’ by recognising the 
legitimacy of a Member State wishing to arrange its working hours in accordance 
with such characteristics.1081 Again, where a technology threatens to undermine 
socio-cultural characteristics, as novel food-related technologies may do – in 
particular given the centrality of food to culture,1082 arguably a similar level of 
judicial respect should apply. 
The Court has frequently held that Member States enjoy some discretion1083 when 
drawing on the above justifications: for example to accommodate their ‘cultural, 
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religious, moral and historic sensitivities’;1084 or in recognition of the fact that public 
policy justifications may vary between countries and eras;1085 or where it is 
necessary to balance two fundamental rights – that of freedom of expression1086 or 
freedom of assembly1087 on the one hand and on the other, right to free 
movement.1088 That discretion and the above acceptance of diverse justifications 
for trade-restrictive measures are illustrations of the general respect the EU has for 
national self-determination on the basis of unique ‘ideological, demographic, 
geographic, historical, religious and cultural idiosyncrasies’, according to which 
each Member State is ‘always right’.1089 This is so particularly with respect to so-
called ‘morality policy’ which is often characterised by conflict over fundamental 
first principles, decisions over ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and lack of consensus.1090  
There are, however, limits to the Court’s deference, evident in particular in its 
proportionality analysis, discussed below. With respect to public policy, it does 
adopt a stricter approach, stating that Article 36 requires ‘a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’,1091 though how this would be 
judged is unclear.1092 And, where it was required to weigh the right to take collective 
action and the protection of workers against the right to freedom of 
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establishment,1093 and freedom to provide services1094 despite acknowledging that 
the EU had ‘not only an economic but also a social purpose’,1095 it found for the 
latter right. For all the Court’s talk of balancing economic and social policy, its 
approach in fact favours ‘the economic freedoms (Articles 43 and 49) and creates a 
presumption that the national rule is unlawful’.1096  
Others have criticised this apparent tendency for social interests to lose out1097 and 
it has been argued that the very means of achieving European integration 
structurally prioritises economic free movement rights over social 
considerations.1098 However, Laval is typically framed as a conflict between the 
right of Swedish unions to use collective bargaining and the right of a Latvian 
company to provide services. The missing players are the Latvian workers' (Laval's 
employees) and their right to exercise freedom of movement to improve their 
economic and social well-being. While the case has been criticised for being 
insensitive to certain social rights, the Court's recognition that the prevention of 
social dumping could justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom1099 further hints 
at an insensitivity towards any distributional (and therefore social) consequences 
of preventing the exercise of freedom of movement by workers for regions and 
Member States.1100 Ultimately, the commercial interests are protected here. The 
approach perhaps indicates the fragility of non-economic and distributional 
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concerns as against other, commercial, economic interests which may well extend 
to the types of concerns triggered by risky technologies. 
Finally, in general, exceptions may only be used for non-economic purposes1101 on 
the grounds that allowing such arguments opens the door to protectionism.1102 This 
norm can pose difficulties for Member States pursuing certain social goals such as 
redistribution.1103 Concerns raised in relation to pesticides include the distribution 
of remediation costs and in relation to GM crops, for example, include threats to 
existing farming structures from ‘contamination’ or competition from large agri-
business, all of which have more or less obvious economic dimensions.1104 However, 
there is flexibility in this general principle.1105 The Court has also allowed measures 
pursuing a public health objective which is contingent on achieving an economic 
objective,1106 indicating that the mere presence of an economic objective does not 
necessarily prevent Article 36 from applying.1107 As such, Member States wishing to 
protect national agricultural structures, for example, will have to prove their 
farming systems pursue objectives beyond the economic.1108 
To summarise, the above cases are evidence of the wide variety of non-safety 
interests Member States may raise to justify obstacles to intra-EU trade beyond the 
Treaty’s predetermined policy objectives.1109 The justifications most salient to this 
thesis could cover concerns relating to the moral implications of technology, 
distribution of risks and benefits of technology, potentially both within and 
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between generations, distribution of economic power and the ownership of 
technologies and the effects of technology on certain, especially agricultural, 
communities. Few cases, however, have exhibited the combinations of concerns 
which frequently characterise risky technologies and so their application is perhaps 
unpredictable. 
Societal need for a technology is often considered important.1110 Commission v 
Netherlands concerned a Dutch requirement that importers demonstrate the 
existence of a nutritional need to market fortified foodstuffs, in addition to their 
safety. The Netherlands sought to justify their requirement under Article 36 on 
grounds of public health. With respect to public health, while the Court’s language 
suggests the primary importance of protecting public health1111 and that Member 
States enjoy a breadth of discretion here approaching that for public morality,1112 
that discretion appears restricted by tough evidentiary requirements and intense 
scrutiny.1113 In light of the uncertainty surrounding individual and cumulative risks 
to public health posed by the fortifying nutrient, discretion in accordance with the 
precautionary principle was permissible, provided it was properly applied. This 
involved adherence to European norms of risk assessment.1114  
The case was largely won and lost on the basis of The Netherlands’ failure to comply 
with these requirements.1115 While the Court conceded that need may be a part of 
the risk assessment, perhaps recognising its relevance in framing the assessment, 
it could not be a separate ground on which to prohibit marketing.1116 The arguments 
                                                          
 
1110 See Chapter Three; Macnaghten and Chilvers (n 27) 535, 540. 
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over need in this case were another facet of The Netherlands’ desire to protect 
human health. However, the Court’s rejection of need as a separate ground for 
prohibiting a product arguably excludes a valid reason for regulating a technology 
which in another situation may not be associated with safety but perhaps, for 
example, expresses doubts over what a technology is actually for.1117 Such an 
approach may become increasingly incompatible with the current direction taken 
by innovation governance which, as discussed in Chapter Three, seeks to guide 
innovation towards fulfilling societal needs. The Court’s approach here neatly 
illustrates the gap between the EU’s policy commitment to greater socio-technical 
integration and its practice by potentially blunting any teeth the former possessed. 
Commission v Poland, which concerned a Polish refusal to enter GM seeds in its 
seed catalogue and a ban on their marketing, naturally exhibited the complex 
considerations characteristic of risky technologies. Poland argued that, since the 
DRD ‘ignore[d] essential aspects characterising’ GMOs (here, ethical and religious 
concerns), these aspects should be regarded as unharmonised and therefore 
subject to Articles 34 and 36.1118 The Court was unconvinced that these concerns 
were genuinely behind Poland’s measures and declined to pass judgment on the 
point, potentially leaving open the possibility of regulating cultivation on ethical or 
religious grounds.1119 However, in assessing the persuasiveness of Poland’s 
arguments, the Court’s analysis glanced on both the moral (as per Poland’s 
understanding)1120 and safety dimensions of GMOs. It found that Poland invoked 
public morality, not separately, but ‘as an aspect of the justification relating to the 
protection of human health and the environment’ and therefore subject to the 
Directive.1121  
It is hard to draw any general conclusion from this observation as it hinges so 
crucially on the Court’s assessment of the quality and consistency of Poland’s 
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evidence.1122 However, a similar mixing of public morality and protection of (animal) 
health appeared elsewhere. Compassion in World Farming concerned a restriction 
on exports of live calves to prevent their being reared using veal crate systems. The 
applicants argued that as the relevant Directive had not harmonised questions of 
public morality or public policy in relation to rearing calves, a Member State could 
restrict exports under Article 36 on the grounds that the Directive did not 
adequately protect animal health. As in Commission v Poland, the Court found that 
public morality/policy were not invoked as separate justifications but rather as an 
aspect of the justification relating to protection of animal health, the subject of the 
Directive, and were therefore unable to benefit from Article 36.1123 AG Léger 
acknowledged the conviction held by various groups in society that the treatment 
of calves in question was cruel and immoral. However, he still required ‘objective 
scientific evidence that the rearing system in question causes unreasonable harm 
to the health or life of animals’,1124 effectively excluding any explicitly definitive role 
for public morality in regulation, even though ‘harm’ as a value-judgment1125 would 
seem naturally to invite ethical input. 
The judicial analysis of public morality (and indeed, need) as an aspect of health and 
environmental protection on the one hand accepts that values and scientific 
assessment cannot easily be separated. However, instead of using morality to 
introduce flexibility, the Court allows safety concerns to subsume, and thereby 
obscure, that morality aspect.1126 On the other hand, eliding the two justifications 
denies the influence values can have on framing risk assessments. The effect of the 
                                                          
 
1122 On consistency, the Court’s analysis appears justified. However, regarding quality, given 
the lightness of both the evidence presented, and judicial scrutiny, in earlier cases 
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Court’s approach in these two cases is to affirm the ‘facts-before-values’ order by 
granting regulatory science priority of agency in determining the existence of a 
problem. In other words, while public morality is not necessarily irrelevant in 
principle in cases which involve a similar mixture of concerns, its relevance is 
contingent upon, and subsequent to, diagnosis through a scientific lens of a valid 
(i.e. safety-related) reason to regulate.  
On the basis of these admittedly fragile examples, scientific priority seems 
incapable of pre-emption by, for example, use of a moral lens to define a problem 
independently of scientific enquiry. This is despite the fact that first principles are 
often at stake and that the public morality exception should arguably apply here on 
the basis that ‘Member States are free to restrict the import and marketing of goods 
wherever this would offend against official scales of values’.1127 It thus eliminates a 
valid, separate reason to regulate a technology. 
If this interpretation of the Court’s approach is correct, while a ban on GMO 
cultivation to ‘protect the viability of family or organic farming’ would plausibly 
constitute a legitimate objective following Ospelt,1128 depending on the framing of 
this hypothetical claim, the Court may conceivably treat the interest protected as 
an aspect the justification relating to environmental protection, for example. In 
which case, the force of the Ospelt justification may depend on prior detection 
through the lens of regulatory science of a threat to the environment. The same 
may well go for all the justifications recognised in the case law discussed above 
where the specifics of the case allow judicial perception of the values at stake as 
contingent on a concern over safety. It will be interesting to watch the Court’s 
approach to any litigation arising out of the newly de-harmonised justifications 
under Article 26b DRD. 
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3.2 Establishing proportionality  
While the Court has indeed accepted as valid a broad range of justifications, a 
national measure must also be proportionate.1129 This means firstly that it is 
appropriate to protect the interest in question (which must genuinely be 
threatened)1130 requiring a link between the measure and the objective pursued.1131 
Secondly, it must be limited to what is necessary to achieve its objective,1132 i.e. it 
must be the least trade restrictive measure possible.1133 Member States must 
produce factual evidence to substantiate their claim. In cases where the 
justification is public health (and also presumably environmental protection), this 
will be scientific evidence, even where uncertainty persists in the assessment.1134 In 
the context of the free movement of persons in Commission v Austria, the Court 
required numerical figures demonstrating over-subscription to courses in Austrian 
universities to justify Austria’s restriction on access to higher education.1135 On the 
whole however, the nature of evidence required to prove a public interest 
justification is unclear, the ease of ‘proving’ public interest is open to doubt1136 and 
public interest arguments are immensely complex.1137 This is a problem for all 
Member States wishing to convince the Court that their measure seeks to protect 
a genuine interest, particularly perhaps in cases involving risky technologies where 
concerns reflect such complex, diverse and competing interests.  
                                                          
 
1129 In addition, measures justified under Article 36 must not be a ‘means of arbitrary 
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If the Court’s approach, identified above, of apparently depriving values other than 
safety of priority is correct, it may continue to demand solely scientific evidence of 
a risk as part of its proportionality review. Given that Member States’ arguments 
shape the Court’s discussion,1138 they would first have to disentangle the various 
interests at stake to demonstrate the priority or independence of their non-safety 
concerns in order to ensure that discussion focuses on those elements.1139 If they 
get that far, it is unclear what evidence they would need to adduce to demonstrate 
the measure is appropriate and necessary to protect a genuinely threatened 
interest. In Commission v Poland, general statements about religiously- or ethically-
inspired public objections to GMOs were insufficient to convince the Court that the 
interest was threatened and that the contested measure was causally linked to the 
justification.1140 Early cases on public morality are unhelpful on this question due to 
absence of a proportionality review from the judgments,1141 but other case law 
perhaps suggests that the Court’s language of deference to a Member State’s own 
scale of values1142 may not translate to proportionality analysis, as discussed below.  
That said, in Omega, the Court seemed convinced by the national referring court’s 
belief in the correspondence between the contested measure and the level of 
protection sought on the appropriateness of that measure, without the need for 
further analysis or reasoning.1143 In Ospelt, the Court’s proportionality analysis was 
limited to a brief consideration of necessity. However, Geelhoed AG’s opinion 
acknowledges that Austria put forward substantial evidence in support of its 
measure. That evidence explained the measure’s objectives, the problems 
associated with the agricultural and geographic structure of Austria and its 
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its argument that ethical considerations remained unharmonised could constitute an 
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1140 Nic Shuibhne and Maci (n 1101) 980–982. 
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population distribution, the dangers of non-intervention and specifically the 
inability of competition and free trade to achieve the objectives.1144 While AG 
Geelhoed was not convinced as to proportionality,1145 his reasoning did not relate 
to the insufficiency of the evidence. The case could therefore provide some 
guidance as to arguments appropriate to justify a restriction on GMO cultivation. 
The intensity of the Court’s proportionality review has not been consistent. In some 
sensitive areas, for example gambling, review has been less intense1146 and has 
often been sensitive to different national values.1147 In others, for example Viking 
Line and Laval, which involved the extremely sensitive balancing of different 
values,1148 the Court presented a narrow reading of proportionality requiring that 
industrial action be regarded as a last resort. This conclusion appeared to ignore a 
range of collective social values, supported at the national level and believed to be 
supported at the EU level.1149 It perhaps showed that ‘recourse to the 
justification/proportionality formula is insufficiently sensitive to local needs’1150 and 
that such balancing exercises cause concerns that ‘ultimately the nature and 
purpose of EC law, and the Court’s limited mandate under the Treaty, tends to push 
economic motivations to the fore, to the detriment of national preferences’.1151  
Finally, it is unclear whether a third element of proportionality, stricto sensu, also 
operates.1152 Case law suggests that the Court may consider it as part of the other 
two elements and will address it where raised by the applicant, though again, the 
depth of enquiry is variable.1153 This element directly opposes market and other 
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(social or environmental) aims and raises constitutional concerns about the proper 
division both between the judiciary and the legislature and between the EU and 
Member States, especially since the Court appears to be imposing its own 
evaluation of the acceptable level of protection. So, while applicants may struggle 
to succeed especially where the protected interest is public health,1154 
proportionality stricto sensu could require Member States to reduce their level of 
protection, in spite of the effectiveness of a measure.1155 This approach undermines 
the allegedly ‘wide’ discretion the Court claims to grant to Member States in the 
fields of environmental and public health protection. If the Court is too willing to 
substitute its own standard, this not only dismisses the national choice, but also 
silences the various values (including broader social values and concerns) which 
contributed to that choice.  
More generally, the overall structure of the justifications (that the national measure 
has already been found unlawful under Article 34,1156 the burden of proof,1157 the 
narrow interpretation of the justifications) perhaps already sets up a (structural) 
preference for the economic over the social, for example,1158 and over-prescription 
of national moral and ethical choices.1159 
Overall, internal market law recognises diverse reasons other than safety to 
regulate and these reasons should be available to justify regulations addressing the 
implications of risky technologies. As Lee argues, the cultivation of GMOs could be 
regarded an area where ‘there are significant moral, religious and cultural 
differences between the Member States’ and one where, now de-harmonised, ‘it is 
for each Member State to determine… in accordance with its own scale of values, 
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what is required to protect the interests in question’.1160 However, the possibility 
that the Courts will predicate the acceptability of these reasons upon a scientifically 
demonstrated threat to the environment and/or human health may severely 
undermine any potential contribution of internal market law to enhanced socio-
technical integration. Furthermore, the evidentiary challenges associated with 
convincing a court that the contested measures genuinely pursue a legitimate 
objective mean the justifications are perhaps more unreliable than they should be.  
4. Member State derogations under Article 114 TFEU  
Article 114(1) aims to effect positive integration of the internal market through 
harmonisation. Article 114(4)-(6) enables Member States to derogate from 
harmonised EU measures in various circumstances. The European Institutions have, 
in general, adopted a restrictive approach to Article 114(4)-(6) as exceptions to 
fundamental Treaty principles.1161 Such a restrictive approach has significantly 
circumscribed Member State autonomy. Since both technologies examined in this 
thesis are the subject of harmonising measures, and for reasons of space, after a 
brief discussion of Article 114(4), this section will focus on the extent to which the 
EU’s approach to Article 114(5) restricts opportunity to integrate values other than 
safety into justifications for derogations. 
4.1 Article 114(4) 
Article 114(4) allows a Member State to derogate from an EU harmonisation 
measure in order to maintain a national provision already in force at the time that 
measure was adopted, justified on the basis of ‘major needs referred to in Article 
36 TFEU, or relating to the protection of the environment or the working 
environment’.1162 These grounds prima facie, imply a fairly broad range of 
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justifications for derogation from a harmonisation measure. However, the 
Article 36 reasons are subject to restrictive interpretation1163 and ‘dependent on a 
wide discretion of the Community institutions to approve or reject the national 
measures.’1164 Member States are therefore unlikely to enjoy a significant degree 
of flexibility in composing justifications for their national provisions and may face 
the same problems identified in section 3.1. 
In terms, in particular, of its appropriateness to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of 
regulating emerging technologies, the scope of Article 114(4) and its relationship 
with Article 114(5) may present problems. This is for two connected reasons 
relating to timing. Firstly, if the EU moves first in producing a harmonised regulatory 
regime to deal with a particular emerging technology, a slower moving Member 
State which objects to the technology on an Article 36 ground will have no measure 
to maintain and will be unable to introduce a measure to reflect such concerns not 
addressed by the EU measure due to the narrow grounds for justification under 
Article 114(5). The second reason relates to a situation where an emerging 
technology inherits a regulatory regime.1165 While a Member State may have 
adopted a more permissive attitude to the technology originally targeted by the 
regime (for example GMOs), it may not have a similarly permissive attitude to the 
emerging technology (for example synthetic biology) and may wish to regulate due 
to changing political attitudes or for any number of reasons specific to that 
technology not covered by the regulation. However, it would again be too late to 
do so under Article 114(4) and the grounds would be unavailable under 
Article 114(5). The justification for the restrictive grounds for derogation in 
                                                          
 
protection. The third condition is also construed as requiring an assessment of 
proportionality, Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 230; M Doherty, ‘The Application of 
Article 95(4-6) of the EC Treaty: Is the Emperor Still Unclothed?’ (2008) 8 Yearbook of 
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1163 de Sadeleer, ‘Procedures for Derogations’ (n 1162) 896; Craig and De Búrca (n 1091) 
696. 
1164 Doherty (n 1162) 49. 
1165 See discussion in Chapter Five and, for example, Stokes, ‘Nanotechnology’ (n 81). 
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Article 114(5) is that the EU institutions could take existing national measures into 
account during harmonisation (as well as a range of competing economic, social, 
environmental and strategic concerns1166) but not those introduced after 
harmonisation.1167 This opportunity for evolution is lost where legislation is simply 
inherited and with it an opportunity for greater socio-technical integration. 
4.2 Article 114(5) 
Article 114(5), which allows Member States to derogate from EU harmonisation 
measures by introducing new national provisions, requires that such provisions be 
based on ‘new scientific evidence’, relate to the protection of the environment or 
the working environment and be ‘on grounds of a problem specific to that Member 
State’, which arose after adoption of the harmonisation measure from which 
derogation is sought.1168 The absence of space for non-safety concerns is evident 
on the face of the provision and already limits opportunity for greater socio-
technical integration. This is further circumscribed by restrictive interpretation by 
the Court,1169 particularly of the requirements for new scientific knowledge and a 
specific problem. Though specificity and novelty have normative dimensions, the 
Court has drawn on scientific evidence in its analysis with the effect of eliminating 
other ways of framing these questions. 
4.2.1 Specifying a specific problem 
When judging the existence of a specific problem, perhaps as a further 
manifestation of an increasing reliance in the EU on technical and scientific criteria 
to frame risk problems in order to transcend social and cultural differences and 
sensitivities,1170 the EU institutions have at times treated specificity as a largely 
epistemic question answerable by scientific advice provided by EU scientific 
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committees.1171 Specificity however, is partly normative, as perhaps indicated by 
the uncertainty in the case law over the test for specificity. Some early cases 
indicate that whether a specific problem existed in a Member State would be 
judged on the basis of ‘extent’ as compared with other Member States, for example 
Netherlands Creosote II.1172 It was unclear what the standard of comparison was 
there.1173 The General Court in Netherlands v Commission, a case involving Dutch 
measures to control concentrations of particulate matter (PM), stated that to be a 
specific problem, the concentrations of PM must be ‘so acute as to distinguish them 
significantly from those observed in other Member States’1174 and that specificity 
depended on the ‘aptness or inaptness of the harmonisation of the applicable 
Community rules’ to deal with the local difficulties.1175 These statements provide 
some guidance, but phrases such as ‘so acute’ and ‘significantly’ still require the 
exercise of judgment. In many cases, this approach to specificity may not be unduly 
controversial. However, in cases concerning risky technologies often subject to low 
certainty and low consensus1176 and high stakes, it hinders greater socio-technical 
integration. 
In its judgment on Austria’s application to derogate from the DRD, the ECJ denied 
that the small-structured farming system and substantial proportion of organic 
farms in Upper Austria which, Austria argued, would be threatened with 
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contamination by GM crops, constituted a specific problem.1177 The Commission 
and the two Courts all found EFSA’s scientific evidence, which held that no scientific 
evidence had been presented which demonstrated ‘unusual or unique ecosystems’ 
or the existence of a specific problem, convincing and that risk assessments 
conducted for ‘Austria as a whole or in other similar areas of Europe’ would 
suffice.1178 It is hard to judge whether Austria’s evidence was rejected due to poor 
quality or because it was not scientific.  
When the ECJ separated out the various conditions in Article 114(5), it did not 
require scientific proof of specificity.1179 However, regardless of the normative or 
scientific quality of the grounds raised by the Member State, the Commission 
worked on the assumption, endorsed by the Courts,1180 that specificity should be 
judged scientifically and has tended to defer to the assessment of a scientific 
committee. But, due to the normative quality of ‘specific’ as exhibited by the depth 
of Sharpston AG’s engagement with the concept, it is at least arguable. She would 
locate a specific problem on a scale ‘somewhere between one which is unique and 
one which is common, generalised or widespread’.1181  
The physical individuality of Austrian farms could indeed be established by a 
comparative study of Austrian against other European farms. But this is surely only 
half the picture. Firstly, it ignores the relevance of the requirement for a ‘problem’ 
which like ‘risk’, as discussed in Chapter Two, is something which a scientific inquiry 
may or may not discern depending on how it is framed and interpreted.1182 Both 
depend, inter alia, on the values constituting the lens through which the ‘problem’ 
is observed. Secondly and relatedly, it again asserts science’s priority of agency in 
determining the existence of a problem. GMOs clearly challenged deeply held 
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notions of Austrian identity in the form of a socio-technical imaginary of 
technological choice.1183 At the risk of reading too much between the lines, it may 
have been through the lens of its own identity that Austria perceived a problem, 
prior to any empirical evaluation of its farming structures or the risks of GMOs. 
Ecological variation tends to be framed as a technical matter but is in fact 
inseparable from social and institutional factors.1184 Austria’s farming structures 
may not have been specific, but Austria’s identity and the value it placed on their 
preservation may have been. These three things combined arguably ‘constructed’ 
the specific problem, as ‘risk’, and indeed ‘emergency’,1185 are constructed.1186  
The Court’s preference for centrally-produced scientific advice, perhaps as part of 
a mission to define a single, objective standard for ‘safety’ thereby enabling trade 
liberalisation1187 ignores these kinds of details. This illustrates the familiar tension 
between relying on the perceived ‘objectivity’ of scientific evidence in the quest for 
(and paradoxical loss of) political legitimacy, highlighted in Chapter Two, and 
adopting the kind of nuanced approach required to integrate concerns other than 
safety into regulatory science and therefore regulation. Here, the approach to 
judging the existence of a specific problem simply does not accommodate either 
the potential concerns of a Member State or the way those concerns might 
influence its apprehension and evaluation of a problem.1188 Furthermore, the 
European denial that a shared ‘problem’ can be specific leads to the ‘absurd result 
that the more Member States are faced with a given problem after harmonization, 
the smaller the chance that their individual counter-measures will be 
authorised’.1189 
                                                          
 
1183 Felt (n 206). Discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
1184 Rothstein and others (n 623) 259. 
1185 Jana Sillmann and others, ‘Climate Emergencies Do Not Justify Engineering the Climate’ 
5 Nature Climate Change 290. 
1186 See Chapter Two. 
1187 Chalmers (n 1043) 545. 
1188 Similarly true of economic analyses, Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy’ (n 1004) 18–
19. 
1189 H Sevenster, ‘‘The Environmental Guarantee After Amsterdam: Does the Emperor Have 
New Clothes?’, Yearbook of European Environmental Law (2000) 302–303. 
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The question of evidence is again relevant. Austria adduced scientific evidence to 
support its case and did not raise explicit arguments about its identity and values 
beyond indicating the importance of organic farming in Upper Austria.1190 Much of 
this discussion is clearly speculative. But it is surely not implausible that such values 
may implicitly have motivated, and perhaps in the future explicitly would motivate, 
a derogation under Article 114(5). In which case, how would a Member State 
substantiate an identity, value or, even more esoterically, a socio-technical 
imaginary? And could (or should?) the review process become subtle enough to 
countenance the influence these factors may have on the framing of any associated 
scientific evidence such as to enable the Court to see the problem through the lens 
of ‘Austrianness’? Scientific evidence may undeniably be a crucial part of identifying 
the existence of a specific problem. But the incomplete picture it provides and 
indeed the elusive nature of ‘specificity’, like uncertainty, indicates the relevance 
of other values.1191  
4.2.2 New scientific evidence 
The notifying Member State must also produce new scientific evidence 
demonstrating the necessity of the derogating national provision. The requirement 
is restrictive enough on its face, given that it excludes arguments not based on 
scientific evidence.1192 The Commission has reinforced this with a willingness ‘to 
subject the nature and quality of the evidence relied on by the Member States to 
‘centralised’ scrutiny’ by relying on EFSA’s assessments of that evidence in its 
decisions on national derogations.1193 
                                                          
 
1190 Land Oberösterreich (n 1177) [61]. 
1191 Everson and Vos (n 62) 4. 
1192 For example, the Commission rejected Poland’s arguments in support of its derogation 
based on the need to fulfil the expectations of Polish society, the fragmentation of Polish 
agriculture and the absence of a compensatory regime for losses due to ‘uncontrolled 
crossing of [GM with conventional] varieties’, Commission Decision 2008/62/EC relating to 
Articles 111 and 172 of the Polish Draft Act on Genetically Modified Organisms, notified by 
the Republic of Poland pursuant to Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty as derogations from the 
provisions of Directive 2001/18/EC [2008] OJ L257/23.  
1193 Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 229. 
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Regarding novelty, successful applications have tended to rely ‘on evidence clearly 
gathered and published after the harmonization measure’.1194 This would seem to 
conform to the Commission’s decision in Land Oberösterreich, which followed 
EFSA’s finding that most of the data presented by Austria were published and 
available before the DRD was adopted.1195 This narrow approach to questions of 
novelty and knowledge evaluation excludes the potential, allowed under 
Article 114(4) in recognition of the uncertainty inherent in risk assessment, for 
Member States to rely on ‘divergent assessments’ of risks,1196 which ‘is a more 
realistic understanding of what might provoke a change in national policy, and 
allows greater scope for national diversity’.1197 Availability of information does not 
necessarily entail proper evaluation by the legislators,1198 and even if evidence pre-
dated adoption of a harmonisation measure, it may not have been entirely 
validated.1199 It also ignores the fact that data can be reassessed and interpreted 
differently depending on a Member State’s standpoint, which, ‘may constitute new 
scientific evidence within the meaning of Article [114](5)’.1200 As such, this narrow 
approach ‘makes it virtually impossible for Member States to pursue environmental 
policy through Article [114](5)’.1201 
Furthermore, the contingency of an opportunity to derogate on ‘new scientific 
evidence’ again attributes priority of agency to science. This implies that the only 
property in society capable of change is scientific knowledge. However, the values, 
habits, behaviours and politics of a society may also evolve and independently 
result in a different framing of a problem.  
                                                          
 
1194 Doherty (n 1162) 55. 
1195 Commission Decision 2003/653 relating to national provisions on banning the use of 
genetically modified organisms in the region of Upper Austria notified by the Republic of 
Austria pursuant to Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L230/34. 
1196 Case C-3/00 Denmark v Commission [2003] ECR I-2643 [63]. 
1197 Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 229. 
1198 Doherty (n 1162) 57. 
1199 de Sadeleer, ‘Procedures for Derogations’ (n 1162) 901. 
1200 Land Oberösterreich, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 1181) [124]; Doherty (n 1162) 58. 
1201 Floor M Fleurke, ‘What Use for Article 95(5) EC? An Analysis of Land Oberösterreich and 
Republic of Austria v Commission’ (2008) 20 Journal of Environmental Law 267, 269. 
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The Court has occasionally hinted at an awareness of such evolution. Most 
generally, the public interest requirements are designed to accommodate policy 
concerns which have developed since the Treaty of Rome.1202 It has also recognised, 
for example, that consumer conceptions may vary between Member States and are 
likely to evolve over time1203 as do justifications for recourse to public policy.1204 
‘The Court’s assessment of the public interest can also evolve over time, in tune 
with how the premises of public interest evolve too’.1205 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, attitudes to risk are conditioned by values and politics. Even if the scientific 
knowledge behind risk assessments remained static, it may not be enough solely to 
consider the numbers.1206 Legislative opportunities to regulate post-authorisation 
that hinge only on the existence of ‘new scientific information’ ignore the reality 
that attitudes change too. The Commission’s interpretation of protection of the 
environment and working environment in Land Oberösterreich reflected the 
narrow approach adopted. It characterised Austria’s concerns regarding 
coexistence as more of a socio-economic problem.1207 This separation dismisses the 
relevance of those concerns as factors which may have influenced the way Austria 
framed and interpreted its problem and again moves further from the goal of 
greater socio-technical integration. 
The same can perhaps be said of the intense scrutiny of the science presented by 
Austria to justify its measure. Austria clearly disagreed with the Commission over 
what constituted ‘new’ scientific evidence,1208 indicating that novelty itself may not 
be a straightforward matter, but may instead be a normative question open to 
                                                          
 
1202 Nic Shuibhne (n 1101) 480. 
1203 Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227 [32]. 
1204 Omega (n 1067) [31]. 
1205 Nic Shuibhne (n 1101) 481. 
1206 Christoforou (n 1047) 209; Stokes, ‘The EC Courts’ Contribution’ (n 1025) 494. 
1207 Recital 66, Commission Decision 2003/653 relating to national provisions on banning 
the use of genetically modified organisms in the region of Upper Austria notified by the 
Republic of Austria pursuant to Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L230/34 (n 1195). 
1208 Land Oberösterreich, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 1181) [120–126]. 
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contestation.1209 In addition, that case reveals a dispute over the appropriate level 
of safety. Austria felt that the relevant risk assessments were inadequate, not 
precautionary enough and that the decision at first instance did not comply with 
the principle of a high level of protection.1210 The reasoning behind those 
arguments is not provided but if they were in part fuelled by Austria’s deeply held 
cultural beliefs, it should arguably have been possible for those to be expressed 
during proceedings, at least as background explanation. Doing so would perhaps 
represent a small step towards enabling socio-technical integration in regulatory 
science and risk regulation in terms of retrospective adjudication. 
Finally, while there should be monitoring of the quality of national risk assessments, 
the Commission’s assessment should leave room for Member State autonomy, 
otherwise scrutiny of Member State methodologies may result in the growth of ‘an 
implicit scientific hierarchy’.1211 One risk assessment methodology is unlikely to 
disclose all relevant information and relying on it could have a dangerous limiting 
effect on Europe’s ability to uncover and interpret risks. Furthermore, given that 
risk assessments do involve value judgments, emphasis on conforming to a 
European methodology excludes the operation of other values in gathering and 
analysing data, or may in other ways disregard ‘ethical and social sensibilities’.1212  
5. Conclusion 
There are occasions in internal market law when examples of the concerns 
summarised in section 1 may be expressed. The Court does recognise the need to 
adjust the balance between trade and regulation due to distributional or ethical 
concerns. However, the ability of such concerns to qualify as justifications for 
                                                          
 
1209 True also with respect to technological innovation which is subject to a 'politics of 
novelty' in the form of disagreements over whether or not, and if so how, it might be novel, 
Guston (n 499) 112–114. 
1210 Land Oberösterreich, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 1181) [47–49]. 
1211 Fleurke (n 1201) 270–271; Doherty (n 1162) 57–58; Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 
228. 
1212 Everson and Vos (n 62) 5; Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner, The Making of a European 
Constitution: Judges and Law beyond Constitutive Power (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 208–
214.  
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regulation addressing the implications of risky technologies is very much in doubt. 
In all three areas examined above, the assumption is that problems requiring 
regulation will consist of risks to human health and/or the environment. Science is 
therefore invoked as the appropriate primary arbiter of their existence. The 
corollary of this approach is that other lenses equally capable of framing and 
identifying a problem/reason to regulate are denied priority and their inevitable 
but undetected influence on the scientific assessment invoked is ignored. There is 
little evidence therefore that the EU’s rhetorical commitment to integrating 
concerns which do not relate to safety as disclosed by scientific inquiry into 
decision-making has filtered down to fine judicial interpretation of treaty articles.  
The discussion above has largely presented non-safety concerns over the 
implications of risky technologies as additional reasons to regulate. Were they 
successful, they would constitute additional impediments to free movement. The 
internal market alongside technological innovation, as discussed in Chapter Eight, 
form the foundations on which the EU seeks to build its future prosperity. The EU’s 
confidence in science to deliver the goods it anticipates extends to a faith in science 
to stand in judgment over those technologies.1213 The two form a consistent 
ideological outlook. All decisions and judgments involving the delicate balancing of 
highly sensitive interests create an acute need for decisional legitimacy in which the 
EU places too much emphasis on scientific and technical criteria in the search for 
the common among the diverse.1214 
 
                                                          
 
1213 A disposition perhaps embedded in synthetic biology itself, Hurlbut, ‘Reimagining 
Responsibility’ (n 989). 
1214 Everson and Vos (n 62) 4 and 6. 
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Chapter Seven – The WTO regime and its influence on EU practice 
1. Introduction 
The introduction to Chapter Six observed that science plays a crucial role in 
establishing a risk and therefore a lawful reason to regulate, allowing interests in 
health and environmental protection to prevail over economic interests. However, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, it is unable to evidence broader values which influence 
societal attitudes to risky technologies and which, I argue, often also constitute 
valid reasons to regulate a risky technology independent of scientific ‘proof’ of a 
risk to safety. Mirroring Chapter Six, this chapter concentrates on the extent to 
which WTO Members may justify national measures on the basis of either concerns 
and values other than safety, or assessments of risk inflected by such national 
concerns and values.1215 
The question at the heart of this chapter then is how much flexibility do the relevant 
WTO rules grant Members to introduce potentially trade-restrictive regulatory 
measures (including setting the level of protection) necessary to manage the non-
safety implications of technological innovation? The chapter does not aim to 
present an ideological argument for increased national regulatory autonomy at all 
costs. Rather, it is founded on the argument that the less flexibility Members enjoy, 
the less scope is available to the EU to regulate risky technologies on the basis of 
its citizens’ concerns and values or assessments of risk influenced by such concerns 
and values. Accordingly, this chapter forms a crucial part of the enquiry into the 
factors limiting socio-technical integration and maintaining the policy-practice gap 
in EU decision-making.  
The purpose of the WTO trading regime has changed over its lifetime. Post-war, its 
emphasis was on multilateral trade liberalisation coupled with ensuring domestic 
stability and a recognition of the legitimacy of government intervention to do so; 
                                                          
 
1215 These are summarised in the introduction to Chapter Six. 
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an order termed ‘embedded liberalism’.1216 The 1970s onwards saw an increased 
influence of neoliberal thought and associated push for further liberalisation as a 
driver of growth and modernisation, removing governmental interference in 
trade1217 and a 'technicalisation' of its decision-making procedures.1218 The amount 
of freedom accorded to Members to regulate is closely connected to the prevailing 
model. As eloquently argued by Andrew Lang, global liberal trade can assume 
different forms and properly considering the social purpose of the WTO is a task 
worth engaging with.1219 
This chapter focuses on the three WTO agreements most salient to the technologies 
examined in this thesis: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(comprising GATT 1947) (GATT), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBTA) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPSA). The TBTA disciplines ‘technical regulations’,1220 including 
regulations specifying product characteristics. The GATT and TBTA may apply to the 
same measure but compliance with the one does not guarantee compliance with 
the other.1221 The SPSA disciplines sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures1222 
which are measures designed to protect human, animal or plant life from diseases, 
pests and food risks. SPSA-compliant measures are presumed to comply with the 
GATT.1223 Article 1.5 TBTA excludes SPS measures from its scope. However, where 
                                                          
 
1216 A Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist 
Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime’ (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 81, 85–89. 
1217 Lang, ‘Reflecting on “Linkage”’ (n 998) 529. 
1218 Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96 The American Journal of International Law 94; 
Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order 
(OUP 2011). 
1219 Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism’ (n 1216); Lang, ‘Reflecting on “Linkage”’ (n 
998). 
1220 Defined in Annex 1.1, TBTA. See also Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC-Asbestos) (adopted 12 March 2001) 
WT/DS135/AB/R [66–70]. 
1221 Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Driftin’ Too far from Shore–why the Test for Compliance with the 
TBT Agreement Developed by the WTO Appellate Body Is Wrong, and What Should the AB 
Have Done Instead’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 509. 
1222 Defined in Art. 1.1, Annex A(1) SPSA. 
1223 Art. 2.4, SPSA. 
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a single measure constitutes both an SPS measure and a technical regulation, it may 
be found in breach in its former capacity but justified in its latter.1224 With respect 
to the GATT and TBTA, I consider the scope they provide for Members to justify 
regulation by reference to reasons other than protection of human health and the 
environment. Discussion of the SPSA, where the goals of regulation necessarily 
relate to safety, focuses specifically on the degree of flexibility afforded Members 
to regulate according to their own evaluation of the SPS risks they face, influenced 
by factors which, as discussed in Chapter Two, commonly shape attitudes to risk.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the non-discrimination 
principles contained in each agreement and the question of ‘likeness’. Section 3 
considers the policy goals recognised under the GATT and TBTA as valid bases for 
regulation and the deference displayed by a panel/Appellate Body (AB) towards 
Member justifications of regulatory action on these grounds. Sections 4 and 5 
examine the stringency of the additional requirements on Members, relating to the 
proportionality of their measures and their method of application, respectively. 
Section 6 presents a self-contained analysis of the SPSA, focusing in particular on 
the requirement for measures to be based on a risk assessment and scope for 
precautionary action. Section 7 concludes.  
With respect to the GATT and TBTA, I argue that while the vast majority of policy 
goals pursued by Members are respected, the overall approach to assessing 
compliance with WTO disciplines restricts Members’ ability to realise that apparent 
flexibility. WTO disciplines operate as a factor therefore in the EU’s ability to 
enhance socio-technical integration in its own decision-making to the extent that 
unless measures are extremely carefully designed, trade interests will prevail. With 
respect to the SPSA, I argue that while there is some respect for national regulatory 
                                                          
 
1224 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A 
Commentary (OUP 2007) 19–20, 29–30; on the relationship between the three, see 
Gabrielle Marceau and Joel P Trachtman, ‘A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of 
Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ 
(2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 351. 
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choices, overall, interpretation of its provisions is strict and leaves little room for 
the EU to regulate in response to nuanced concerns about risky technologies. 
A single chapter on a subject of such breadth and complexity necessarily requires 
the exclusion of certain topics. Firstly, the EU has approved and is negotiating 
bilateral trade and investment agreements with Canada (CETA) and the USA (TTIP) 
respectively.1225 These agreements are controversial1226 and part of their purpose 
appears to be shaping future global trade norms according to the preferred model 
of the parties.1227 The WTO/GATT contains rules governing its interaction with 
bilateral/regional trade agreements1228 but the relationship between the WTO and 
these new trade agreements is not considered here. However, the point is that the 
WTO may increasingly compete (or conflict) with other regimes in disciplining 
international trade1229 and the EU’s regulatory autonomy may be further, or 
differently, constrained by these new agreements. Secondly, both the TBTA and 
SPSA contain provisions1230 encouraging harmonisation by requiring Members to 
base domestic measures on international standards. Detailed discussion of these 
provisions is omitted due to space constraints. However, there is debate over 
whether panel/AB interpretation under the TBTA has transformed non-binding 
international standards into binding norms of international law,1231 possibly 
                                                          
 
1225 TTIP negotiations are on hold, TTIP Advisory Group, Meeting Report 9 March 2017, 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/april/tradoc_155484.pdf> accessed 7 June 
2017. CETA is provisionally in force and awaiting ratification by Canada and all EU Member 
States, having been granted consent by the European Parliament in February 2017, 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1624> accessed 7 June 2017. 
1226 Nick Dearden, ‘Like TTIP, the Ceta Deal Is a Ticking Time Bomb’ (The Independent, 31 
October 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/justin-trudeau-brussells-eu-ceta-
ttip-toxic-deal-wallonia-a7388841.html> accessed 25 April 2017. 
1227 Trade Justice Movement, ‘TTIPing Away the Ladder: How the EU-US Trade Deal Could 
Undermine the Sustainable Development Goals’ (2015) 4–5. 
1228 Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Arwel Davies, World Trade Law: Texts, Materials and 
Commentary (2nd ed, Hart 2012) ch 8. 
1229 For a perspective on how such agreements could affect the WTO, see Gary Clyde 
Hufbauer and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, ‘How Will TPP and TTIP Change the WTO System?’ 
(2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 679. 
1230 Art. 2.4 TBTA and Art. 3.1 SPSA. 
1231 Robert Howse, ‘A New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and “international Standards”’ in C Joerges and EU 
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shrinking national autonomy. Thirdly, this thesis is concerned with internal 
regulatory regimes applicable to particular technologies, as opposed to internal or 
import-related taxes. This chapter therefore focuses its GATT analysis on 
discrimination in relation to regulatory measures under Article III:4.1232 Article I, 
establishing the most favoured nation principle in the WTO/GATT, covers the same 
measures as Article III:4, as well as customs duties/tariffs. However, given its less 
frequent invocation1233 and the tendency of disputes to concern matters less 
relevant to this thesis, this provision is also excluded from analysis.1234 
2. Non-discrimination and likeness  
Discrimination between ‘like products’ is prohibited by Articles III:4 GATT and 
2.1 TBTA. Discrimination is also relevant under Article 5.5 SPSA, discussed in 
section 6. Members are entitled to treat different products differently. Whether 
there has been a breach of such provisions (but notably not Article 2.2 TBTA) 
therefore depends on an analysis of ‘likeness’. While not directly concerned with 
the reasons Members can cite to justify their measures, a discussion of likeness is 
relevant as an insight into the level of sensitivity towards the values behind national 
judgments of difference and the reasons for their measures. 
The concept of discrimination was originally closely linked to ‘protectionism’ thus 
respecting national regulatory diversity.1235 The interpretation of discrimination 
and ‘trade barrier’ has evolved over the lifetime of the GATT/WTO to become fairly 
wide, attributable broadly to what has been described as the regime’s ‘neoliberal 
                                                          
 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation 
(Hart 2006); contrast Scott, The WTO Agreement (n 1224) 261–266. 
1232 As opposed to taxation, governed by Article III:2 GATT. Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 
1228) 287. 
1233 ibid 311. 
1234 But see Appellate Body Report, EC-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries (adopted 7 April 2004) WT/DS246/AB/R where the AB’s interpretation 
of ‘non discriminatory’ left more flexibility for Members to pursue certain policy goals. 
1235 Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy’ (n 1218) 97. 
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turn’.1236 This expanding trend1237 is evident for example, in the growth in influence 
of de facto discrimination,1238 and a focus on eliminating market distortions, i.e. the 
effect of a measure, rather than on the intent behind the measure.1239 This 
potentially enables increasing intrusion into Members’ regulatory choices.1240 It is 
also perhaps evident in the evolution of panel/AB approaches to likeness. 
Likeness is a controversial,1241 highly normative and inherently indeterminate1242 
concept and may be interpreted differently depending on the agreement or 
provision.1243 A broad definition of likeness ‘sometimes leads almost inevitably to a 
finding of violation’1244 while a narrow definition renders the non-discrimination 
principle immensely respectful of regulatory autonomy.1245 Although so far 
untested, likeness raises questions over a Member’s ability to regulate on the basis 
of a product’s ‘profile’, for example, whether it is fair trade, organic or made using 
child labour.1246 
The analyses of likeness under Articles III:4 GATT and 2.1 TBTA are similar; both 
essentially requiring the existence of a competitive relationship between the 
products in question.1247 In EC-Asbestos, the AB specified determination on a case-
                                                          
 
1236 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218). 
1237 From the late 1980s, Robert E Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: 
Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 619, 622–623. 
1238 For the TBTA, Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US-Cloves) (adopted 24 April 2012) WT/DS406/AB/R [175]; for 
the GATT, Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef (Korea-Beef) (adopted 10 January 2001) WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R 
[147]. 
1239 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 254–257. 
1240 Debra P Steger, ‘Afterword: The “trade and ...” Conundrum-a Commentary’ (2002) 96 
The American Journal of International Law 135, 141–142. 
1241 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 316. 
1242 Tomer Broude and Philip I Levy, ‘Do You Mind If I Don’t Smoke? Products, Purpose and 
Indeterminacy in US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes’ 
(2014) 13 World Trade Review 357. 
1243 Hudec (n 1237) 625. 
1244 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 305. 
1245 Robert Howse, ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the 
World Trade Organization’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2329, 2332. 
1246 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 316. 
1247 EC-Asbestos (AB) (n 1220) [99] with respect to Art. III:4 GATT; US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) 
[111–112] with respect to Art. 2.1 TBTA. 
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by-case basis according to criteria which include: the product's end-uses; 
consumers’ tastes and habits; the product’s properties, nature and quality and tariff 
classification.1248 Previously, approaches to determining likeness under the TBTA 
were characterised by a struggle between the Article III:4 ‘economic’ or 
competition-based test1249 and a regulatory purpose, or ‘aims and effects’, test.1250 
The latter test was arguably designed to intrude less into domestic policy-
making;1251 products would only be considered like where a protectionist aim and 
discriminatory effect of the relevant regulatory distinction could be demonstrated. 
Under that test the relevant question would therefore be whether the Member had 
a legitimate reason for distinguishing between the products.1252  
The regulatory purpose approach suggested greater respect for national regulatory 
autonomy in its ability to balance free trade and other goals.1253 Its recognition that 
likeness ‘can only ever be evaluated from a particular perspective and for a 
particular purpose’1254 is positive, but also arbitrary,1255 and there are problems, 
generally, with reviewing intent.1256 The competition-based approach appeals due 
to its perceived ability to provide an account of likeness, based on 
‘objective’/factual or ‘technical’ economic factors. However, if determinacy is the 
yardstick of a useful analytical approach, then this test is barely superior, by reason 
of the subjective assumptions necessary to conduct it (much like risk 
                                                          
 
1248 EC-Asbestos (AB) (n 1220) [101]. 
1249 Robert Howse and Philip Levy, ‘The TBT Panels: US-Cloves, US-Tuna, US-COOL’ (2013) 12 
World Trade Review 327, 341; Broude and Levy (n 1242) 367. 
1250 As demonstrated by Broude and Levy (n 1242). See also, generally, Hudec (n 1237). 
1251 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 278; Shi Jingxia, ‘Factoring Cultural Element into 
Deciding the “Likeness” of Cultural Products: A Perspective From the New Haven School’ 
(2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law Review 167, 186. 
1252 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 259–260. 
1253 Steger (n 1240) 143. 
1254 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 260. 
1255 Howse and Levy (n 1249) 340. 
1256 David M Driesen, ‘What Is Free Trade--The Real Issue Lurking behind the Trade and 
Environment Debate’ (2000) 41 Virginia Journal of International Law 279, 354; also perhaps, 
Appellate Body Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (adopted 12 January 2000) 
WT/DS87/AB/R and WT/DS110/AB/R [61].  
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assessment1257),1258 its simplistic nature and the necessity, still, of looking at the 
regulation and product to perform this analysis.1259 Furthermore, its apparent 
exclusion of value judgments as to the measure’s legitimacy,1260 suggests the 
irrelevance of Members’ concerns and interests, at least at this stage, though there 
may be valid reasons for differentiating, for example, the products of synthetic 
biology, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
While broadly rejecting the regulatory purpose test, the AB does attempt to retain 
some of its flavour by accepting that the regulatory concerns underlying a measure 
may still play a role in determining likeness,1261 suggesting, for example, that health 
risks may be relevant to analysing likeness criteria under Articles III:4 GATT and 2.1 
TBTA.1262 In EC-Asbestos, toxicity as a physical characteristic and factor affecting the 
tastes and habits of consumers was found ‘likely to influence the competitive 
relationship’.1263 While this slight extra flexibility is welcome for the respect it 
implies for national regulatory purposes, it is perhaps unclear how much respect it 
would afford regulation of a product whose risk profile is more controversial than 
asbestos, as it might be, for example, with certain pesticides,1264 or where the 
protected interest is deemed less critical than human health.1265 Rather, it will likely 
                                                          
 
1257 Or indeed deployment of any technical knowledge over more deliberative decision-
making procedures, Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 350. See also 
Chapter Two. 
1258 Broude and Levy (n 1242) 368–278.  
1259 Alexia Herwig, ‘Competition, Not Regulation - or Regulated Competition?: No Regulatory 
Purpose Test Under the Less Favourable Treatment Standard of GATT Article III:4 Following 
EC-Seal Products’ (2015) 6 European Journal of Risk Regulation 405, 409–410. 
1260 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 262; Henrik Horn and Petros C 
Mavroidis, ‘Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the 
GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 39, 60. 
1261 US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [117]. 
1262 ibid [120]; Broude and Levy (n 1242) 383. 
1263 EC-Asbestos (AB) (n 1220) [122]. 
1264 E.g., the current controversy over the carcinogenicity of glyphosate, EURACTIV.com and 
AFP, ‘UN Panel Now Says Monsanto Weedkiller “unlikely” to Cause Cancer’ (EurActiv.com, 
17 May 2016) <http://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/un-panel-now-
says-monsanto-weedkiller-unlikely-to-cause-cancer/> accessed 18 June 2016. 
1265 On the implicit arrangement of objectives in hierarchies by panel/AB rulings, see 
Michael Ming Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-
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be subject to an analysis of competitiveness, although this is debated.1266 On the 
other hand, the possible influence on consumers’ tastes and habits of harmful, 
physical properties,1267 the interrelationship of the criteria1268 and their ability to 
combine thus may enhance arguments in favour treating products differently. 
It is also unclear whether a panel/AB would be persuaded that ‘social concerns’ 
rather than harm to health would influence consumer tastes and habits to the 
same, or significant, degree. For example, in adjudicating a hypothetical ban on 
products containing synthetic vanillin on grounds of unsustainability (assuming this 
constituted a legitimate objective under Article 2.2 TBTA),1269 would a panel accept 
that unsustainability could influence consumer tastes and habits and hence the 
competitive relationship between the relevant products? This also raises the 
question of the role of process and production methods (PPMs) in determining 
likeness (and indeed whether synthetic biology techniques would qualify as a 
‘related’ or ‘non-product-related’ (NPR) PPM) as it is these production processes 
which catalyse the unsustainable effect. The Panel in US-Tuna II suggested the need 
for very strong consumer preferences for a finding of unlikeness, implying that such 
(NPR-)PPM-based measures would be subject to scrutiny under the TBTA (and 
GATT).1270 
The approach to likeness grants Members some flexibility to argue that differently 
regulated products are not in a competitive relationship, thereby escaping some 
WTO disciplines. Arguments with respect to consumer tastes and habits for 
                                                          
 
Discrimination to Harmonization’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 269, 299–
301. 
1266 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 306. 
1267 US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [117]. 
1268 EC-Asbestos (AB) (n 1220) [102]. 
1269 Not impossible in light of the AB’s regard to sustainable development in its judgment in 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (US-Shrimp) (adopted 6 November 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R [129]. 
1270 Gracia Marín Durán, ‘NTBs and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: The 
Case of PPM-Based Measures Following US – Tuna II and EC – Seal Products’ in Christoph 
Herrmann, Markus Krajewski and Jörg Philipp Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law 2015 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2015) 114 if we accept that 
NPR-PPMs make a technical regulation. 
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example might work best with respect to risky technologies, although this may not 
adequately encapsulate the concerns and values of diverse, engaged publics. 
However, the lack of an explicit opportunity to raise such collective value judgments 
at this stage, along with ‘reliance on objective economic evidence and survey 
data’1271 tend towards increased interference in Member regulatory choices.  
3. Exceptions, justifications and legitimate objectives  
That the WTO is concerned with more than trade liberalisation is clear, as evidenced 
in particular by the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.1272 This recognises the role 
of trade in inter alia raising living standards, increasing employment and protecting 
the environment. While structured differently, both the GATT and TBTA contain 
provisions which recognise lawful reasons to introduce potentially trade-restrictive 
regulation. Under the TBTA, Members have a right to regulate in pursuit of their 
chosen policy objectives at their chosen levels.1273 The exceptions in Article XX GATT 
are worded and interpreted fairly broadly but reflect the interests of the time of 
drafting and do not include certain current concerns, for example labour rights, 
human rights and the environment per se.1274 As discussed below, that limitation 
may restrict the ability of Members to justify certain policy goals. That said, the AB 
provided, in US-Shrimp, that the WTO Agreement be read in the light of 
‘contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment’, acknowledged ‘the objective of sustainable 
development’ in the WTO Agreement Preamble and characterised the language as 
evolutionary.1275 This could permit regulation to address novel implications of 
technological innovation, for example the sustainability of producing substances 
                                                          
 
1271 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 262. 
1272 Scott, The WTO Agreement (n 1224) 262–263. 
1273 Recital 6, TBTA; US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [94]. 
1274 Paola Conconi and Tania S Voon, ‘EC-Seal Products: The Tension between Public Morals 
and International Trade Agreements’ [2015] SSRN Electronic Journal 9 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666997> accessed 25 June 2017. 
1275 US-Shrimp (AB) (n 1269) [129–130]. 
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using synthetic biology techniques. However, the language of Article XX is 
ambiguous and interpretation has been inconsistent at times.1276 
Once a panel/AB has determined whether a measure breaches Article 2.1 TBTA, it 
examines whether the objective pursued by the measure is legitimate and, as 
discussed in section 4, its proportionality. The TBTA sets up a finely-tuned balance 
between the right to regulate and the ‘desire’ to avoid creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade, familiar from the chapeau to Article XX, discussed 
below.1277 There is no equivalent to Article XX under the TBTA. Perhaps in response 
to this absence, the AB has acknowledged that technical regulations, by their 
nature, establish distinctions between products according to their characteristics 
or ‘related PPMs’. Thus, under the TBTA (though not under the GATT1278), where a 
detrimental impact ‘stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions’, it 
will not necessarily breach Article 2.1. This is on the basis that the object of the 
TBTA is to strike a balance between trade liberalisation and Members’ right to 
regulate.1279 
The concept of ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ remains ill-defined. While the 
apparent deference may, in principle, support greater respect for national 
regulatory objectives, the legitimacy of such an overall objective, for example public 
health, will not automatically legitimise a regulatory distinction made ostensibly in 
its pursuit. A panel/AB essentially looks for even-handedness,1280 a tougher 
standard to meet than non-discrimination which challenges Members’ response to 
national political realities, such as domestic industrial interests.1281 In practice, the 
                                                          
 
1276 Steger (n 1240) 135. 
1277 US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [96]. 
1278 Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (adopted 22 May 2014) WT/DS400-1/AB/R [5.97-5.125]. But see discussion of 
previous, conflicting case law in Donald H Regan, ‘How to Think about PPMs (and Climate 
Change)’ in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International Trade 
Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (CUP 2009) 120–122. 
1279 US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [174–175]. 
1280 ibid [182]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US-Tuna II) (adopted 13 June 2012) 
WT/DS381/AB/R [231]. 
1281 Howse and Levy (n 1249) 344–345. 
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level of scrutiny of those distinctions has so far deprived Members of the in-
principle benefit despite recognition of the legitimacy of the aims pursued, as 
shown by the decisions in US-Cloves, US-Tuna II and US-COOL. For example, the AB 
was not convinced that the risks cited by the US legitimised the distinction it drew 
between different types of flavoured cigarettes.1282 It found therefore that the 
measure was discriminatory/not even-handed and so breached Article 2.1, though 
it accepted under Article 2.2 that the measure pursued the legitimate objective of 
protecting public health by reducing youth smoking.1283 The intense scrutiny of the 
even-handedness of such measures means that any measure regulating, for 
example, a product of synthetic biology must be designed extremely carefully, if it 
is found to be in a competitive relationship with a conventional product. 
Article 2.2 is closest to Article XX GATT, linguistically, but imposes an additional 
obligation, as opposed to an exception.1284 It contains an indicative list of objectives 
considered legitimate, which ‘provide a reference point for other objectives that 
may be considered to be legitimate’.1285 In determining whether a national 
regulatory objective is legitimate, panels are entitled to look to objectives 
acknowledged as legitimate in other covered agreements.1286 It is likely therefore 
that the exceptions included in Article XX form legitimate objectives in their own 
right under the TBTA.1287 This openness is helpful for Members seeking to respond 
to complex and often novel implications of risky technologies. Furthermore, 
panels/ABs have generally adopted a deferential attitude to reviewing the 
legitimacy of Members’ objectives.1288 For example, the provision of information to 
consumers falls within the prevention of deceptive practices.1289 It is also possible 
                                                          
 
1282 US-Cloves (AB) (n 1238) [225]. 
1283 ibid [235-236]. 
1284 Howse and Levy (n 1249) 349. 
1285 US-Tuna II (AB) (n 1280) [313]. 
1286 ibid. 
1287 Durán (n 1270) 122. 
1288 Mavroidis (n 1221) 514–515. 
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that certain labour and human rights objectives, though perennially controversial 
within the WTO,1290 could be squeezed into ‘the protection of human life and 
health’, although less likely where such measures lay down NPR-PPMs.1291 
Under Article XX GATT, justifications include public morals (paragraph (a)), 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b)), securing 
compliance with GATT-consistent laws or regulations (paragraph (d)) and the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)). Paragraphs (b) and 
(g) (and their interpretation) affirm the lawfulness of regulating to protect public 
health1292 and the environment, respectively. Under the former, relevant risks may 
be evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively and Members are entitled to determine 
their appropriate level of health protection regardless of whether the alternative 
also poses a risk.1293 Under the latter exception, generous interpretation has 
determined clean air1294 and sea turtles,1295 despite their renewability, to be 
exhaustible natural resources. 
Significant developments, for the purposes of endowing Members with flexibility 
to regulate risky technologies, have occurred with respect to public morality 
justifications. Article XX(a) is a provision of unclear scope and assessment of 
national policy relating to moral concerns is difficult.1296 However, interpretation of 
this exception has been deferential,1297 acknowledging that public morals may ‘vary 
in time and space’ and depend ‘on a range of factors, including prevailing social, 
ethical and religious values’. Members should also be permitted to define and apply 
                                                          
 
1290 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 137–139. 
1291 Arthur E Appleton, ‘The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’ in Patrick FJ Macrory, 
Arthur E Appleton and Michael G Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis (Springer 2005) 392. 
1292 As in EC-Asbestos (AB) (n 1220). 
1293 ibid [167-169]. 
1294 Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US-
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1295 US-Shrimp (AB) (n 1269) [128]. 
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their own public morals ‘according to their own systems and scales of values’,1298 
recognising their ‘inherent diversity’.1299 It has covered instrumental measures 
concerning reviews of the content of imported cultural goods which could have a 
negative impact on public morals,1300 and restrictions on online gambling due to its 
connection with money laundering, fraud, compulsive gambling and under-age 
gambling, implying that pornography and illegal drugs are probably covered too and 
perhaps alcohol and tobacco.1301 These findings suggest that ethical or religious 
concerns over interference with nature, the blurring of boundaries between man 
and machine or the distribution of the impacts of technology within and between 
generations, for example, could justify regulation.  
In a broadly positive move for regulatory pluralism,1302 the AB in EC-Seals, found 
Article XX(a) covered the EU’s prohibition on the import of seal products addressing 
concerns about the participation of EU consumers in a market for products from 
inhumanely slaughtered seals.1303 It was, furthermore, recognised that a measure 
could pursue multiple, perhaps competing, objectives at once.1304 In that case, the 
Inuit exception to the ban attempted to mitigate its impact on indigenous, seal-
hunting communities.1305 The Panel in EC-Seals also found that public morals fell 
within the scope of Article 2.2 TBTA.1306 Perhaps most significantly, the panel/AB 
did not require scientific evidence of harm,1307 thus recognising the lawfulness of a 
measure based on intrinsic ethical beliefs which cannot be substantiated by 
                                                          
 
1298 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services (adopted 20 April 2005) WT/DS285/R [6.461]. 
1299 Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 1297) 117. 
1300 Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (adopted 19 
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1301 Lester, Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 374. 
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1303 EC-Seals (AB) (n 1278) [5.225]. 
1304 Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 1297) 115–116. 
1305 EC-Seals (AB) (n 1278) [5.167]. 
1306 Panel Report, EC-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
(25 November 2013) WT/DS401/R [7.382, 7.418]. 
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science.1308 The panel recognised that the primary purpose of the regulation was to 
respond to public moral concerns by reference to evidence presented by the EU on 
public opinion,1309 confirmed by the AB.1310 It has been disputed that the evidence 
entirely supports this conclusion,1311 perhaps indicating a certain lightness of 
scrutiny on this point, or a willingness to accept responding to public opposition to 
an activity as a legitimate objective. It may also indicate a ‘de facto expanding [of] 
the closed list of legitimate objectives under the GATT’.1312 On these bases, 
regulation to address ethical or religious attitudes to the manipulation of life, to 
express cultural or ethical judgments about the ‘naturalness’ of our food or 
concerns relating to the participation of consumers in a market for products which 
stimulated rainforest destruction, or which caused loss of livelihood for farmers, 
could survive this stage of analysis. 
However, the panel arguably over-relied on public opinion,1313 finding that evidence 
on public opinion did not suffice to prove that the Inuit exception was motivated 
by public morals.1314 Alexia Herwig argues that the panel treated the question of 
whether public concerns over seal welfare were a legitimate objective as one of 
empirical fact, enquiring what public opinion was and whether that was reflected 
in EU law. It thus ignored the normative dimension of ‘legitimate’, failing to 
examine why seal welfare is, in itself, legitimate.1315 As such, the report contains 
                                                          
 
1308 Alexia Herwig, ‘Too Much Zeal on Seals? Animal Welfare, Public Morals, and Consumer 
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little general guidance as to what constitutes a legitimate objective in terms of 
public morals, or how to substantiate it, other than with evidence of public opinion. 
This could be a source of uncertainty for Members wishing to justify measures on 
the grounds of public morals. On the one hand, inability to regulate on the basis of 
public morals unsupported by (sufficient) evidence of public opinion would 
significantly curtail Members’ freedom to regulate.1316 Members should be able to 
regulate, for example, to protect vulnerable communities against potentially 
uneven distributive impacts of synthetic biology on the basis of compelling 
evidence produced by NGOs or social science, or even on the basis of normative 
arguments with respect to public morals, even if the public as a whole is not fully 
apprised of the matter. That public opinion need not necessarily be decisive was at 
least acknowledged by the AB but without further guidance.1317 On the other hand, 
focusing on empirical questions could indicate a reluctance by the panel to 
scrutinise national assessments of public morals too fiercely, thereby respecting 
Member autonomy. Overall, this approach to public morals (and general respect 
for differing national values) would seem to offer significant scope for the EU to 
address many implications of risky technologies, in particular, including concerns 
defined independently of scientific proof of harm and thereby enhance socio-
technical integration in such regulation. 
4. Proportionality analysis 
Each agreement contains an approximation of a proportionality test with which 
measures must comply. Under Article XX, measures must usually be ‘necessary’ to 
achieve the particular policy goal.1318 Article 2.2 TBTA obliges Members to ensure 
that their technical regulations are ‘not more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfil a legitimate objective’ with respect to their preparation, adoption or 
application, ‘taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’. While much 
in this analysis follows the contours of the equivalent ‘necessity’ test under 
                                                          
 
1316 ibid 129. 
1317 EC-Seals (AB) (n 1278) [5.146]. 
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Mercurio and Davies (n 1228) 368.  
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Article XX, the TBTA departs from the GATT in that the ‘least restrictive measure 
test’ applies to every technical regulation, not just measures in breach of Article 2.1 
TBTA. This has been described as a ‘paradigm shift… from a regime of non-
discrimination to one of non-justified obstacles’.1319 
The AB, in applying the necessity test under Article XX chapeau, apparently 
promotes a proportionality stricto sensu analysis requiring the weighing and 
balancing of the interests of trade against the importance of the policy goal 
pursued.1320 Further, it has stated that ‘[t]he more vital or important those common 
interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure 
designed as an enforcement instrument’.1321 Such an analysis would represent a 
significant interference with national regulatory autonomy. However, it has been 
convincingly argued that, despite repeated exposition of this test, the AB does not 
actually engage in a strict proportionality analysis but instead applies a ‘less 
restrictive alternative test’.1322 A measure must make, or be ‘apt’ to make, a 
material contribution to the achievement of its objective.1323 Analysis may be by 
way of comparison with a reasonably available, WTO-compliant alternative 
measure,1324 which actually targets the risk at hand.1325  
The standard is not challenging and perhaps implies a recognition that panels/ABs 
are ‘ill-equipped’ to pass judgment on such matters.1326 Members have a right to 
                                                          
 
1319 Henrik Horn and Joseph HH Weiler, ‘European Communities - Trade Description of 
Sardines: Textualism and Its Discontent’, The WTO Case Law of 2002 (CUP 2005) 252; Arwel 
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1326 Mavroidis (n 1221) 525. 
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choose their own level of (health) protection,1327 and the AB’s pledged respect here 
appears more supportive of flexibility in regulation and implies a reluctance to 
engage in such analysis.1328 This deference is significant with respect to enabling the 
EU to respond to concerns regarding a technology with a high level of protection. 
Further evidence of this approach is perhaps the deference to the EC’s own 
judgment of the importance of the moral questions at stake in EC-Seals, in which 
the AB refused to perform an analysis of regulatory consistency1329 as it had in 
Korea-Beef.1330 Furthermore, the AB does offer the unpredictable possibility of 
rescue, in EC-Seals, with its dictum that even a highly restrictive measure can still 
be found necessary subject to the result of a weighing and balancing exercise under 
the specific conditions of the case and in the light of the particular nature of the 
measure at issue.1331 
The standard is lower under Article 2.2 TBTA, reducing the overall intrusion this 
analysis requires into national regulation.1332 There is no minimum threshold of 
fulfilment a measure must meet, respecting a Member’s right to choose its level of 
protection1333 and focusing instead on whether international trade is restricted 
more than necessary to achieve the degree of contribution the measure makes to 
the legitimate objective.1334 Article 2.2 sets out indicative criteria for assessing the 
importance of the interest protected (expressed as the ‘risks of non-fulfilment’), 
enabling analysis to draw on evidence from further afield. ‘[S]cientific and technical 
information’ is one criterion but, as technical regulations are often applied to 
matters not closely related to biosafety, for example consumer protection,1335 this 
could promote enquiry into different perspectives and evaluations of the relevant 
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risks and their consequences. However, with the kinds of technologies discussed in 
this thesis, this criterion may instead induce a panel/AB to base its analysis on 
scientific evidence, thereby tending to exclude other types of information (as use 
of scientific evidence often does, see Chapter Two), as opposed to investigating 
societal evaluations. The potential remains, though, as part of the ‘weighing and 
balancing’ process.1336 
5. Method of application 
In what has been described as a turn to a procedural approach, parallel to and 
separate from scrutiny of a Member’s substantive choices,1337 a panel/AB will also 
scrutinise the application of a measure. A measure provisionally justified under 
Article XX must comply with the chapeau requirement that its application does not 
‘constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade’. This aims to 
prevent abuse or misuse of the exceptions by the invoking Member.1338 The flexible 
approach taken by panels/ABs to individual exceptions is absent in the more 
intrusive approach to examining compliance with the chapeau.1339 Many 
provisionally-justified measures have fallen at this stage, as the examples below 
illustrate and the impact of the chapeau on regulatory autonomy is well-known.1340 
Indeed, this further layer of scrutiny is particularly important in counterbalancing 
the wide interpretation of Article XX with disciplining protectionism1341 and thereby 
balancing trade liberalisation against other societal values.1342  
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The TBTA does not contain a directly equivalent provision, although elements of 
the assessment of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or a disguised 
restriction on trade under the chapeau surface in the TBTA test for ‘treatment no 
less favourable’.1343  
In order to comply with the chapeau, Members should cooperate with (all1344) 
relevant foreign governments and consider the regulatory burden on foreign 
operators;1345 avoid coercing the specific policies of other member governments 
without regard to their different conditions;1346 and apply equal implementation 
periods.1347 In US-Gasoline, while the ‘relating to’ standard under paragraph (g) was 
easier to meet, that flexibility evaporated under the heat of the AB’s chapeau 
analysis,1348 arguably demonstrating insensitivity towards the fact that certain 
measures, for example for environmental protection, often stem from the political 
need to balance various different public interests.1349 In both US-Gasoline and US-
Shrimp the survival of trade-related environmental measures was contingent on 
fulfilling procedural requirements, implying the ascendancy of trade interests 
reinforced by the high standards for compliance with the chapeau.1350  
Whether discrimination is justified is determined by the cause of, or the rationale 
for, the discrimination.1351 The chapeau itself places no limit on possible 
justifications for discrimination.1352 However, discrimination is unjustifiable where 
the rationale bears ‘no rational connection to’ or conflicts with the objective under 
Article XX providing provisional justification.1353 This test has been criticised for 
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being ‘excessively rigid’ and inappropriate for measures with more than one 
competing objective.1354 In EC-Seals, a breach was found on the basis of the EU’s 
failure to ensure the welfare of seals in similarly inhumane Inuit, as well as 
commercial, hunts; a discrimination deemed to be irreconcilable with the professed 
policy objective of addressing moral concerns and not explained by the EU’s desire 
to mitigate the impacts of the ban on the relevant indigenous peoples.1355 While 
the AB’s analysis concerning provisional justification accepted the balancing of 
multiple objectives in one measure, its chapeau analysis appears to reject that 
possibility by requiring that ‘any element of discrimination must be justified in 
terms of the main objective of Article XX(a)’.1356 
This may be a problem when regulating the complex implications of technological 
innovation in accordance with variations in appetite for risk. For example, a country 
may wish to ban imports of substances (e.g. food ingredients, chemicals, cosmetics) 
produced by synthetic biology processes on the basis of an ethical objection to the 
manipulation of life employed in these process. It would seek to justify this ban on 
the basis of public morals (paragraph (a)). However, it may wish to make an 
exception for artemisinin on the public health basis that it represents a cheaper 
treatment for malaria. Such a ban would reflect the tendency amongst publics to 
accept higher trade-offs where the social benefit is high, such as medical 
breakthroughs, than where the social benefit is regarded as lower.1357 It is doubtful, 
however, whether the current approach under the chapeau could accommodate 
such complexities. 
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6. The SPSA  
6.1 Risk assessment 
The SPSA expands upon Article XX(b) GATT1358 and reaffirms Members’ right to take 
SPS measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.1359 It 
enlists the principles and processes of regulatory science to control the creation 
and application of regulation in this field,1360 uniquely perhaps, though this 
innovation may be situated within an overall increase in prominence of technical 
expertise in the WTO.1361 The core science-based obligations of the SPSA are found 
in Articles 2.2 and 5.1. The former obliges Members to ensure inter alia that their 
SPS measures are based on scientific principles and are not maintained without 
‘sufficient scientific evidence’. The latter obliges Members to ensure their SPS 
measures are based on a risk assessment. The two ‘should constantly be read 
together’1362 and are integrally linked through the presumption that a violation of 
Article 5.1, violates Article 2.2.1363 The primacy of risk assessment seems assured in 
policing the quality of the scientific basis for national regulation of SPS risks.1364 
However, it has been argued that the plain wording of the SPSA accommodates 
diverse understandings of science and styles of risk regulation.1365 Similarly, 
Members’ ability to respond to the socio-political complexities of SPS risks 
(including those posed by technology) depends less on the SPSA requirement that 
measures be based on risk assessment per se, and more on whether panel/AB 
interpretation of the science-based obligations promotes a model of risk 
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assessment flexible and open enough to accommodate diverse values, concerns 
and framings in the evaluation of the relevant risks.1366 The more open the model 
of risk assessment promoted, the less constrained the EU would be in seeking to 
enhance socio-technical integration in its regulation of risky technologies where the 
SPSA applies. 
Article 5.2 obliges Members, during risk assessment generally, to take into account 
certain factors, including available scientific evidence, relevant PPMs, relevant 
ecological and environmental conditions, and quarantine or other treatment. This 
is not a closed list,1367 implying that other things, for example consumer concerns, 
cultural or moral preferences and societal value judgments,1368 may be considered 
in evaluating risk,1369 and may indicate a legitimate rather than protectionist 
purpose.1370 Nor are things that cannot be ascertained in a laboratory excluded; 
risks as they exist in the real world are included,1371 perhaps in recognition of the 
contingency of risk on ‘particular social contexts’,1372 or more ambitiously that the 
indeterminate social world itself constitutes risks1373 and the relevance of other 
insights from the literature discussed in Chapter Two.1374 Indeed, in Hormones, the 
AB found that risks arising from failure to comply with good veterinary practice in 
administering hormones may be taken into account under Article 5.21375 and held 
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that panels have a duty to consider evidence of such abuse, where presented.1376 
This would ostensibly allow the EU to apply an SPS measure to, for example a novel 
food additive produced by synthetic biology, on the basis of risks arising from its 
actual use as opposed to studies under idealised lab-based conditions. However, 
the apparent immanent requirement for a scientific basis1377 ‘for all risks of 
concern’ would seem difficult to satisfy with respect to this concern1378 and the EC’s 
attempts at substantiating a ‘real world’ problem failed the specificity requirement, 
discussed below.1379 Furthermore, the Panel in EC-Biotech refused to allow 
extrapolation of a ‘real world’ risk from a lab-based study as a justification for one 
of the safeguard measures challenged in that case,1380 highlighting the difficulty of 
justifying an SPS measure on this basis.  
Further flexibility for Members subsists in the ability to express risk in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms.1381 An equivocal concession, perhaps, given the 
prohibition on theoretical uncertainty as a basis for an SPS measure,1382 discussed 
below. Furthermore, risk assessments must be sufficiently specific in terms of the 
harm concerned and the precise causal agent.1383 The specificity requirement may 
be a misinterpretation of the Article 5.1 obligation to base measures ‘on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks’, given that risk-based 
programmes tend to address broad categories of risk.1384 The impossibility of 
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regulating risks not demonstrable ‘through particularized scientific studies’ (for 
example, in Hormones, the small health risks posed by hormone residues and their 
contribution to an overall onslaught of carcinogens and other hormones) also 
potentially encroaches upon Member freedom to select risks to tolerate or 
avoid.1385 It potentially prioritises the disciplining of protectionism over national 
autonomy where scientific uncertainty exists1386 and ‘raises a significant barrier to 
the regulation of small and diffuse risks’.1387 The AB in Hormones II arguably 
tempered the specificity requirement by requiring only a demonstration of the 
potential for harm to arise from the hazard and that exposure to the hazard be ‘one 
of the factors contributing to the possible’ harm.1388 It also interpreted the phrase 
‘as appropriate to the circumstances’ qualifying risk assessment in Article 5.1 to 
recognise that the substance and risk being evaluated may pose particular 
methodological difficulties,1389 perhaps acknowledging the challenges faced by 
Members. Ultimately though, the specificity requirement demotes studies 
highlighting uncertainties, which restricts scope for precautionary regulation,1390 
discussed further below. 
Specificity may also undermine Member ability to use minority science to support 
their SPS measures; a right available provided there is a rational relationship1391 
between the science and the measure,1392 and certain quality criteria are 
fulfilled.1393 The AB’s scrutiny1394 of the science cited by the EC in Hormones 
concluded that the scientific studies suggesting such hormone use was safe related 
specifically to hormone residues in meat from cattle treated with hormones for 
                                                          
 
1385 Alan O Sykes, ‘Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty and Scientific Evidence Requirements: 
A Pessimistic View’ in George A Bermann and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), Trade and Human 
Health and Safety (CUP 2006) 267. 
1386 ibid 270. 
1387 Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 35) 215. 
1388 Hormones II (AB) (n 1370) [563]; Peel, Science and Risk Regulation (n 1365) 207–208. 
1389 Hormones II (AB) (n 1370) [562]. 
1390 Peel, Science and Risk Regulation (n 1365) 208. 
1391 In itself unclear in terms of its relationship to the size of the minority, Scott, The WTO 
Agreement (n 1224) 107. 
1392 Hormones (AB) (n 1362) [194]. 
1393 Hormones II (AB) (n 1370) [591]. 
1394 Peel, ‘Of Apples’ (n 1374) 448. 
236 
 
growth promotion purposes while the minority science related to the carcinogenic 
potential of hormones generally.1395 This may imply a requirement that minority 
science match the majority in its focus and parameters to assume authority. This 
seems to preserve for the majority some degree of ascendancy;1396 even if the 
substance is not dispositive, the approach it takes may yet be the yardstick against 
which the minority approach is judged,1397 potentially restricting Member ability to 
rely on certain minority science to contest the majority view. It may thereby also 
reduce the EU’s ability to introduce (precautionary) regulation in reliance on 
alternative sources of science which more accurately reflect ‘European’ concerns 
about a risky technology.  
References to differing yet equally justifiable responses by representative 
governments to risks1398 would appear to acknowledge the contingency of scientific 
knowledge and validity of public input. However, the standard of review of the 
obligations in Articles 2.2 and 5.1 requires an objective or rational relationship 
between the measure and risk assessment,1399 i.e. that the conclusions drawn by 
the Member are sufficiently supported by the scientific evidence relied upon.1400 
This raises questions about a panel/AB’s competence to assess1401 and potentially 
assigns exclusive relevance to scientific risk findings.1402 Experts may be relied upon 
to perform this analysis.1403 However, this risks panels ‘defer[ring] to the ‘epistemic 
superiority’ of experts’,1404 whose ostensibly neutral and objective ‘scientific’ 
evaluation will likely reflect their own normative commitments and framings,1405 
and potentially substituting Member risk framings with those of the expert 
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advisers. Furthermore, the greater the emphasis the standard of review places on 
a strong relationship between the measure and the risk assessment, the more likely 
a panel is to exclude alternative risk framings and non-scientific contributions such 
as public opinion.1406   
The AB in Hormones II arguably stipulated a more deferential procedural 
approach,1407 limiting panels to determining whether the Member’s risk 
assessment is objectively justifiable on the basis of coherent reasoning and 
respectable scientific evidence, not whether it is correct.1408 This seems to conform 
roughly to the standard proposed by Vern Walker to preserve domestic regulatory 
autonomy from over intrusion.1409 It also perhaps faintly echoes Robert Howse’s1410 
proposed deferential procedural analysis1411 which he argues could enhance 
legitimacy of, and trust in, regulatory decision-making,1412 and national democratic 
deliberation by providing a foundation of all available, relevant scientific 
information,1413 taking into account citizen determinations of risk acceptability.1414  
By contrast, the far more rigorous standard of review in Australia-Apples1415 
distinguished between the scientific basis underlying the measure and the 
reasoning and conclusions of a risk assessor on the basis of that scientific 
evidence.1416 The AB scrutinised the latter more fiercely than the former in terms 
of its objectivity, coherence and sufficiency of the scientific evidentiary support, 
requiring it to be ‘reasoned and explained consistently with Articles 5.1 and 5.2’,1417 
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apparently slipping into substantive review.1418 In this context, the position of a 
Member wishing to regulate a risky technology is uncertain. Whether its own risk 
framings and the conclusions it draws from the scientific evidence will be respected 
and what other input could be considered is unclear. If the approach taken in 
Australia-Apples points the way forward, the EU may be significantly constrained in 
regulating the risks of technologies as it sees and interprets them including by 
reference to the concerns of its publics. 
6.2 Precaution under the SPSA  
Measures subject to the SPSA may well concern matters characterised by 
uncertainty. There are faint glimmers of potential for precautionary action in the 
SPSA. For example, where there is sufficient evidence to perform a risk assessment 
but there is scientific uncertainty, a Member may resort to expert judgment to 
estimate the probability of ‘certain events’, though these conclusions are still 
subject to review against the requirements of coherence and objectivity.1419 
Furthermore panels, in determining whether an SPS measure is supported by 
sufficient scientific evidence, ‘should bear in mind that responsible, representative 
governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution where 
risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are 
concerned’.1420 The reference to representative governments may be an 
acknowledgement of the relevance of public opinion and underlines the AB’s 
inclination for some deference to Members’ decisions regarding health.1421 
However, it remains a high bar for precautionary action and far from fully 
recognises the potential value of public input in evaluating risk.1422 Ultimately, the 
precautionary principle does not override the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 and 
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5.2,1423 perhaps indicating more generally a rejection of attempts to use ‘non-WTO’ 
law to influence the WTO’s ‘normative order’1424 and a move away from the 
openness expressed in US-Shrimp.  
Furthermore, the risk evaluated in a risk assessment must be ‘ascertainable’,1425 
despite a recognition that ‘theoretical uncertainty’ always exists.1426 This 
‘uncertainty paradox’1427 is characterised by persistent evasion of the relevance of 
uncertainty1428 and ignores the potential that uncertainty (theoretical included) 
itself reflects risk.1429 It requires that any theoretical risk be tolerated, ‘regardless 
of the nature of the risk-generating activity and the social worth attaching to it’.1430 
It has been argued that this requirement influenced the CJEU in its findings on 
hypothetical risk, as discussed in Chapter Six, perhaps excessively restricting EU 
activity, given that this finding may be confined to Article 5.1 and not necessarily 
extended to Article 5.7.1431 The intense uncertainty surrounding both the 
unprecedented level of manipulation of life within the ambition of synthetic biology 
and its benefits, as discussed in Chapter Five, surely makes acknowledging 
uncertainty as a valid consideration in regulatory decision-making all the more 
urgent. The WTO’s approach and its apparent influence on the EU here may 
indicate the current unlikelihood of that happening. 
Article 5.7, perhaps provides most scope for precautionary action, allowing a 
Member, where relevant scientific evidence is ‘insufficient’, to provisionally adopt 
SPS measures on the basis of ‘available pertinent information’. This is not triggered 
by uncertainty1432 and the interpretive emphasis on sufficiency potentially excludes 
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any scope for responding to uncertainty at all, even uncertainty persisting following 
risk assessment,1433 as in EC-Biotech.1434 However, it was unclear then what was 
meant by ‘uncertainties’ and whether it included ‘irreducible’ uncertainty.1435 This 
is unlikely, especially given that theoretical uncertainty may not be relied upon.1436  
Article 5.7 has been strictly enforced1437 and four cumulative1438 requirements must 
be satisfied to adopt and maintain a provisional measure under Article 5.71439 and 
avoid breaching Article 2.2.1440 In Japan-Apples, the AB held that insufficient 
scientific evidence exists where ‘the body of available scientific evidence does not 
allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate 
assessment of risks’ to SPSA standards.1441 Questions regarding when a risk 
assessment is ‘adequate’ and when evidence is ‘reliable’ were left unresolved and 
ultimately, Member ability to regulate under Article 5.7 rests on ‘the preparedness 
of WTO decision-makers to recognise the context-dependent nature of questions 
surrounding the adequacy of risk assessment’, as influenced by, inter alia, the 
Member’s desired ALOP.1442 However, respect for alternative Member risk framings 
or assessments of the salience of different sources of uncertainty seemed distant 
in the AB’s dismissal of Japan’s argument, in that case, that in relation to specific 
aspects of the spread of fire blight in apples evidence was insufficient.1443 It found 
that the specificity or generality of the scientific information was irrelevant 
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providing that overall, the relevant scientific evidence was sufficient to perform the 
necessary evaluation.1444 
The AB potentially operates a double standard in its emphasis on, or dismissal of, 
specificity depending on context.1445 In Hormones it found the studies relied upon 
to be insufficiently specific, demanding an assessment of the specific hormones 
used in a specific manner for specific purposes.1446 By contrast, Japan was 
concerned about gaps in knowledge relating to the fate of the bacteria in immature 
apples and contamination pathways,1447 preferring to hang onto its precautionary 
approach while those uncertainties obtained. The information lacking in each case 
is of a different kind, but arguably of a similar level of detail or specificity. In both 
cases the detail was absent but only in the former was that absence salient.1448 The 
implication is that once a certain threshold of relevant scientific evidence is 
reached, the regulating Member will have to tolerate any remaining uncertainties. 
This misses the point of precaution and undermines the AB’s belief that the 
precautionary principle is reflected in Article 5.7,1449 excluding assessment of risks 
according to different risk framings.1450 It is uncertainty to which states require 
flexibility to respond, particularly where highly controversial technologies with 
deeply uncertain implications are concerned. Article 5.7 may indicate that the SPSA 
was designed to deal only with risks characterised by high certainty and high 
consensus1451 such as quarantine risks, and not more intractable forms of 
uncertainty such as ignorance and indeterminacy.1452 If correct, this highlights 
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further the inadequacy of the provision to deal with the likely responses of some 
Members to the potential impacts of controversial and unpredictable emerging 
technologies such as synthetic biology (or GMOs)1453 where risks are characterised 
by low certainty and low consensus amplifying the importance of public input,1454 
especially given the strictness with which it has been interpreted.1455  
The benefit of focusing on insufficiency is perhaps the ability to force a resolution, 
preventing Members from endlessly pursuing certainty to delay relaxing their SPS 
measures.1456 Members are entitled to determine their own ‘appropriate level of 
protection’ (ALOP)1457 (including a ‘zero-risk’ ALOP1458). The SPSA nowhere 
stipulates what Members should take into account, presumably leaving Members 
free to consider the multiple concerns influencing attitudes to risk discussed in 
Chapter Two. However, this pragmatic approach could be seen as retrospectively 
eating into that right by dismissing some uncertainties and thereby squeezing 
exercise of precaution.1459 It also renders the AB acknowledgement that a 
Member’s ALOP can influence the scope or method of its risk assessment1460 almost 
meaningless given that an ALOP and associated risk assessment are likely to be 
informed (or framed) in part by concerns over uncertainty1461 and conducted using 
non-scientific assumptions and judgments.1462 Instead, scrutiny focuses solely on 
the relevant body of scientific evidence and its sufficiency for the purposes of a risk 
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assessment, ignoring the roles of framing, context and values, apparently without 
reference to the ALOP.1463 
Though the authority of the analysis is doubtful, this approach is illustrated in the 
Panel’s treatment of sufficiency in EC-Biotech, in which it rejected the EC’s 
argument1464 that sufficiency should be judged in relation to the regulatory goals of 
the regulating authority, including, for example, its ALOP.1465 In doing so, it appears 
to seek a ‘complete, self-contained’1466 risk assessment, objective, free of framing, 
regulatory culture and ‘adequate for all purposes’;1467 similar to the ‘view from 
nowhere’ identified by Jasanoff as characterising US regulatory science and which 
it is deeply committed to promoting, internationally.1468 The monolithic conception 
of risk pre-supposed (in which risk assessors need not know the level of risk their 
client seeks)1469 is a vast simplification of the nuanced and complex understanding 
of risk discussed in Chapter Two.  
This may contradict the SPSA’s very own definition of risk assessment, at least in 
relation to pests and diseases, which requires evaluation ‘according to the sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures which might be applied’.1470 The latter could be 
interpreted as supporting, or even requiring, the combined treatment of risk 
management and risk assessment, arguably bolstered by the AB’s acceptance that 
a Member’s ALOP may influence its risk assessment including what is considered to 
be sufficient or insufficient scientific evidence1471 and its rejection of the Panel’s 
distinction between risk assessment and risk management.1472 This perhaps 
                                                          
 
1463 Hormones II (AB) (n 1370) [686]. 
1464 EC-Biotech (Panel) (n 1380) [7.3226-7.3227]. 
1465 ibid [7.3234]. 
1466 ibid [7.3188]. 
1467 Peel, Science and Risk Regulation (n 1365) 253–254. 
1468 Jasanoff, ‘Practices of Objectivity’ (n 148). 
1469 EC-Biotech (Panel) (n 1380) [7.3243]. 
1470 Annex A(4) SPSA. 
1471 Hormones II (AB) (n 1370) [534, 685]. 
1472 Hormones (AB) (n 1362) [181]; Scott, The WTO Agreement (n 1224) 100. 
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indicates a sensitivity towards ‘value-infused scientific policymaking’1473 and an 
understanding of risk more consonant with that examined in Chapter Two.1474  
In addition, the AB has recognised that previously sufficient science may become 
insufficient, merely by new evidence ‘put[ting] into question the relationship 
between the body of scientific evidence and the conclusions concerning risk’.1475 
This characterises insufficiency as transitory, ignoring and excluding ‘more 
pervasive issues of ignorance and indeterminacy’ as reasons to adopt provisional 
measures under Article 5.71476 and ignoring the contingency of existing scientific 
knowledge. This is particularly relevant to pesticides, synthetic biology and other 
risky technologies which will still encounter ‘new, unprecedented conditions of 
deployment’, not covered by previous testing.1477 That said, this approach does not 
appear to institute a tough and entirely inflexible threshold for the enactment of 
provisional measures. However, precaution may still depend on how strictly panels 
interpret ‘new scientific evidence’ and review Member interpretations of when 
such evidence ‘puts into question’ previous conclusions about risk, and the breadth 
of the expert advice taken as to its sufficiency.1478 If it is as strict as the CJEU’s 
interpretation of ‘new scientific evidence’ under Article 114(5) TFEU, discussed in 
Chapter Six, then it may leave little room for manoeuvre. Alternatively, if this 
constitutes a recognition that risk assessment and determination of the sufficiency 
of scientific evidence require subjective judgments by risk assessors in the context 
of a particular community and/or chosen ALOP,1479 it may leave more room for the 
EU to open up its own risk assessment and decision-making procedures.  
                                                          
 
1473 Winickoff and others (n 250) 96; but may be of limited effect, Davey (n 1421) 126.  
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International Economic Law 1077, 1083. 
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1478 Peel, Science and Risk Regulation (n 1365) 237. 
1479 Alessandra Arcuri, Lukasz Gruszczynski and Alexia Herwig, ‘Independence of Experts and 
Standards for Evaluation of Scientific Evidence under the SPS Agreement - New Directions 
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6.3 Proportionality and application 
Necessity analysis under Article 5.6 SPSA requires that SPS measures are not more 
trade-restrictive than required to achieve the relevant ALOP, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility. A footnote to the Article providing for 
compliance where, inter alia, there is no other reasonably available, significantly 
less trade-restrictive measure that achieves the ALOP1480 suggests that de minimis 
differences are of no consequence.1481 Nonetheless, a decision on this question can 
be controversial, cutting into national choice of appropriate measure to achieve the 
ALOP.1482 While panels are not permitted to engage in a de novo review of the 
relevant science under Article 5.1, they are obliged, under Article 5.6 to evaluate 
the science on their own,1483 suggesting a tightening of control on national 
regulatory autonomy at this stage.1484 There is also the possibility that, where a 
Member does not comply with its apparent duty to determine its ALOP with 
sufficient precision,1485 the measure it has implemented in order to achieve that 
ALOP is found to be unnecessary on the basis that it achieves a higher ALOP.1486 
Furthermore, where a measure pursues non-SPS purposes, those non-SPS benefits 
will not carry weight in the proportionality analysis.1487  
Article 2.3 SPSA prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
Members ‘where identical or similar conditions prevail’.1488 Article 5.5 SPSA 
contains the expanded1489 and unusual requirement that Members avoid ‘arbitrary 
or unjustifiable distinctions’ in the ALOPs applied in different situations, ‘if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade’. The aim is to achieve consistency in the application of the concept of the 
                                                          
 
1480 Australia-Apples (AB) (n 1415) [363]. 
1481 Walker (n 1384) 271. 
1482 Pauwelyn (n 1368) 652. 
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ALOP.1490 Analysis under Article 5.5 focuses specifically, first, on whether the 
distinctions are arbitrary or unjustifiable1491 and secondly on whether such 
distinctions also result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, to be decided in each individual case.1492 
With respect to the former criterion, a panel may consider the stringency of the 
ALOP in relation to the magnitude of the risk,1493 the scale of regulatory 
intervention, and perhaps administrative difficulties and costs,1494 though it is 
unclear how sensitive it would be towards distinctions which result from broader 
historical or cultural differences between Members.1495 A panel may also accept 
distinctions based on the purposes of the activities to which different ALOPs apply, 
for example hormones administered for growth and therapeutic or zootechnical 
purposes.1496 However, in Hormones, rigorous engagement with the relevant risk 
assessment to assess the scientific plausibility of the EC’s response to the scientific 
uncertainty present revealed an unjustifiable distinction between carbadox and 
hormones.1497 Acceptance however, that the EC could pursue different ALOPs for 
natural and synthetic hormones1498 is significant for the purposes of any future 
attempt to discipline the regulation of substances produced by synthetic biology 
using Article 5.5. It is unclear however, whether the potential unsustainability of 
substances produced by synthetic biology as a factor influencing evaluations of risk 
and resulting in different ALOPs would be acceptable. 
With respect to the latter criterion (whether the distinctions in ALOPs result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade), the AB in Australia-
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Salmon confirmed the use of three ‘warning signals’ and two ‘additional factors’ in 
assessing the measure distinguishing salmon and other fish.1499 The detail of its 
inquiry perhaps suggests a genuine attempt to root out protectionism1500 and 
thereby save bona fide SPS measures, perhaps seen too in Hormones, where the AB 
found significant evidence of consumer concern but no protective intent among the 
national regulators.1501 
The AB has provided criteria for determining comparability, for example, where the 
same substance or the same adverse health effect1502 or the same or similar 
disease1503 is involved or where ‘common element or elements’ are judged 
sufficient for comparability.1504 It has also recognised that different ALOPs may 
stem from voluntary exposure by the public to particular risks, for example those 
from traditional foods,1505 acknowledging the significance of voluntary assumption 
in forming attitudes to risk (see Chapter Two), and perhaps trust in personally 
accumulated experience as opposed to scientific evidence of safety.1506 It also 
highlights the difficulty in categorising sets of decisions as either consistent or 
inconsistent, particularly at a societal level.1507 The use of the social science 
literature discussed in Chapter Two as evidence explaining different attitudes to 
risks would surely enhance this analysis.1508 Recognition of voluntariness, purpose 
and naturalness as factors justifying inconsistency suggests a sensitivity to non-
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scientifically determinable considerations relevant to setting an ALOP and may be 
a step in the right direction. But this, plus the essential indeterminacy from which 
this comparison suffers and the plurality of cultures amongst Members, invites the 
question whether it is appropriate to scrutinise ALOP consistency more intensely 
than philosophical consistency (i.e. whether Members, for example in all areas of 
animal welfare, regulate according to a consistent moral standard) as the AB 
declined to do in EC-Seals, limiting its intervention in Member choice of level of 
protection.1509  
7. Conclusion 
Flexibility in one area matched by rigidity elsewhere pervades the above analysis, 
perhaps reflecting, not surprisingly, an overriding aim to balance national 
sovereignty to pursue democratically determined social ends and the disciplining of 
protectionism.1510 With respect to the GATT, the Article XX exceptions are broadly 
worded and interpreted. The TBTA, and to a certain extent, panel and AB 
interpretations of its provisions, are full of opportunities, in principle, for Members 
to justify their regulation for example through the concepts of ‘legitimate 
objectives’ and ‘legitimate regulatory distinctions’. Under all three agreements, 
Members may determine their ALOP and the ability under the SPSA to rely on 
minority science provides an opportunity for Members to cite, as justification, 
science which perhaps represents more closely the interests they wish to protect. 
Some1511 also noted a turn to procedural away from substantive scrutiny in 
panel/AB interpretation of proportionality, the chapeau, and to a certain extent 
under the SPSA, and the intention to increase regulatory wriggle room. 
However, this development may not ultimately achieve that intention for 
substantive decisions still underpin procedural analysis and the boundary between 
procedural and substantive review cannot easily be discerned. For example, 
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determining whether a risk assessment was conducted can merge into determining 
how it was carried out which entails questioning the substantive choices made 
during the risk assessment, as perhaps seen in Australia-Apples.1512 
Furthermore, the flexibility identified above is perhaps constrained by other 
aspects of panel/AB interpretations of the three agreements. Under the SPSA, for 
example, autonomy in choosing an ALOP is undermined by the limited scope for 
precautionary action, a narrow understanding of uncertainty and an analysis of 
sufficiency of scientific evidence without appropriate reference to the Member’s 
aims and concerns. Deference to Member risk assessments works alongside the 
hard edge of specificity. And the ability to rely on minority science may be 
constrained by a searching analysis of its scope by comparison against the majority 
approach in determining whether there is a rational relationship between the risk 
assessment and the measure. This perhaps approaches use of a particular 
conception of sound science to discipline Members’ SPS measures.1513 Overall, 
Members have a high hurdle to clear to maintain their SPS measures. In terms of 
the extent to which the EU may rely on risk assessments influenced by specifically 
‘European’ values and concerns to justify its regulation of risky technologies, there 
is limited scope under the SPSA. 
Similarly, the GATT and TBTA acknowledge many non-safety concerns as valid 
grounds for regulation, most notably public morality, and necessity is not 
impossible to prove. However, rigorous analysis under the chapeau and rejection 
of the regulatory purpose test which arguably preserved some measure of freedom, 
ultimately constrain national responses to such concerns. Under the TBTA, 
regulatory distinctions are minutely scrutinised and so far have been unconvincing; 
measures may fall, despite their pursuit of legitimate objectives, for reasons 
relating to their manner of application. While the TBTA holds out greater potential 
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for deference to national regulation than the SPSA, navigating to success is full of 
pitfalls.  
Were the SPSA and the GATT and/or the TBTA to apply simultaneously, the question 
arises whether science would be called upon to determine the existence of a risk as 
grounds on which to accept the existence of a moral problem or whether the moral 
concern could exist and justify regulatory action in its own right. Current indications 
suggest that the latter is possible, though the evidentiary requirements are not 
entirely certain. A further question is whether, if a public morality justification were 
accepted under the TBTA, for example, this would have any bearing on AB/panel 
scrutiny of the supporting scientific evidence presented or its relationship to the 
level of protection sought under the SPSA.  
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Chapter Eight – Innovate or die! Ideas as barriers to closing the 
policy-practice gap 
1. Introduction 
The previous four chapters constituted an enquiry across EU and WTO law for 
opportunities in which values other than safety may prompt or influence regulation 
of risky technologies. In other words, they asked how successfully they can compete 
with the benefits associated with trade, including the benefits that 
commercialisation of technology allegedly brings. They have attempted to uncover 
why, despite repeatedly professing a policy commitment to greater socio-technical 
integration, the EU has frequently failed to perform. Chapters Three-Five presented 
alternative ideas or frameworks for regulation/governance capable, if implemented 
ambitiously, of challenging the dominance of commercial economic values by 
permitting or encouraging the consideration of other, non-safety, concerns in 
decision-making. While conclusions have been different, a consistent theme has 
been that non-safety values occupy a vulnerable position vis-à-vis these economic 
values and ultimately, for different reasons, struggle to compete. They tend not to 
be recognised as factors influencing risk assessment and, as reasons to regulate, 
are tightly restricted. 
This chapter steps back from the detail of science-society relations, specific 
technology regulation and trade law to examine some of the ideas which drive and 
consolidate the strength of such economic values in the EU, sometimes neglected 
by STS scholarship.1514 To that end, it adopts some of the arguments and 
perspectives of those who perceive Western liberal democracies to be in a ’post-
political’ or ‘post-democratic’ state, characterised by the ‘depoliticisation’ of 
otherwise, or previously, political matters. The questions and concerns raised by 
risky technological innovation are irreducible to, for example, expert evaluations of 
risk. They are valid subjects of political debate in which the choices, assumptions 
and dictates of even the highest political level are admitted to scrutiny, and in which 
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genuine alternatives are available both in terms of solutions and societal futures. 
This chapter argues, however, that aspects of EU innovation (and related) policy 
exhibit characteristics of ‘post-politics’ and that they deprive many of the choices, 
questions and concerns associated with technological innovation of political 
oxygen. 
Section 2 elaborates upon the notion of post-politics, setting out some of its theses 
against which aspects of EU policy are subsequently analysed. Section 3 identifies 
imaginaries which surface throughout that policy and argues that above all, the EU 
pursues a goal of economic competitiveness which it conditions on 
commercialisable scientific research, technology and innovation. Section 4 
considers the master narratives which wrap around those policies and imaginaries, 
supporting and reinforcing them. In each section, I illustrate how policy closes down 
debate and 'depoliticises' underlying choices, questions and concerns which are 
properly regarded as political. Section 5 concludes. I acknowledge now, as I did at 
the beginning of Chapter Three, that neither the EU nor the Commission are 
monolithic sources of policy. However, the point, overall, of this chapter, is to show 
the sheer ideational weight in and behind much of EU innovation policy and the 
irresistibility of its general vision as evidence of the extreme difficulty of attempting 
anything which might disrupt its agenda, including increasing socio-technical 
integration in regulatory decision-making. To that end, the chapter focuses almost 
exclusively on policy. The influence of this framework on the law is addressed in 
Chapter Nine. 
2. The ‘political’ and depoliticisation 
Chantal Mouffe describes a ‘post-political’ vision of modern democracy. She 
differentiates ‘politics’; the practices and institutions organising human 
coexistence,1515 from ‘the political’ which she takes to refer to ‘a space of power, 
conflict and antagonism’.1516 For her, indelible antagonism and disagreement are 
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the essence of the political and political questions ‘are not mere technical issues to 
be solved by experts… [but] involve decisions which require us to make a choice 
between conflicting alternatives’.1517 Similarly, the political is an ‘index of the space 
for disagreement’ and political actions are those that ‘[open] up the possibility for 
disagreement’.1518  
The state of the ‘post-political’ denotes a formation in which former partisan 
conflicts are consigned to history1519 and a belief that the ‘passions’ associated with 
those collective identifications will fade with the march of individualism and 
rationality.1520 This wilting of the political is attributed to various causes. For 
example, ‘the hegemony of liberalism’ which, in its rationalism and individualism, 
may be unable to accommodate the conflicts, inevitable in a plural society, for 
which no rational solution is possible.1521 Additional causes which have been cited 
include the increased power of corporate elites, deregulation, reducing the state 
etc. aided by globalisation and the shift by the left from its traditional support base 
and policies, to the centre.1522 Neoliberal policy, it has also been argued, 
depoliticises economic regulation and strategy, placing previously contested policy 
fields ‘off limits’ for political discourse and in the domain of technocratic 
management.1523 Likewise, the influence of neoliberal thought on WTO law entailed 
the rejection of the idea of economic governance as the pursuit of collective goals 
and values in the international economic order and, alongside the elevation of the 
importance of technical knowledge, has hindered discussion and debate over ‘the 
possibility or desirability of collective projects of international economic order’.1524 
Finally, it has been argued that the complexity of the public sphere and the 
                                                          
 
1517 ibid. 
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1524 Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (n 1218) 7. 
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proliferation of independent agencies shields public policy from public gaze in a way 
that can also depoliticise.1525 
Post-politics in the West is also characterised by ‘the growth of a managerial 
approach to government… deprived of its proper political dimension’,1526 perhaps 
encapsulated in Michael Power’s, ‘risk management of everything’.1527 In the EU a 
shift towards ‘managerial sensibility’ reliant on expertise and procedure which 
obscures underlying political choices has been discerned.1528 In relation to 
regulatory science, despite the social science insights into values and culture 
discussed in Chapter Two, public management discourses maintain ‘a preference 
for rationalism and standardization in making public science accountable’ leading 
to ‘a conception of risk governance heavily framed by rationalized notions of a risk 
management process’.1529 Power highlights the contestability of governance and 
the tension between its two logics of democracy and managerial process.1530 It is 
within this management logic which risk analysis is now conducted and which, along 
with ideals of ‘good governance’, provides the framework for participation. While 
lay participation may still occur in risk regulation, the current organisational logic 
of risk analysis frames such exercises as strategies to manage public expectations, 
regarded as a source of risk in themselves, and to calm any public opposition with 
the generation of legitimacy.1531 Persuasion and the manipulation of public opinion 
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(along with increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of opening politics to scrutiny) 
are characteristic of, according to Colin Crouch, ‘post-democracy’.1532  
Despite the persistent state of disagreement at the heart of the political, common 
decisions are of course still required for government, though potentially arbitrary 
and lacking ‘rational’ justification.1533 In a democracy, legislation may be justified by 
the need to reach agreement, if not by reason or consensus, while persistent 
disagreement on many of its aspects is acknowledged.1534 The extent to which 
deliberation should seek consensus is a recurring question. Some emphasise that it 
should. Liberalism, it is argued, is convinced of the possibility of objective public 
knowledge and universal, rational consensus often by melding together plural 
values through dialogue.1535 This is so notwithstanding that conditions for 
consensus are contingent – not necessarily indicating a proven truth1536 - and that 
consensus in the eyes of the public may be forged by forces not recognised as 
‘rational’ or ‘scientific’, for example the media.1537 In the context of this thesis, 
expert risk assessment provides the ‘objective public knowledge’ which frames 
public debate and contributes to depoliticising EU decision-making on risky 
technologies.1538 Others see consensus as unlikely in a plural society1539 and 
emphasise a place for contestation, continued disagreement on the reasons behind 
an agreed decision,1540 compromise and conflict1541 and the engendering of mutual 
respect for conflicting values.1542 How different to the EU’s familiar dismissal of 
opposition on the basis of the deficit model.  
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Problem-solving approaches to deliberation require merely a shared commitment 
to solving a problem among participants but no consensus on values at any point in 
the process.1543 Consensus has been criticised for suppressing the creative potential 
of conflict for solving problems by attempting to reconcile sometimes irreconcilable 
interests and for enabling manipulation of the process by dismissing certain 
interests, undermining its legitimacy.1544  
Erik Swyngedouw summarises: ‘[p]ost-politicization reduces the political terrain to 
the sphere of consensual governing and policy-making centered on technical, 
managerial and consensual administration (policing) of environmental, social, 
economic or other domains’.1545 In acutely contentious areas such as the 
environment, climate1546 or here, technological innovation, consensus as a goal 
sought by rationalism, managerialism and technocracy epitomises the post-political 
condition due to its foundation in exclusion and ‘annulment of dissensus’ signifying 
‘the end of politics’.1547 The ‘post-politicizing environmental consensus’ allows only 
discussion over ‘technologies of management, timing of their implementation, 
arrangements of policing and the interests of those whose voices are recognized as 
legitimate’; conflicting or alternative trajectories are forestalled.1548 Swyngedouw 
identifies a similar pattern to Power: disagreement and debate occur but only 
‘within a model of elite consensus and agreement subordinated to a managerial-
technocratic regime’ without trespassing into ‘the socio-political framing of present 
and future natures’.1549 Thus he argues ‘the properly political’ is evacuated from the 
public sphere.1550  
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In Mouffe’s definition of ‘the political’ as antagonistic, opponents are perceived as 
enemies whose demands are illegitimate.1551 A consensual approach, instead of 
creating conditions for a reconciled society, leads to the emergence of antagonisms 
which often manifest instead as moral conflicts between right and wrong (as 
opposed to, for example, left and right).1552 These ideas are highlighted here for the 
additional insight they provide into the resilience of current institutions of risk 
regulation in the face of PES/‘new scientific governance’ initiatives for change and 
hence the limited progress towards socio-technical integration identified in this 
thesis. For example, criticisms of consensus shed light on the shortcomings of 
instrumental deliberation and attempts to overcome opposition, as discussed in 
Chapter Five. The analysis of ‘the political’ as antagonistic is helpful for 
understanding the extreme antagonism and dismissal of opposing concerns and 
viewpoints which characterise much societal interaction in relation to risky 
technologies, often marked by bitter disagreements and moralising.1553 This 
political contestation rarely seems accommodated, in terms of a space for 
disagreement or respect for different values, in many of the decision-making 
structures discussed in this thesis. Thus, some aspects of depoliticisation echo 
processes which close down, rather than open up, debate over risky technologies. 
Ultimately, it depends on how deliberation is used. Voices from STS have warned 
that the aim should not be consensus1554 (though perhaps too often it is1555) but 
rather a pluralistic discourse to open up participatory appraisal.1556 There is 
evidence that deliberation can engage society more closely and fruitfully in science 
and vice versa.1557 However, highly controlled engagement pursuing consensus can 
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1556 Stirling, ‘“Opening Up” and “Closing Down”’ (n 9) 282. 
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stifle genuine debate as much as reductive assessment techniques and can close 
down choice over technological trajectories.1558 With respect to the EU, Amandine 
Crespy has argued that it has adopted an ‘elite-based and consensus-orientated 
understanding of deliberative democracy’.1559 It is elite in the sense that 
deliberation occurs amongst national experts, NGOs, interest group spokespeople 
and union officials in the Brussels microcosm, remote from the public sphere while 
excluding the most contentious voices.1560 Its pursuit of conflict avoidance, she 
argues, has led to the ‘negation of politics and democracy’1561 though conflict and 
contestation may actually be productive.1562 
The antagonism, the disagreement central to the political and the criticism of 
‘rational’ consensus all support a fundamental contention of this chapter and 
indeed this thesis; that the arrangement of institutions (science, innovation, 
markets, risk assessment, policy, even old technologies etc.) is a matter of choice 
dependant on ideas and the convictions and values of a society,1563 regardless of 
what the policy discourses examined below argue or imply. The interpretive 
flexibility1564 of technology and the existence of a choice are at the heart of 
constructivist thought on socio-technical development which ipso facto provides a 
rationale for ‘a politics of technology’ and participatory decision-making.1565 The 
presence of choice evinces the intrinsic contingency and undecidability of every 
arrangement. However, that choice is currently restricted. My reason for focusing 
on imaginaries here is to pick out certain of the ideational forces restricting choice. 
My argument for sustainability and RRI (and mechanisms for opening up decision-
making in general) is that they might reveal and challenge those forces.  
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To summarise, the following policy tendencies may be regarded as depoliticising. 
The expectation of and drive for a consensus on policy questions arrived at 
rationally, informed by the provision of expert knowledge; a rejection of the 
possibility of legitimate disagreement (or no acknowledgement of a (rational) 
alternative); and a managerial approach to problems, including the management or 
manipulation of public opinion and responses. These tendencies form the themes 
of EU innovation policy highlighted below.1566 
3. The EU’s imagined future 
Ideas and imagination play a profound role in constituting our world and society.1567 
This is no less the case with the EU’s innovation policy vision which this section 
examines through the prism of imaginaries, specifically socio-technical and 
economic imaginaries, in order to understand better their durability and power.  
Imaginaries express collectively held beliefs or prescriptions about how society is 
or ought to be ordered, how social relations function, including understandings of 
good and evil, and the expectations that are normally fulfilled.1568 They are, in a 
sense, circular; actions premised upon their validity confirm and produce their 
reality.1569 Imaginaries are also future-orientated, ordaining possible, desirable or 
rightfully attainable destinies for society.1570 Their power lies in their ability thereby 
to conjure political will or public determination to pursue such destinies.1571  
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Different imaginaries can co-exist1572 and indeed combine to shape societal futures. 
Socio-technical imaginaries consist of temporally- and culturally-situated 
imaginaries of societal futures ‘attainable through, and supportive of, advances in 
science and technology’.1573 They may be articulated alongside shared fears over 
the consequences of (not) innovating.1574 The particular value of socio-technical 
imaginaries here is their capacity to explain why some socio-technical 
arrangements are more durable than others.1575 In this case, they may illuminate 
some of the reasons for the EU’s adherence to its particular framework of risk 
governance. Economic imaginaries endow the ‘economic’ field with meaning and 
shape, moulding discourses or ways of being around economic strategies, projects 
and visions which ultimately influence institutional orders and society.1576 Socio-
technical and economic imaginaries operate symbiotically here and it is this 
symbiosis which offers insight into EU’s current risk governance framework. 
3.1 A menagerie of imaginaries 
3.1.1 Past failure and bright futures 
Future and past imaginaries can shape each other.1577 The EU’s reading of Europe’s 
innovation history is one of vast untapped innovative potential,1578 too rarely 
translated into innovation. It has dawdled in pioneering new, marketable products 
depriving it of opportunities, businesses, jobs and competitive advantage,1579 
causing an ‘innovation deficit’ as compared with its more dynamic competitors.1580 
The theme running through all policy visions examined here is that of securing and 
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maintaining Europe’s competitiveness in a global market and it is the fear of failure 
on this front which ignites the palpable urgency firing the EU’s commitments.  
The EU’s overarching vision for the 21st century is to become a ‘smart, sustainable 
and inclusive economy, delivering high levels of employment, productivity and 
social cohesion’.1581 ‘Smart growth’ expresses the goal of creating a knowledge- and 
innovation-driven economy, also known as the knowledge-based economy (KBE). 
The KBE reflects the vision of a society enriched by social and economic goods1582 
and ‘societal progress’1583 conditional on, inter alia, enhanced R&D, 
competitiveness, innovation and a completed internal market.1584 Policy presents a 
stark choice: tackle the exigencies of inter alia post-financial crisis economic 
recovery, globalisation and societal challenges or face the desolation of lost wealth, 
a sluggish recovery, high unemployment and social distress.1585 
The knowledge-based bioeconomy (KBBE), defined as ‘the sustainable, eco-
efficient transformation of renewable biological resources into health, food, energy 
and other industrial products’,1586 is an extension of the KBE.1587 It promises to 
transform life sciences into new, sustainable, eco-efficient and competitive 
products,1588 improve economic and environmental sustainability, reconcile food 
security, the use of renewable resources and environmental protection, while 
                                                          
 
1581 Commission, ‘Europe 2020’ (n 580) 3. 
1582 Commission, ‘Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways 
Forward into the 21st Century COM(93) 700’ 62; Commission, ‘Innovation in a Knowledge-
Driven Economy’ (n 1579); Commission, ‘Europe 2020’ (n 580) 10–12. 
1583 Commission, ‘Innovation in a Knowledge-Driven Economy’ (n 1579) 14. 
1584 ‘Presidency Conclusions: Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000’ 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-
r1.en0.htm> accessed 25 June 2017; Commission, ‘Innovation in a Knowledge-Driven 
Economy’ (n 1579) 4. 
1585 Commission, ‘Europe 2020’ (n 580) 8–9. 
1586 Kean Birch, Les Levidow and Theo Papaioannou, ‘Sustainable Capital? The 
Neoliberalization of Nature and Knowledge in the European “Knowledge-Based Bio-
Economy”’ (2010) 2 Sustainability 2898, 2899. 
1587 Les Levidow, ‘European Transitions towards a Corporate-Environmental Food Regime: 
Agroecological Incorporation or Contestation?’ (2015) 40 Journal of Rural Studies 76, 81. 
1588 DG SANCO (n 130) 7. 
262 
 
achieving economic growth by producing ‘more with less’.1589 It is justified by 
‘unprecedented and unsustainable exploitation of [Europe’s] natural resources’, 
climate change, biodiversity loss and a growing world population.1590 It is a narrative 
of particular relevance here due to synthetic biology’s promise of more efficient 
production, discussed in Chapter Five, and the KBBE’s role in achieving 
sustainability in Europe. 
The life blood of these visions of global competitiveness is innovation,1591 not 
merely as the driver of economic change but the means to whip the EU from the 
bleak jaws of economic obscurity and propel it into a technologically-enhanced 
future.1592 They are expressions of a master narrative (discussed below) which 
claims that innovation is the only pathway to secure Europe’s future,1593 manifested 
in the transformation of knowledge into products, services and processes which 
create new markets.1594 This strand of the narrative goes hand-in-hand with fears 
that failure means the EU will not return to the path of economic growth;1595 the 
foundation of the European quality of life and social model.1596  
This imaginary seeks to galvanise wills to overcome obstacles1597 to swift market 
access for research-based breakthroughs, bringing rapid benefits to citizens, 
prosperity1598 and competitiveness gains.1599 The dire alternatives and urgent 
societal challenges resemble Swyngedouw’s depoliticised ‘apocalyptic imaginaries’, 
foreclosing proper political framing and choice between alternative trajectories or 
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political programs in favour of techno-fixes1600 and other ‘techno-managerial and 
behavioural transformations’ to ‘retrofit’ these problems, without ever challenging 
the current political order.1601 Such imaginaries seek consensus around the problem 
while technical solutions check impulse towards a political solution.  
3.1.2 The EU’s problems 
The above socio-technical imaginaries are linked to economic imaginaries of the EU 
as a self-contained economic unit striving for its leadership position in the 
increasingly globalised, competitive and knowledge-driven world economy.1602 This 
state of affairs is taken for granted1603 and used, for example, to justify the EU’s 
biotechnology policy.1604 Societal challenges are viewed as translatable into 
‘business opportunities’1605 for breakthroughs with a particular focus on those ‘with 
high potential for sustainable competitiveness, innovation and growth’.1606 The aim 
is to enable European companies to lead in the development of new technologies 
and increase jobs.1607 
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The key, according to this policy vision, to fully realising the EU’s imaginaries is the 
market,1608 including the creation of new markets1609 accessed via the internal 
market.1610 The market will distribute the anticipated technological solutions 
thereby unlocking both their problem-solving and economic growth-promoting 
potential.1611 Indeed, to the internal market is attributed European growth, jobs 
and the strengthened global competitiveness of European companies.1612 The 
smooth functioning of the internal market is pursued by the framework regulating 
synthetic biology, discussed in Chapter Five. In KBE terms, knowledge will be 
transformed into socio-economic value.1613 The EU’s imaginaries are therefore also 
contingent upon completing the single market;1614 market fragmentation is a 
running concern of policy.1615 These policies appear to endorse the claimed 
ideological neutrality of the internal market and its prioritisation of market 
efficiency at the heart of European integration.1616 However, markets are in fact 
‘politics by other means’ and ‘a specific and contentious way of distributing goods 
and bads’;1617 the internal market itself is a ‘highly politicized choice of ethos, 
ideology, and political culture’.1618 The Aho Report however, pre-empts concerns 
and reassures that a ‘market-led vision’ does not entail abandoning European 
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values but rather means using ‘the force of the market to preserve them’, alongside 
a ‘reformed social model conducive to innovation’.1619 
The KBBE expresses this mutually reinforcing combination of economic and socio-
technical imaginaries.1620 Eco-efficiency becomes synonymous with sustainability 
through the technologically-enhanced productivity of abundant, renewable bio-
resources as substitutes for fossil fuels and synthetic chemicals. In other words, 
‘societal progress is equated with ‘sustainable’ economies, in turn dependent on 
eco-efficient innovations’ stimulated by markets.1621 It also extends earlier policy 
frameworks promoting both biotechnology and the life sciences as symbols of 
Europe’s progress, and environmental protection.1622 The EU seeks, by these 
visions, to ‘mobilize resources and policy support for such markets’.1623  
In sum, EU innovation policy defines two key problems both of which must be 
tackled by innovation. Firstly the existence of a global competition in which Europe 
must succeed in order to afford its social model1624 underpinned by the 
disproven,1625 linear model of innovation.1626 Secondly, the inefficient use of 
resources, treatable only with ‘resource-efficient innovation through 
technoscientific advance as basis for societal progress’.1627 
Problem definition or ‘framing’ can be a political act and may be used to manage 
conflict, for example, over biotechnology.1628 It may depoliticise by marginalising 
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proposals and concerns that fall outside its bounds1629 and pre-empt 
alternatives.1630 Framing, which involves making judgments regarding which issues 
to discuss and what evidence is deemed relevant in a particular context, can 
influence discussions over governance and may limit opportunities for democratic 
and open debate.1631 In Chapter Two, I discussed framing as an integral part of risk 
assessment and as a factor contributing to the contingency of assessments of risk. 
Participatory processes are as sensitive as risk assessment to framing conditions 
such as process design, choice of focus, phrasing of questions, characterisation of 
alternatives etc.,1632 increasing the likelihood that public debate will conform to an 
accepted framework.1633 Framing may also prevent examination of whether our 
political/economic system is in fact at least partly at fault.1634 For example, a low 
efficiency problem, rather than a resource demand problem, mandates increased 
production and consumption as the solution delivered by an eco-efficiency techno-
fix which ‘accommodate[s] global markets as if these were exogenous’ to the 
relevant production system.1635  
This approach has been described elsewhere as ‘solutionism’ – a predilection for 
narrow-minded and speculative technological fixes to solve ‘complex, fluid and 
contentious’ problems without first thoroughly investigating those problems.1636 
Solutionism generally and associated problem framings specifically ignore the 
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immense complexity of environmental sustainability (and other) challenges of 
modern society1637 and may, by their simplicity, spawn unproductive diagnoses and 
policy measures, while still shaping society.1638 Alternative innovative approaches 
based on, for example, behavioural changes and lower consumption require more 
comprehensive framing of society’s relationship with natural resources, for 
example. They also require greater involvement by other forms of expertise, such 
as the social sciences, opening up problem definitions to include our markets and 
models of trade themselves, and potentially, different societal futures.1639  
Master narratives of societal progress contingent on technological advance and the 
global competitive race still pulse through EU innovation policy veins. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, there is increasing recognition of the need to encourage 
innovation which contributes to society at large.1640 ‘Societal challenges’ therefore 
increasingly justify research agendas.1641 However, societal challenges such as 
environmental sustainability also risk being framed by dominant political-economic 
interests which promote policy emphasis on more efficient production methods or 
bringing more products to market for increasing economic competitiveness, as a 
solution.1642 For example, ‘European Technology Platforms’ (ETPs) are ‘industry-led 
stakeholder fora that develop short- to long-term research and innovation agendas 
and roadmaps for action at EU and national level to be supported by both private 
and public funding’.1643 The rationale for their existence is, again, catching up with 
global competitors and boosting jobs and growth in the EU.1644 The Strategic 
Research and Innovation Agendas (SRAs) they produce identify regulatory and non-
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technological barriers1645 and exhibit a similar balance of priorities displayed in EU 
policy.1646 
Although ETPs are supposed to involve ‘all relevant stakeholders’,1647 ETPs in the 
agri-food-forestry-biotech industries were mainly initiated by industry 
organisations led by multinational corporations.1648 Even the Commission 
acknowledges the difficulty for SMEs in participating and the potential for capture 
by ‘big’ players1649 perhaps squeezing dissent or insights from, for example, the 
social sciences.1650 Indeed, the Commission has been the subject of a partially 
successful complaint to the European Ombudsman with respect to alleged industry 
dominance of the biofuels ETP and lack of objectivity in its advice.1651 ETPs operate 
in partnership with the Commission, which ‘undertakes to take full account of 
relevant aspects of [their] research and innovation agendas’ and Commission 
representatives will ‘actively participate in the work of respective ETPs’.1652 Indeed, 
state agencies and the Commission often defer to ETPs as the main experts, for 
example, in defining societal challenges1653 and advice in implementing Horizon 
2020.1654 ETPs have successfully ‘contribut[ed] to the definition of research 
priorities including those under the Research Framework Programmes’,1655 for 
example the KBBE.1656 This ETP influence occurs through particular framings of 
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natural resources, future markets and societal progress which informs broad 
research and innovation policy.1657  
According to Jasanoff, the EU had to invent the discourse of problem-solving in 
order to justify its support of biotechnology. This involved identifying structural 
problems in healthcare and agriculture, emphasising the urgency of addressing 
them and positioning biotechnology as solution.1658 Synthetic biology has been 
described as ‘awash with solutionism’1659 and it now justifies itself on the basis of 
solving certain societal problems. In doing so, according to J. Benjamin Hurlbut, it 
‘constructed itself as able to respond, and thus as the right response, to basic 
problems of human welfare and security’.1660 This alchemy of societal challenges 
and innovation in yielding future economic gold can be seen in specific sectors. For 
example, the ‘Plants for the Future’ ETP advocates a coordinated innovation effort 
by industry, academic and farmers associations to feed the world. It projects that 
this will simultaneously cause the development of a sustainable, highly productive 
and competitive European plant sector and contribute to economic growth and job 
creation.1661  
Sustainable development is a vague and almost infinitely malleable term.1662 As 
such, it – and perhaps other generally framed societal challenges – could be a site 
for debate over alternatives, as promoted by RRI. In Chapter Three, I discussed its 
potential to respond ambitiously to many of the concerns relating to pesticide use. 
Horizon 2020 provides that ‘all challenges should contribute to the overarching 
objective of sustainable development’.1663 But whether contributions genuinely 
respond to societal needs or concerns is related to who has framed societal 
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challenges and how. Any research activity could be described as contributing to 
sustainable development in the absence of any intellectual work to inject explicit 
substance or handle tensions among the possible aims of sustainable 
development.1664 As discussed in Chapter Four, sustainability can be understood 
unambitiously. If framing problems or societal challenges pre-empts broader 
political debate, this raises questions over the existence of policy appetite or space 
for competing visions or socially-defined research agendas such as those potentially 
generated through RRI activities discussed in Chapter Three. Meanwhile, though 
the targets and justifications for research have changed (now societal challenges), 
the proposed solutions have remained capital-intensive innovation which can be 
brought to market with minimal consideration of its social or sustainability 
aspects.1665 
Innovation, in the broadest possible terms, can unquestionably contribute to 
fulfilling social needs.1666 There are fleeting suggestions in EU innovation policy that 
the EU views innovation broadly (despite the lack of an official definition of 
innovation1667), including for example social innovation or behavioural changes.1668 
However, the lack of interest in non-scientific/non-technological innovation or 
innovation which will not return a profit is palpable1669 and overall, the dominant 
policy framework constrains such activity.1670 
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3.1.3 Governable emergence 
EU innovation policy resembles Hurlbut’s imaginary of governable emergence, 
which illustrates how the broader societal implications of technological emergence 
can become marginalised in innovation governance and regulation. According to 
Hurlbut, this imaginary has three dimensions. Firstly, technoscience is privileged as 
the source of novelty driving historical and social change. This, in turn, ‘ascribes 
priority of agency to science’; technology emerges independently of any social 
context with society’s role becoming merely reactive.1671 Secondly, this conception 
of technoscience grants a ‘scientific community’ ‘competence (and responsibility) 
to generate and adequately characterise novelty and decree what forms of novelty 
warrant societal attention’.1672 Thirdly, granting scientists this role comes with a 
‘vision of the right allocations of responsibility between institutions of governance’. 
Technology thus conceptualised as a site of social emergence has the consequence 
that ‘governance rests on epistemic questions about the nature of the technology’: 
its newness, predictable consequences etc. are questions for regulatory science and 
therefore experts.1673 Here, science is imagined as the institution most capable of 
governing technological emergence. ‘Normative questions of what is at stake, what 
is the public good and who has the authority to define benefits and harms are 
thereby rendered subsidiary to expert assessments of novelty’1674 and the types of 
questions which can be raised are limited.1675 
Each dimension of this imaginary can be detected in the EU policy on innovation 
examined in this chapter. For example, both the policy emphasis on technological 
innovation as driver of social and economic change through providing solutions to 
European problems, identified above, and the idea of technology as neutral and not 
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socially shaped, discussed in section 3.1.4, privilege technoscience as the source of 
novelty. 
Furthermore, the EU identifies a need to build the ‘right regulatory 
environment’.1676 It perceives (outdated or unnecessary) regulatory procedures or 
over-regulation in approval procedures as obstacles to industry and innovation,1677 
raising development costs and increasing time to market.1678 According to the 
Plants ETP, there is too big a separation between the policy goals of stimulating 
innovation and health/consumer protection policy seeking to control market access 
for innovations; a divide which creates a huge gap between areas of the world 
embracing plant-based innovation and Europe, where promising innovations 
remain blocked in the pipeline.1679 New techniques and technologies should be 
regulated in a ‘fair and transparent manner on the basis of an independent, 
objective safety assessment and without political interference’.1680 It cites GM crops 
as an example of a technology whose development regulation severely limited, 
hindering transition to the KBE, and warns of the consequences of a repeat with 
other technologies essential for Europe’s future global economic 
competitiveness.1681 Improving and harmonising regulation here is part of the EU’s 
project to reduce fragmentation in its internal market and innovation system to 
enable businesses to maximise their returns on the resources allocated to 
innovation,1682 release the potential of the internal market to incentivise 
innovation1683 and transform innovation into wealth.  
Risk assessment, particularly as source of apparently rational and objective 
scientific evidence for decision-making, as discussed in Chapter Two, slots neatly 
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into this framework. Appeals in policy for science-based regulation alongside 
initiatives to educate the public about change, innovation and its benefits indicates 
both how responsibility for defining which novel implications deserve societal 
attention has been allocated (i.e. to scientific experts) and that the relevant 
questions are regarded as epistemic rather than normative.  
Risk-based regulation, in which effort and resources are channelled towards the 
most risky activities or entities, is apparently rational and its deregulatory1684 effect 
is to protect a space of freedom and opportunity for enterprise.1685 Risk assessment 
as a form of measurement can (though not always1686) depoliticise,1687 constraining 
scope for disagreement and implying that political contestation is over. Opposition 
based on uncertainty may be marginalised as partisan and poor regulatory 
science.1688 However, the impression that political and moral questions have been 
resolved is often inappropriate in the sometimes bitterly contested terrain of 
technological innovation where there have been increasing demands for 
politicisation1689 and where politicians have been criticised for using expert advice 
to avoid responsibility for decisions.1690 
The imaginary of governable emergence casts the law as permanently lagging, 
reactive and potentially inhibitory of scientific progress1691 where it should 
facilitate. While criticism of those characteristics is commonly expressed, Hurlbut 
argues that this lag is in fact deemed ‘necessary’, liberating science to produce 
novelty.1692 Thus, scientific risk assessment demands restraint from the law pending 
confirmation that a particular form of novelty warrants legal response.1693 The 
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epistemological framework it sets up converts moral uncertainties into questions 
of risk, extinguishing space for other moral framings.1694 This responsibility for 
predicting risks and benefits delegated to science by law,1695 though perhaps not 
necessarily deregulatory, can be exploited in expedient arguments, depending on 
the goal of the communication, about the newness or sameness of, for example, 
(bio)technology,1696 which can condition regulatory responses and facilitate 
technological development.1697 It may, in particular, limit regulatory responses 
sensitive to any implications of innovation not assessable by science. This 
establishes a rather incremental approach to governance and regulation. For 
example, with respect to the (inherited1698) regulation of synthetic biology, it 
‘authorizes science to measure new and ungoverned potentialities against known 
forms of novelty thereby delimiting uncertainty to defining strategies for the 
containment of discernible risks’.1699 The presence of this imaginary certainly does 
not indicate regulatory frameworks supportive of the promised socio-technical 
integration and suggests that only the worst consequences of market liberalisation, 
for example in the environmental sphere, are regulated.1700 
Thus, the familiar dichotomy between facts and values is reproduced, with 
normative questions following expert assessments of novelty.1701 Novelty’s 
reprieve from wider social assessment obscures the extent to which it is itself 
constructed in socio-technical terms.1702 Hurlbut attributes this to an imagination 
of society’s capacity, through its governance mechanisms, to assimilate new 
technologies and contain their potential for harm interfering only where risks 
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genuinely demand, leaving clear passage for the emergence of good technologies 
via the market. Thus, according to Hurlbut, ‘science has authority to construct – and 
constrain – public imagination of what counts as legitimate and valuable 
progress’.1703  
3.1.4 Innovation as both neutral and inherently good 
Despite the presence of research-orientating societal challenges, the narrative arcs 
of economic competitiveness and social progress contingent on technological 
advance arguably reflect the implicit dogma of EU innovation policy that all and any 
innovation, though neutral and directionless, is inherently socially beneficial.1704 For 
the EU, innovation becomes an end in itself.1705 This dogma follows a ‘framing 
narrative’ that knowledge and the innovation it produces are not socially shaped 
which persists even despite acknowledgment that risk knowledge may be.1706 This 
perpetuates the assumption that scientific research questions are independent, 
reproducing the self-governing scientific community in its role of truth producer, 
and the model of facts before values.1707 The assumption is hard to sustain given 
the economic values which underpin much of the EU’s innovation policy and the 
type of innovation it appears to promote, discussed above. 
Likewise, simplistic diagnoses of an insufficiently innovation-friendly European 
market1708 ignore the underlying reasons for controversies and the fact that one 
man’s silver bullet is another’s WMD. This denies the interpretive flexibility of 
innovation,1709 ignores the politics of artefacts which can reinforce existing 
inequalities1710 and that technology itself can be shaped through, for example, 
visions and the policies built on them.1711 It obscures in particular the politics and 
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(primarily economic) values behind this construction of innovation while 
simultaneously implicating those politics. It both assumes and prescribes the 
unfolding of innovation in a certain way without human agency and, as a narrative, 
extinguishes space for alternatives.1712 It cloaks the political choice which this 
chapter seeks to uncover and which frameworks such as RRI could re-open. Political 
contestation is arguably further displaced by the vagueness of ‘societal challenges’ 
which eliminates cause for disagreement, even though they include climate change, 
which is surely one of the most politically-charged contours of the modern era.  
The EU’s conception and expectations of innovation are full of assumptions. 
Innovation is frequently a double-edged sword1713 and its macroeconomic benefits, 
for example GDP growth, do not necessarily spur improvements in health, well-
being or sustainability.1714 It does not necessarily drive economic growth1715 nor 
create more, or better, jobs;1716 indeed, the Commission cited the tendency of 
pesticides to reduce the need for labour as a benefit.1717 The overall predisposition 
of technology to deskill1718 demands deeper questioning of the assumption that 
innovation will create better jobs. However, despite clear public concern generally 
over the speed of innovation,1719 policy sees only the speed of innovation processes 
as capable of modulation,1720 so as to accelerate products to market and increase 
returns on R&D investment.1721    
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3.1.5 The public as resource and obstacle 
Improvements are required of the European public and culture which are currently 
not producing the right type of consumers. For example, the lower growth rate 
identified in Europe before the economic crisis is attributed to, inter alia, 
‘reluctance in some parts of our societies to embrace innovation’ and an 
insufficiently innovation-friendly EU market 1722 which may stem from cultural or 
institutional factors1723 and a ‘weak understanding of science, technology and 
change’.1724 The Aho Report reported a lack of ‘demanding and novelty-seeking 
customers’ as a major barrier in service innovation1725 and called for a shift to a 
culture which celebrates and embraces innovation and risk-taking.1726 The 
achievement of all objectives realisable by innovation requires a society open to 
innovation.1727 
Citizens have a role, certainly, but perhaps not necessarily one which involves 
debating ‘what science (and innovation) for what society?’ (and vice versa);1728 
rather one confined within the pre-defined innovation policy framework and its 
justifications and commitments. There is a degree of resemblance to contemporary 
frameworks for participation described by Power and Crouch above. For example, 
citizens may be seen partly as a resource in innovation systems, providing 
knowledge and ideas, co-creating new products, creating demand, providing 
funding and even the necessary trust1729 but not as originators of alternative 
collective visions.  
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In contrast to much of the slightly confused but relatively optimistic policy 
examined in Chapters Three and Five on taking into account public concerns and 
values in research and innovation, models for governance expressed elsewhere in 
EU innovation policy frequently ignore those initiatives and their reasoning. For 
example, running in parallel to a scientific evidence-based regulatory framework, a 
reductive and instrumental agenda for securing public trust in scientific and 
technological breakthroughs provides for ‘transparent information and 
involvement of citizens’ thereby ensuring a favourable environment for 
investment.1730 The assumption seems to be that transparency and token 
involvement thrown in while the bio-cultured future ferments is sufficient, ignoring 
how scientific evidence, information and citizen involvement will interact. The Plant 
ETP provides a striking example of this disconnect. Having called for public 
involvement in discussing R&D goals, rebuilding trust and integrating ethical issues 
into research agendas, it immediately declares that the public does not understand 
that the ‘EU has established a rigorous safety-based regulatory system that 
evaluates crop plants before they can be placed on the market’.1731  
Similarly, in the context of KBBE policy, participative governance, dominated by the 
transmission of information, seems founded on the cognitive deficit model.1732 
Here, science and innovation are the basis both for policy-making and ‘informed 
societal choices’1733 with even socio-economic studies being used to ‘design new 
ways of attracting and informing consumers about [the] benefits’ of innovative bio-
products.1734 And, specifically with respect to food, enhancing consumer trust and 
protection is regarded as contingent on ‘[f]ood safety innovations, improved tools 
for risk and risk-benefit assessment and for risk communication and improved food 
safety standards’,1735 with socio-economic, cultural and ethical questions relegated 
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to a vague intention to address ‘other aspects’.1736 Again, science is granted priority 
in defining relevant problems. 
In its report, Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, the EGSG identified an 
ambiguity in the Lisbon Strategy between translating research into commodities 
and a commitment to public engagement,1737 also identifiable in subsequent policy 
(see for example that discussed in Chapter Five). According to Les Levidow and 
Claudia Neubauer, the EU opted for the former and initiatives based on the latter 
have remained marginal in policy and research funding.1738 That might appear a 
little strong given the resources now ploughed into RRI initiatives, discussed in 
Chapter Three, but perhaps is still reasonable given the risk RRI runs of 
instrumentalisation for commercial ends or pre-committed policies.1739 
Furthermore, the emphasis on provision of information perhaps betrays a post-
political assumption of the impossibility of any rational disagreement with the 
‘objective’ truth enshrined in the EU’s policy goals and attempts to manoeuvre 
public opinion into the correct position.  
3.1.6 Summary  
EU innovation policy exhibits certain logics and assumptions. Its depoliticising 
tendencies may be construed in, for example, simplistic statements about the 
choice facing Europe. The undesirable alternative to innovation-driven 
competitiveness is such as to expect consensus around its vision and to cast 
disagreement as irrational. In this conception, politics is perhaps ‘either the 
irrational opposite or the rational application of science’.1740 (Bio-)technological 
innovation is isolated as the only, or at least, primary means to secure Europe’s 
future. The economic rationalism of the discourse re-makes EU citizens as apolitical 
consumers.1741 More products and/or services in the marketplace leads to more 
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consumption which creates growth and jobs and thereby increased well-being. 
However, the logic behind this innovation imperative is not necessarily beyond 
political contestation.1742 Moreover, the policy is notably light on analysis of the 
socio-political causes of challenges1743 (characteristic of ‘solutionism’) and details 
as to how environmental, social and economic sustainability will emerge as a 
natural consequence of this model, especially since technological innovation has 
often been the cause of societal problems.1744 There is, furthermore, evidence of 
public scepticism and disapproval of this expectation of increased consumption.1745  
3.2 The power of imaginaries 
State power and resources can endow imaginaries with a particular durability, true 
too of the EU whose policy engine is well-equipped to define and sustain visions for 
its future and roadmaps for their achievement.1746 As an example, the EU’s above 
imaginaries are partly enshrined in Article 179(1) TEU: ‘The Union shall have the 
objective of strengthening its scientific and technological bases by achieving a 
European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology 
circulate freely, and encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its 
industry…’.1747  
Part of the power of imaginaries resides in their ability to inform strategies to 
accrue institutional, political and material backing for their priorities and to line up 
support for their achievement from wider policies.1748 This is seen, perhaps, in the 
explicit call for innovation to become the EU’s overarching policy goal to which all 
activity under other policies contributes with the highest political level setting the 
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strategic agenda.1749 The mobilisation of such support and resources for 
technological innovation may thereby change institutional practices, especially in 
funding priorities;1750 funds distributable under Horizon 2020 are intended for 
projects contributing to the realisation of the EU’s imaginaries. Depoliticising 
education and communication strategies to persuade citizens of the pre-
determined benefits as opposed to listening to, reflecting on, learning from and 
responding to their thoughts and concerns, discussed too in Chapter Five, are 
perhaps further manifestations of these phenomena, reinforced by calls for 
science-based indications of appropriate interventions, reminiscent of the 
imaginary of governable emergence. 
This last point speaks to a further quality of imaginaries. In addition to corralling 
support, they may justify countering or silencing political opposition,1751 for 
example by ‘reconfigur[ing] actors’ sense of the possible spaces of action’.1752 
Although socio-technical orders are not natural nor intrinsic to humans or things1753 
meaning that we have choices, in the EU’s imaginaries there is little room to 
question the origin of the accepted definition of society’s problems or the accepted 
understanding of a ‘worthwhile’ objective or outcome.1754 The coherence of the 
visions of Europe’s gilded future spun from imaginary thread through its prodigious 
output of policy enables Europe to justify interventions, promote specific policy 
changes and pre-empt or marginalise ‘disruptive public responses’1755 and the 
consideration of alternatives. For example, FP7 funding priorities dominated by a 
life sciences vision of the KBBE and capital-intensive research agendas aimed at 
increasing efficiency marginalised alternative visions, agendas1756 or 
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imaginaries.1757 EU policy on ‘the Knowledge Society’ and ‘the Knowledge Economy’ 
though ostensibly disinterested, reveals its politics in the privileging of certain types 
of knowledge; the bioeconomy (and its attendant problem definitions) rather than 
the eco-economy is chosen.1758 Within that choice, the life sciences vision prevails 
over an agro-ecological vision.1759 And within that choice again, certain types of 
advanced biotechnology are privileged, marginalising others and other 
innovations.1760 
Similarly, though he uses different language, many features of Hurlbut’s imaginary 
are identifiable as characteristic of post-politics. For example, the rush to 
rationalism in the prioritisation of expert over political judgments; faith in 
management in the idea of governability – restricted to containing risk – and the 
control of public reaction; and state intervention through defining, controlling and 
being seen to control those risks. These are assisted by the predictability of the 
linear model of innovation. All these arrangements lock out others from the 
construction of those technological futures by stipulating who, how and in what 
they are competent to participate.1761  
Another facet to this circumstance is visibility. Imaginaries may determine which 
goals or concerns are visible or important by constructing, training and delimiting 
what a viewer may perceive. They can simplify an infinitely complex world by 
attributing meaning to some aspects of life over others,1762 privileging certain 
attainable and desirable future economic relations, thereby pre-figuring and 
                                                          
 
1757 OECD policy on the bioeconomy almost seems to fear alternative solutions, suggesting 
that the aim is not actually to solve the problems but rather tackle them in a particular way, 
Goven and Pavone (n 1514) 315. 
1758 Andy Stirling, ‘Power, Truth and Progress: Towards Knowledge Democracies in Europe’ 
in James Wilsdon and Robert Doubleday (eds), Future Directions for Scientific Advice in 
Europe (Centre for Science and Policy 2015) 135–136. 
1759 Levidow, Birch and Papaioannou (n 708) 61; Vanloqueren and Baret (n 707).  
1760 Stirling, ‘Power, Truth and Progress’: (n 1758) 136; Goven and Pavone (n 1514) 313. 
1761 Hurlbut, ‘Remembering the Future’ (n 1008) 141–142; Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented 
Worlds’ (n 1625) 329. 
1762 Jessop (n 1569) 338. 
283 
 
facilitating their realisation.1763 For example, economic competition occurs but, in 
imaginary terms, forms a simplified structure for guiding economic action which 
smooths the grain of cause and effect.1764 According to Jasanoff, sight is conditioned 
by history with ‘its choices and exclusions’ determining what is (in)visible,1765 
reinforced by a sense of ‘the rightness of action’ which imaginaries can confirm.1766 
On this analysis, the EU may have become blind to other perspectives, problem 
framings and concerns by the cloud of its past failures or the promising glare of the 
visions to which it remains committed. The type of public concern still visible is risk, 
as demonstrated by the calls for science- or evidence-based governance. Vision, 
and other techniques (such as metaphors,1767 or linking new ideas (eco-efficiency) 
with established ones (sustainability)) naturalise and familiarise so organised 
criticism or opposition may never occur.1768 Part of the potential of alternative 
narratives and frameworks, such as sustainability and RRI, is as contrasting ways of 
viewing the world, making its problems and possible futures visible again by 
challenging and disrupting the dominance of current narratives, imaginaries and 
frameworks. As discussed in the following chapter however, these alternatives are 
fragile and the task is a delicate one.  
Any (official) space for political disagreement is restricted. ‘Different visions’ 
implied by references to the ‘European social model’ or the ‘European way of life’, 
are absorbed (or perhaps, better, appropriated) into the imaginaries of Europe’s 
future, contingent on innovation-driven progress. The EU’s official language of 
‘common visions’ for a future Europe ‘downplay[s] societal tensions and 
reinforce[s] dominant political-economic actors as neutral experts’,1769 again 
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disguising underlying political choices and the uncollaborative and undemocratic 
shaping of these imaginaries.1770 Trade-offs such as environmental or health risks 
are dissolved through the rhetoric of reconciliation or governable emergence with 
its assurances of management and control and exclusion of alternative visions, 
concerns or problem definitions. The KBBE provides an example of this, perhaps 
dubious, reconciling in its promise to de-couple economic growth from 
unsustainability and environmental harm.1771 Such a ‘win-win’ promise reinforces 
the durability and consensus-generating power of this imaginary by offering 
something meriting universal approbation.1772 To some extent, these visions 
resemble sustainability; vague enough to accrue mass support but malleable 
enough to be co-opted by specific interests which are able to take advantage of 
that support to push their agendas and conceal underlying political choices.  
This, and the enormous amount of work EU policy expends on promoting and 
generating acceptance for its imaginaries, may suggest, in certain senses, that the 
EU is aware of their fundamental fragility. This is perhaps best illustrated by the 
absurdity of the contention, patent once disinterred from EU policy logic, that 
‘European culture’ in all its vastness, maturity and diversity, is ill-adapted to 
innovation, rather than that the type of innovation pushed is ill-adapted to 
European culture. People oppose or support a specific technology as a synecdoche 
for the future.1773 In short, the EU’s imaginaries again depoliticise by helping 
occlude alternative values and visions. When that filter falters and those values 
become visible, they are reconcilable. If they are not reconcilable, they are worth 
sacrificing for the benefits. 
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate how the allure of the EU’s 
imaginaries can partially explain its unswerving commitment to their achievement, 
at almost any cost. The greatness of both the potential prize and loss in the event 
of failure perhaps steels its reluctance to apprehend concerns over uncertainties, 
                                                          
 
1770 EGSG (n 6) 46. 
1771 Commission, A Bioeconomy Strategy for Europe (n 1621) 3. And Chapter Nine. 
1772 Goven and Pavone (n 1514) 307. 
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the speed or ambiguous implications of innovation and proposals for alternative 
problem-definitions and solutions which it views as threatening to derail progress. 
The post-political search for a rational consensus perhaps encourages the 
channelling of such concerns into risk assessment as a means to avoid derailment 
by dispelling disagreement with ‘objective facts’.  
4. Narrative reinforcements 
The EU’s self-imposed ‘innovate or die!’ mandate is not the complete picture. 
Imaginaries are reflected in, sustained and guided by master narratives which 
perform various legitimating functions.1774 Master narratives are ‘sweeping, 
entrenched accounts’ which ‘define horizons of possible and acceptable action, 
reproduced as normal and taken-for-granted and may lie beyond rational debate 
or deliberate re-design such that supporting evidence is no longer required’;1775 
they themselves provide justification or explanation.1776 From an unchallengeable 
vantage they both describe and prescribe, serving ‘as prior framing, starting-point, 
justification and mode of sense-making for the policy domain’.1777 They operate as 
an immutable constant, though, like imaginaries, account for society’s historical 
path ‘while also constraining that society to performing the imagined lines of the 
story’.1778 Like imaginaries too, they can ‘orient policymaking and thereby direct 
resources to particular forms of technoscience’.1779 They therefore wield a great 
deal of power in controlling imagination.1780 Here, they link ideas of progress to 
science and technology.1781 
It is worth picking out certain narrative threads in the warp and weft of the above 
imaginary weave which contribute to reinforcing the EU’s imaginaries. Firstly, the 
                                                          
 
1774 Agnes Heller, ‘European Master Narratives about Freedom’ in Gerard Delanty (ed), 
Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory (Routledge 2005) 257. 
1775 EGSG (n 6) 73–74. 
1776 Jasanoff and Kim (n 828) 123. 
1777 EGSG (n 6) 75–76. 
1778 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’ (n 1567) 20. 
1779 Levidow, Birch and Papaioannou (n 708) 40. 
1780 Heller (n 1774) 257. 
1781 EGSG (n 6) 12. 
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master narrative of science, technology and progress which conflates societal 
‘progress’ with ‘technological advance’ and privileges scientific knowledge,1782 as 
embodied in the KBE.1783 This master narrative has exercised a powerful influence 
over public science policy since before the Enlightenment, in its original formulation 
in Francis Bacon’s powerful declaration in 1605 that a purpose of science discovery 
should be ‘the relief of man’s estate’.1784 Here, it operates in contrast to the 
imaginary of Europe’s unrealised innovation potential, implying that Europe will be 
on the wrong side of history if it does not improve.1785  
Again, innovation is unequivocally good. Problem definitions and proposed 
solutions are unquestioned. There is no debate over what ‘progress’ looks like or 
alternatives, so democratic input is minimised and the real risks stem from failure 
to innovate1786 blamed on European risk aversion at odds with the tide of 
technoscientific progress. This master narrative perhaps helps maintain the 
imaginary of governable emergence in two ways. Firstly by characterising social 
mechanisms to control technology, such as law, ethics or serious public 
engagement as lagging behind or braking progress,1787 even though the law can in 
fact anticipate.1788 Secondly, (and particularly where novelty is downplayed while 
control, improvement and precision are played up1789) by reinforcing a minimalist 
approach to social oversight due to science and technology’s unambiguous status 
as social saviour.1790 This master narrative contains many elements in common with 
the imaginaries discussed in section 3.1. The difference is that set in a master 
                                                          
 
1782 ibid 73–74. 
1783 Birch, Levidow and Papaioannou (n 1586) 2899. 
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(2008) 8 Journal of Biological Physics and Chemistry 71, 71. 
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1786 EGSG (n 6) 76–77. 
1787 ibid 77. 
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Macnaghten and Guivant (n 1745) 213 and references in both. 
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narrative they form part of a justifying, historical and universal arc, thereby 
reinforced.  
Secondly, the master narrative of objectivity and rationality, which makes 
depoliticising calls for evidence-based decision-making while rarely questioning the 
origin of the required expertise or the problem definitions to be addressed. It 
assumes, reinforcing the imaginary of governable emergence, that science facts 
should first establish a framework for subsequent, rational discussion of 
alternatives, values or regulation thereby deemed relevant. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, this model of perfectly separated facts and values and purely objective 
regulatory science is flawed, yet its sedimentation here in risk assessment-based 
regulation places it beyond easy challenge.1791  
A third master narrative simultaneously praises the public for its role as supporter 
and consumer in diffusing innovation while blaming its ignorance for obstructing 
the technological path towards solving urgent societal challenges and economic 
growth. The response is public engagement but, though a right to participate may 
increase rhetorically, those framings of resource/obstacle persist and may restrict 
even upstream engagement,1792 reflecting a post-political tendency to manage and 
manipulate, discussed in section 2. The more comprehensive framework of RRI 
could provide a partial solution, discussed further in Chapter Nine. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, policy on participation is confused as to its aim, partly 
due to those constructions of the public. In addition, urgency and the leadership 
imperative ‘inhibits our capacity and/or willingness to experiment with 
alternatives’ in our search for progress and to ‘assess the potential of scientific 
knowledge against the objective we want to achieve with it’.1793 
Finally, the narratives above are set in a master economic narrative of increasing 
global economic competition as a result of intensifying globalisation and the rise of 
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new powers, such as China and India.1794 The EU regarded these developments as 
threatening its global economic competitiveness1795 and therefore future 
prosperity and living standards, coming at a time (1980s and 1990s) of low growth 
and ‘techno-economic’ decline, amongst other things.1796 The European response 
to the perceived threat was a commitment to providing an innovation-friendly 
market for businesses,1797 the lack of which was the main barrier to investment, in 
order to catch up.1798 
As discussed, the KBE is a particular incarnation of the economic competitiveness 
narrative. Pointing to its depoliticising effect, its position in EU-wide and national 
policy frameworks and configuration by R&I policy elites arguably removes the 
need for popular acceptance, acquiescence or even awareness.1799 For example, the 
sedimentation of the ideas of competitiveness as common-sensical and beyond 
discussion1800 or likewise of innovation as universal salve, could discourage scrutiny 
of the choice to pursue primarily economic ends, the compatibility of that goal with 
addressing societal challenges, the presentation of potential benefits as certainties 
and the types of benefits seen as worthwhile. Indeed, the pervasiveness of this 
discourse in policy, despite academic scepticism,1801 reveals its power and ubiquity 
in policy circles.1802 Spokespersons for scientific institutions complain that policy-
makers ‘take unsubstantiated concerns of environmental groups at face value’,1803 
while those spokespersons themselves take unsubstantiated technological 
                                                          
 
1794 Commission, ‘ERA New Perspectives’ (n 1598) 2, 5. 
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promises at face value.1804 This is unsurprising perhaps, in light of the master 
narratives discussed above, which corroborate the apparent common sense of that 
position, placing it beyond dispute. 
5. Conclusion 
While the ideas examined in this chapter operate many orders above the 
comparatively minute regulatory decisions concerning individual technologies with 
which the rest of this thesis is engaged, their existence and power is, I argue, 
essential to the EU’s failure to fulfil its promise of greater socio-technical 
integration at all levels of governance, including, importantly, downstream 
regulation and regulatory science. In the final chapter, I link these arrangements 
specifically to the technologies examined in this thesis and their regulation. Many 
of the concerns repeatedly expressed with respect to risky technologies relate to 
the very constituent parts of these ideas; speed, commercialisation, productive 
employment of nature, distribution of risks and benefits which, in particular, in a 
liberalised trade paradigm, could legitimately be ignored.1805 These are not just 
political concerns but concerns which target the specific political choices of the 
prevailing EU ideational architecture. Meanwhile, the above analysis is intended to 
show that, partly for this reason, the strength of the EU’s commitment to a certain 
vision of its future, bolstered by each, galvanising imaginary and reinforcing 
narrative, is unlikely to soften easily. That commitment is well equipped to fend off 
challenges with its unreflexive armoury of depoliticising mechanisms which 
promote rational consensus around expertise and sedimentation which clouds 
choice and denies the possibility of legitimate, political disagreement about the 
definition of problems, their solutions, the means to achieve or distribute them and 
their justification. While the current order prevails, action remains ‘trapped within 
its configuration of forces’.1806 
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Chapter Nine – Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
Attitudes to technology, innovation and risk frequently relate to broader political 
questions about what kind of a society we want to live in. These questions form a 
direct link between an isolated, regulated technology; an organism, pesticide, 
nanomaterial etc. and deeply held political convictions or imaginaries about what 
is good and right for society or what kind of society a technology might create or 
consolidate. Discussion of these political concerns may occur but, as a force for 
change, they are inevitably constricted by the EU’s encompassing ideational 
architecture. This concluding chapter describes how a consequence of this 
architecture and the depoliticising tendencies of some of its elements is that the 
EU is prevented from making good on its policy promise to enhance socio-technical 
integration in its regulation of risky technologies. In short this architecture, it is 
argued, prevents the EU from closing the gap between its policy on science and 
society and its practice.  
Depoliticising occludes the fact that many of the institutions governing/influencing 
the way the EU regulates are shaped by political values and ideas and that 
technology trajectories have already been plotted through ideational forces in 
operation at times and spaces far beyond the reach of a regulatory hand at the 
snapshot of authorisation. Two ideas were examined in this thesis (sustainability 
and RRI) for their potential to open up or re-politicise some of the debate by 
disrupting sedimented modes of thinking and practice. In other words, as 
ambitiously implemented frameworks, they could aid the EU in realising its promise 
of greater socio-technical integration throughout the governance and regulation of 
risky technological innovation.  
In the following section, I draw direct links between features of the regulation 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five respectively and the ideational architecture 
elaborated in Chapter Eight. Part of that architecture relates to markets and the 
impetus to complete the EU internal market to help the EU achieve leadership in 
innovation and economic competitiveness. I argue, with respect to sustainability, 
that the sustainability discourse has largely been absorbed into that architecture 
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through its redefinition as ‘efficiency’ or ‘risk reduction’ with a corresponding 
reduction in its ability to invite the consideration of concerns not relating to safety 
in regulatory decision-making. With respect to RRI, I argue that, while it is perhaps 
too early to tell whether it will ultimately aid greater socio-technical integration, it 
does appear to be struggling against the force of the commitments examined in 
Chapter Eight which may curtail its potential. 
In section 3, I build on section 2 by drawing together some of the themes which 
have surfaced throughout this thesis. In large part, these represent a continuation 
of previous criticisms highlighting the shortcomings of the public engagement with 
science movement or ‘new scientific governance’, discussed in Chapter Two. The 
combination of these shortcomings with the ideational framework discussed in 
Chapter Eight and their mutual reinforcement provide the most potent force 
working against increasing socio-technical integration and closing the policy-
practice gap. Section 4 presents a final conclusion. 
2. Alternatives to the EU order and their fate 
2.1 Sustainability and pesticides: keeping the apolitical, apolitical 
Various elements of sustainability were identified in Chapter Three as enablers of 
reflection on the problems associated with pesticide use and as a foundation on 
which to build a framework sensitive to those problems. On the one hand, as a 
mature and socially-embedded technology, pesticides could be described as 
apolitical,1807 with the dominance of high-input, monocultural agriculture which 
their use supports now thoroughly sedimented. One the other hand, the various 
controversies surrounding pesticides identified in Chapter Four demonstrates the 
potential for politics to erupt into this apparently settled model. Ambitiously 
implemented, sustainability could have helped unearth some of the politics, 
choices and dispositions underlying this model. However, as argued in Chapter 
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Four, in the Sustainable Use Directive1808 sustainability is, instead, unambitiously 
equated with risk reduction and efficiency. 
EU innovation policy is not directly addressed to mature technologies. However, 
aspects of that policy which relate to research for agriculture evince a reluctance to 
wander far from current paths and trajectories. For example, a high-capital input 
life sciences vision of the KBBE at least partially locks out agroecology,1809 and policy 
emphasises biotechnology, whose current limited output consists partly of crops 
modified to withstand pesticides. Both reflect a tendency in agricultural science to 
seek minor changes, leaving unquestioned the monocultural model of agriculture 
itself and unconsidered the need for radical alternatives under increasing pressure 
from, for example, climate change or rising energy costs.1810 Pesticides sit upon the 
second horn of Collingridge’s dilemma of control1811 and path dependency in this 
field is a concern. Change is possible1812 but requires political will which is 
contingent on the relevant political choices (sometimes decades old1813) becoming 
visible again.  
Perhaps strangely, given the apolitical promotion of a (risk) management fix in the 
SUD and related policy, there is a crystallisation of Mouffe’s antagonistic 
conception of ‘the political’1814 in the law. As discussed in Chapter Four, the main 
disagreement during consultation was between use/dependency or risk reduction. 
Unresolved prior to casting in legislation, there are also references to 
use/dependency reduction.1815 That disagreement could be evidence of a deeper 
politics;1816 use reduction indicating a desire to shift from the current industrial 
                                                          
 
1808 SUD (n 55). 
1809 Vanloqueren and Baret (n 707); Levidow, Birch and Papaioannou (n 708). 
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1816 For, example, Industry appears to prefer a risk reduction approach, while green NGOs 
prefer use reduction ‘Stakeholders’ Conference on the Development of a Thematic Strategy 
on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides: Conference Report’ (2002) 11–14. 
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model of agriculture by weening society off pesticides and risk reduction suggesting 
a reluctance to disrupt current practices. The ultimate goal of both, however, as 
uncollaboratively defined by policy, is still ensuring safety by reducing risks so 
competing political visions remain confined within those bounds, compressed into 
a battle between different fixes. More positively, while the conflict between risk 
and use reduction could be regarded as incoherence in the law, the presence of 
both could equally be viewed as providing flexibility. These represent two different 
solutions to the ‘pesticide question’. If, in the future, aspiration grows for transition 
from our current industrial model of agriculture towards a low-input model, a 
(partial) legal basis will be there, to encourage and support such transition (perhaps 
with the aid of ambitious interpretation), in the more ambitious elements of the 
SUD. 
Overall, however, as discussed in Chapter Four, pesticides policy and legislation 
promotes a traditional conception of sustainable development in agriculture as 
optimising pesticide input while minimising harm,1817 a principle of (eco-)efficiency 
also reflected throughout the EU policy examined in Chapter Eight, particularly that 
relating to the KBBE. It is unlikely to precipitate radical change and, instead, forms 
part of a discourse which assumes resource use inefficiency requiring further 
intensification facilitated by new knowledge and technology and which accepts and 
accommodates global economic competition as a given. Indeed, it sees these 
environmental problems as opportunities for societal progress, provided ‘barriers 
to technoscientific development [are] removed’.1818 As such, the approach will 
perhaps harden existing resource-intensive monocultural agriculture in pursuit of 
increased agricultural competitiveness.1819 Ultimately, if we are looking for a 
discourse with which to repoliticise an apolitical technology such as pesticides, 
sustainability (re)defined as efficiency, may be a dead end.  
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The depoliticising force of sustainability-as-efficiency comes in its promise to 
reconcile the previously irreconcilable. Dominique Pestre has argued that 
sustainable development replaced the tension between discourses of boundless 
technological development for resource-intensive growth and alternative ideas of 
development, displacing the latter and dulling challenges to technology-contingent 
problem-solving.1820 While sustainable development did originally develop to 
‘dissolve the conflicts between environmental and economic values’1821 this could 
be understood and implemented far more ambitiously than expecting 
reconciliation through increased (eco-)efficiency. The approach advocated in 
Chapter Three would have acknowledged the tensions and the challenges 
presented by the co-existence of the three pillars.1822 It would also perhaps have 
attempted to keep them alive during the national planning process envisaged in 
Article 4 SUD; the kind of approach necessary to accept the validity of positions 
attached to these interests and to take those viewpoints into account. By contrast, 
an approach characterised by risk reduction and efficiency promises the continued 
reaping of the socio-economic benefits of pesticide use while reducing 
environmental harm, without considering the overall (un)sustainability of the 
agricultural system at stake, its drivers, distributive effects or necessary trade-offs 
between competing goods.1823 This approach manoeuvres opposing viewpoints out 
of consideration. The euphemistic language of balancing and reconciliation 
employed by AG Léger in First Corporate Shipping,1824 a case which clearly involved 
                                                          
 
1820 Dominique Pestre, ‘Challenges for the Democratic Management of Technoscience: 
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1822 Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 51) 67. 
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a trade-off between environmental and economic interests, seems another 
symptom of a detachment in the EU from substantive engagement with these 
intensely political questions.1825 
This reductive reconciliation discourse is also familiar from the socio-technical 
imaginaries of EU innovation policy and its equation of sustainability with eco-
efficiency through ‘techno-fixes’ spurred by market competition to ensure 
conservation of natural resources.1826 In the case of pesticide use, it is not an 
innovation-based techno-fix but rather a management fix, transferring 
responsibility for appropriate resource use from the state to non-state 
stakeholders1827 for example to professional users, distributors and advisors1828 and 
the general public.1829 The potential value of these measures in improving 
protection through educating, training and advising the relevant actors is not 
disputed. However, the pattern of an increased burden of responsibility on private 
actors and citizens and a reduced, meta-governance (or ‘governance of 
governance’) role for the state1830 suggests little political appetite to engage with 
concerns not already addressed by the SUD’s risk reduction regime. Indeed the 
overall approach to increasing state intervention is extremely cautious; reflection 
on further regulation is required1831 rather than on unsustainable practices and 
pesticide-related concerns as a way of prompting change.  
A lack of engagement with the drivers of unsustainable pesticide use and related 
concerns may be partly explained by the long-standing faith in the ability of 
sustainability-as-efficiency to reconcile competing values reinforced by the 
                                                          
 
1825 Perhaps this is not surprising in the formality expected of court proceedings. However, 
Sharpston AG, in an even more highly politically-charged case, acknowledged the politics at 
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and Mobile Telephones’ (2005) 8 Journal of Risk Research 635, 638–639. 
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asymmetric assumption that technologies, including pesticides, tend to produce 
socio-economic benefits and environmental harms.1832 Those convictions appear to 
have provided pre-made problem framings for policy analysis of the pesticide 
question. The question is in fact far more complex (see Chapter Four) but such 
problem definitions may obscure the need for more profound policy consideration 
of ethical or distributive questions or ‘what matters’. Where distribution is the 
combined gift of technological innovation and the market, as discussed in Chapter 
Eight, that question may seem to be out of political hands. Alternatively, a more 
ambitious approach to environmental protection may be seen as a luxury until high 
real incomes are produced.1833 That may be for the best from a capitalist, free 
market perspective1834 which, in its professed neutrality1835 and suspicion of 
sustainable development,1836 may balk at the more substantive aim of just 
distribution of the costs and benefits of pesticide use.1837 And if trade-offs are pre-
empted, there is perhaps little cause to consider what matters or alternative 
solutions. Thus, the win-win of reconciliation may extinguish any reason to raise 
other concerns which challenge the prevailing order. The thread of competitiveness 
also runs through EU pesticide policy,1838 agriculture policy1839 and, indeed, 
environmental policy1840 which, as argued in Chapter Eight, perhaps further blinds 
the EU to contestation which could threaten to divert it from that course. 
                                                          
 
1832 Commission, ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy’ (n 514) 11–12; Commission, ‘Thematic 
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The emphasis on risk reduction and efficiency is closely tied to measurement and 
use of indicators, echoing to some extent the technical predisposition in the EU to 
measure and monitor sustainable development.1841 Chapter Four identified some 
opportunities for the exercise of value judgments in the definition of indicators but 
on the whole these are constrained by the SUD’s overall goal of risk reduction and 
discussion may therefore be unlikely to rise beyond that frame. While 
measurement can sometimes ignite fervent political debate,1842 the risk 
management/indicator-monitored approach adopted by the SUD is perhaps more 
likely to confirm rather than challenge the status quo in its reduction of the 
normativity of fully-realised sustainability to the ‘neutrality’ of numbers. 
In sum, I have tried to demonstrate how certain elements of the EU’s policy 
architecture examined in Chapter Eight manifest in the more specific context of 
policy and legislation relating to pesticide use. Their operation in the context of 
pesticide use has a similar, depoliticising effect in forming a framework built on an 
asymmetric understanding of technology, the re-imagination of sustainability as 
efficiency, reconciliation and measurement which could discourage 
acknowledgement of the political side to pesticide use and its role in supporting 
modern, arguably unsustainable, agricultural systems. This, I argue, results in a 
deep reluctance, or even inability to countenance the existence of, let alone yield 
to, concerns over pesticide use not already recognised by that framework. The 
framework’s emanation from the highest political level, pervasiveness in policy and 
the long history of some of its themes further militate against the integration of 
other concerns such that the gap between the EU’s policy and practice persists. 
2.2 RRI and synthetic biology: fermenting a rational consensus  
The discussion of RRI and its four dimensions in Chapter Three highlighted various 
aspects of that framework which could open up decision-making with respect to 
synthetic biology and challenge the policy commitments examined in Chapter Eight. 
For example, the role of anticipation in prompting consideration of contingencies 
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disputes the existence of an objective truth discoverable through expert perception 
and may elaborate alternatives to the EU’s imaginaries. Reflexivity, in encouraging 
consideration of the commitments behind a research endeavour along with 
alternative framings,1843 challenges the EU’s instrumental drive for 
commercialisable innovation.1844 Essentially, RRI takes little for granted; not the 
economic competitiveness discourse,1845 nor the centrally promulgated problem 
definitions and societal challenges,1846 nor the inherent beneficence of innovation, 
nor the possibility of a true determination of risk, nor the necessary validity of 
regulation based on it, nor the EU’s visions of its future society. 
Nevertheless, the unequivocal determination in EU policy suggests a compulsion to 
forge ahead. The belief in the existence of a universal, expert-determined and 
guided true mode of regulatory science, still implies the expectation of a rational 
(and anti-political) consensus on the basis of expert knowledge. The corollary is an 
inability to recognise that any disagreement with the EU’s policy commitments 
could be valid. It is this determination, expectation and inability which I identify as 
running through EU policy and legislation in relation to synthetic biology and which 
I argue could ultimately prevent the EU from realising its commitment to greater 
socio-technical integration in this field, despite the potential of RRI.  
To start with a familiar observation: both the legislation and policy on synthetic 
biology consistently privilege expert-determined safety, despite the limitations of 
this approach discussed in Chapter Two. The requirement for risk assessments in 
both the Contained Use Directive (CUD)1847 and Deliberate Release Directive 
(DRD)1848 reflects high-level policy calls for evidence-based regulation, as discussed 
in Chapter Eight, reminiscent of Hurlbut’s imaginary of governable emergence.1849 
For example, the siting of public consultation by the DRD after the conduct of the 
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1844 Levidow and Neubauer (n 1626) 406. 
1845 Stilgoe, Owen and Macnaghten (n 29) 1573; von Schomberg (n 429) 58. 
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1847 Art. 4(1) CUD (n 743). 
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Environmental Risk Assessment1850 asserts science’s priority of agency to define 
legitimate causes for public concern, significantly reducing terrain for political 
debate. So, while the EU is keen to draw on the public as a resource in generating 
innovation,1851 it provides no opportunity for the public to confirm that the result 
was what they wanted. That arrangement can perhaps again be attributed to the 
EU’s pervasive asymmetric policy assumption that the anticipated socio-economic 
benefits of innovation can be left to the care of the market as anticipated by EU 
innovation policy, while expert hands deftly manage any threats to human health 
or the environment. Consultation under the DRD and CUD occurs within the limits 
of policy assumptions and scientifically-defined concerns, hardened in the purpose 
of the relevant legislation to ensure safety.1852 The participation provisions in the 
DRD reinforce the educational nature of participation while preventing real 
dialogue and presuming consensus on the underlying political agenda.1853 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the restrictive conditions for consultation under the 
DRD reduces space for disagreement, limits potential to challenge regulatory 
science-informed authorisation and aids the EU’s general policy commitment to 
speed innovation to market. That commitment to speed (though not in relation to 
authorising) was perhaps also evident in the CJEU’s refusal to grant Austria a right 
to be heard under Article 114(5) TFEU with respect to Austria’s application to 
derogate from the DRD, on the grounds that speedy completion of the procedure 
in Article 114(6) was required for the proper functioning of the internal market.1854 
In a move of particular salience in the context of the EU’s innovation policy, the 
Court prioritised the completion of the internal market over deeper scrutiny of a 
highly political question at the heart of Austrian identity.1855 In general, the 
                                                          
 
1850 Art. 24(1) DRD. 
1851 For example, Commission, Open Innovation (n 431) 13–14, 17, 30. 
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competitiveness imperative rings through the legislation and policy. Both the 
CUD1856 and the DRD1857 assume the economic benefits for the EU of developing 
biotechnology and pave the path to the market, the EU’s primary concern,1858 as 
committed to in policy.  
In addition, the lack of opportunity to feed the outcomes of potential RRI-style 
anticipative, reflective or deliberative activities into the decision-making processes, 
under either the CUD or DRD, further allows decision-makers to ignore any 
outcome of such activities and proceed with authorisation on the basis of the 
product’s expert-determined safety profile. Indeed, it is generally unclear how the 
principles of responsibility may be enforced.1859 While both the novelty of the 
technology and its planned governance in accordance with RRI1860 provide reasons 
for revising the legislation, the inheritance of old legislation, discussed in Chapter 
Five, and the disposition that controversial questions were settled the first time 
round,1861 shuts down that opportunity for debate. In the language of ‘the political’, 
it looks like a case of legal depoliticisation. While some strands of policy have 
changed since the turn of the 21st century, for example the development of the 
science and society discourse, the focus of EU innovation policy, has perhaps 
evolved less. Biotechnology has long been seen as key to EU’s development and 
prosperity.1862 That does not imply an appetite for revising the relevant legislation, 
unless it be to aid authorisation.1863 
The DRD does, however, allow Member States to raise objections to the placing of 
GMOs on the internal market1864 and in doing so explicitly recognises the possibility, 
and even legitimacy, of disagreement on that front. The raising of an objection 
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initiates a comitology procedure1865 which may provide the potential for political 
deliberation.1866 However, the emphasis on consensus and the population of the 
committee by national experts1867 would not necessarily guarantee an airing of the 
kinds of political concerns associated with synthetic biology, especially given the 
potential for political questions to be recast as technical questions.1868 Moreover, 
where the required majority cannot be reached in committee, the ability of the 
Commission to take a decision in the most politically contentious cases1869 is rather 
dismissive of valid political differences between Member States, especially given 
the Commission’s commitments to such technologies in the policy examined in 
Chapter Eight. Likewise, the new Article 26b DRD enables national regulation of 
cultivation on the basis of diverse interests and values and offers some scope to 
promote RRI, even upstream. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, its potential 
to strengthen the technocratic nature of decision-making, for example, and its 
ultimate aim to facilitate authorisation and operation of the internal market1870 
suggests limited capacity to enhance socio-technical integration in this context. 
Many of the features of the policy identified in Chapter Five indicate a reluctance 
to accept, as valid, opposition to the EU’s intention to exploit the economic 
potential of synthetic biology. For example, the control over information and the 
language of addressing or overcoming concerns as if each is thereby extinguished 
and replaced with consensus, are a far cry from reflecting on the purposes of the 
research or the substance of public concerns, as envisaged by RRI. The 
instrumentalisation of engagement, reiteration of the deficit model, corresponding 
refusal to countenance the possibility of rational disagreement and dismissal of 
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concerns as ‘politically motivated’1871 imply that political partisanship is 
inappropriate and deny the values driving EU innovation policy. Finally, seeking 
acceptability1872 suggests inducing the resigned acceptance of a pre-made decision 
by an ‘irrational, scientifically ignorant and emotional’ laity,1873 in line with a 
preference for markets as the location of decision-making,1874 rather than active 
definition and endorsement of the ‘right impacts’ by an engaged citizenry. 
Establishing genuine acceptability requires the EU to relinquish applications which 
publics oppose and engage with the causes of that opposition,1875 something which 
seems unlikely given the EU’s undiscerning appetite for any innovation.1876 Overall, 
there is a lack of advocacy of debate where citizens might disagree over what is at 
stake1877 though deliberation/debate may be crucial in revealing this, as a first 
step.1878 
3. Continuity, patterns and the difficulty of change 
Some of the reasons behind the EU’s failure to close the policy-practice gap, in 
relation to the specific technologies examined here, are symptomatic of deeper 
problems with the EU’s governance and regulation of technological innovation and 
its ongoing failure to improve socio-technical integration. This section identifies 
various themes and patterns which run through the law and policy discussed in the 
rest of the thesis and which operate against closing the policy-practice gap. 
Chapter Two discussed the long-standing assumption underpinning regulation of 
risky technologies that (scientific) facts should precede value-based discussion of 
how to manage risks. Other concerns are frequently subordinated in procedures 
(for example in terms of the timing of their expression) and in substance. This 
assumption, which I have discussed with reference to the notion that science is 
                                                          
 
1871 Marris (n 909) 90–91. 
1872 DG SANCO (n 130) 23. 
1873 Armeni (n 905) 421–423. 
1874 Goven (n 377) 104. 
1875 ibid 107. 
1876 von Schomberg (n 429) 58. 
1877 Marris (n 909) 85. 
1878 Goven (n 377) 108; Bruna De Marchi, ‘Public Participation and Risk Governance’ (2003) 
30 Science and Public Policy 171, 172. 
303 
 
granted priority of agency in policy- and decision-making, continues to pervade 
governance and regulation, as discussed in Chapters Five and Eight, and above. It 
also characterises the role of science in determining the lawfulness of restrictions 
on trade. This is so with respect to the areas of EU internal market law discussed in 
Chapter Six and with respect to scope for precautionary regulation under the SPSA, 
as discussed in Chapter Seven. This legal landscape is perhaps evidence of a 
tendency to see measures unjustified by science as evidence of protectionism1879 
and more broadly a general preference for technical expertise1880 and a desire to 
keep ‘politics’ out of trade.1881 The result may be states less responsive to their 
citizens;1882 a problem for the EU’s promise of greater socio-technical integration in 
regulatory decision-making which entails responding to the concerns of European 
citizens. 
By contrast, scope under the GATT and TBT to regulate on the basis of public 
morality, without scientific evidence of harm as a precondition of moral judgment 
as provided in EC-Seals1883 is unlikely to help EU Member States. EU law, of course, 
still applies and requires ‘objective’ scientific evidence of harm before moral 
judgment may be exercised. Both the CJEU in Commission v Poland and AG Léger in 
Compassion in World Farming found that public morality was not a separate 
justification but rather related to the protection of human health and the 
environment,1884 or protection of animal health.1885 Scope for value judgments is 
similarly limited due to the dominance of scientific evidence and reasoning in the 
Court’s examination of precautionary regulation and regulation under Article 
114(5) TFEU.  
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In terms of innovation governance, the attribution of priority of agency to science 
may stifle the operation of different forms of anticipation, as promoted by RRI, to 
consider other possible, desirable or unwanted futures before the potential of 
science becomes hardened into material artefacts and before regulatory science 
has defined the undesirable (i.e. safety-related) implications. Furthermore, this 
arrangement is frequently left unchallenged by the models of public engagement 
employed by the EU in governance and regulation. It is by no means always 
inappropriate to use an appraisal process (including public engagement) to ‘close 
down’ a decision-making process.1886 However, an enduring criticism of public 
engagement has been that it is too often used instrumentally to close down, and 
not often enough to open up, debate. The discussion, in Chapter Five, of EU policy 
on public engagement in the governance of synthetic biology bears this criticism 
out.  
This policy indicates employment of a conflict-avoidance model of dialogue and 
deliberation. Such use of engagement to close down rather than open up debate 
works alongside the depoliticising forces discussed in Chapter Eight. For example, 
the public often becomes merely another stakeholder; though in a democracy it 
should perhaps occupy a more privileged position, it may often appear only in the 
reduced capacity of ‘consumers’,1887 rather than citizens. Discussing the UK, Charles 
Thorpe and Jane Gregory have argued that public engagement is viewed by policy-
makers as a tool for creating the social conditions - consumer-citizens, markets, 
products - for innovation and is thus swept up into the overall drive to achieve 
economic competitiveness. In this capacity, it acquires a ‘therapeutic’ purpose to 
build consensus around those goals and promote commercialisation.1888 A further 
criticism is that the utility of engagement is limited if no real choice exists between 
clearly differentiated alternatives.1889 We can and should identify practical barriers 
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(see Chapter Five) to public participation which opens up decision-making 
processes. However, the weight of EU policy energy driving towards particular 
goals, discussed in Chapter Eight, raises significant doubts about the potential for 
even technically exemplary deliberative exercises conducted within that ideational 
architecture to re-open any of its assumptions and goals,1890 let alone respond to 
any of its outcomes, either concerning the technology or the architecture itself.1891  
For example, the EU has been criticised for steering clear of politically sensitive 
questions and making no effort to identify and understand commonalities and 
divergences amongst Members States.1892 Furthermore, the objective of the FP7 
Science in Society programme was to stimulate, inter alia, harmonious integration 
of science and technological endeavour in Europe by encouraging European scale 
reflection and debate on science and technology and their relation with society and 
culture. Its aim was to build an ‘open, effective and democratic European 
Knowledge society’ and involve society in setting research agendas.1893 However, it 
still sits within confines: there is little countenancing of alternatives to science and 
technology to solve problems or alternative imaginaries of Europe’s future. This 
seems to reproduce a more fundamental tension between enhancing democracy 
through engagement and commercial exploitation of technological innovation.1894 
As argued in Chapter Eight, political choices underlie the knowledge society. This at 
least should be divested of its apparent neutrality.  
As discussed in Chapter Eight, the pursuit of consensus has been described as a 
depoliticising trend characteristic of the current post-political order. Alongside the 
potential of RRI to address isolated aspects of EU innovation policy commitments 
(therefore perhaps indirectly, their politics), the suggestion of a ‘politics of RRI’ 
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appears in von Schomberg’s concern that RRI may contravene the general principle 
of modern liberal democracies to refrain from defining ‘the good life’ in directing 
science policy.1895  
Despite von Schomberg’s concern, a politics of RRI might be beneficial in terms of 
repoliticising the field. Indeed, ‘productive engagement exercises typically open up 
areas of dissensus’’.1896 While that potential may exist, Michiel van Oudheusden 
criticises RRI as currently not attending to its own assumptions and politics, for 
example its privileging of a deliberative, process definition of democracy with its 
own questions of ‘power, ends and authority’.1897 ‘[I]ncluding wider publics (e.g. 
citizens) in science is not a politically neutral thing to do’,1898 although it is often 
presented as such.1899 Invoking the non-political language of responsibility and 
innovation and an appearance of neutrality risks RRI becoming another means to 
‘rationalize actions and actors’1900 and is hard to maintain substantively.1901 Given 
the ambition of the policy changes RRI seeks, van Oudheusden recommends 
making its politics explicit.1902 Indeed, the decision whether or not to frame current 
modes of governance, in or out of participation exercises aimed at influencing the 
direction of biotechnology policy, is a continuing design question.1903  
With respect to nanotechnology, Phil Macnaghten warns that ‘public reactions to 
emerging nano-technologies have the potential to become significant so long as the 
questions that appear to underpin emergent public attitudes remain occluded from 
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public dialogue and processes of decision making’.1904 Van Oudheusden’s 
recommendation could repoliticise the policy field by throwing light on the choices 
underlying the current innovation-market-competitiveness-dominated political 
arrangement in the EU. This could help make concerns over innovation visible again 
and reintroduce the idea of legitimate disagreement. Until then, the impact of RRI 
may be limited and, if the deliberative elements of RRI ignore the broader political-
economic context, for example the audience, whose response might be pre-
determined by existing policy commitments, it may risk becoming impotent, 
irrelevant or instrumental.1905 
It is, furthermore, possible to discern a pattern of ambitious ideas becoming 
‘euphemised’1906 or repurposed in support of preserving the status quo as, for 
example, with the redefinition of sustainability as efficiency. Similarly, since its 
adoption, RRI in the hands of the EU has become somewhat ‘Europeanised’. The EU 
has, for example, added six policy agendas relating to ethics, governance, gender 
equality, open access, science education and public engagement, which are ‘more 
concrete normative orientations’ to be furthered by RRI.1907 The worth of these 
agendas is not disputed per se, although it depends on the use to which they are 
put. For example, ‘governance’ is contestable,1908 education and public 
engagement can become manipulative and/or instrumental and open 
source/access may serve major industrial interests.1909 The requirements for 
‘responsiveness and adaptive change’1910 could also be read as criteria for the 
nimble innovation systems and markets desired to respond to economic rivals and 
assume competitive leadership. Furthermore, in some parts of EU policy, RRI has 
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been reduced to ‘ethical acceptability and orientation to societal needs, both as 
opportunities for more successful innovation’ or to mean avoiding risky innovation, 
or preventing harmful/unethical research and innovation.1911 Valuable and 
powerful in its original vision for socio-technical integration and for shaping 
innovation trajectories, RRI may be vulnerable to hijack by the EU’s economic 
competitiveness agenda and employment towards generating ‘acceptance’. If this 
happens, the potential of RRI (and sustainability) to enhance socio-technical 
integration will have been significantly reduced. 
To be clear, the above is not a criticism of sustainable development/sustainability, 
RRI or its deliberative characteristics per se. Indeed, much of this thesis assumes 
the potential of deliberative processes to facilitate socio-technical integration and 
to counteract science-driven governance.1912 It criticises the EU for not providing 
more, or better, opportunities for engagement. It is more a criticism of the 
framework in which it tends to occur, with its commitments to technological 
progress, management and ‘rational’, often risk-based, approaches to problems. In 
this paradigm, concepts with potential to enhance socio-technical integration at 
various stages of innovation, authorisation or use become redefined, repurposed 
(and depoliticised). Mouffe warns of the danger of identifying the interests of a 
particular hegemonic project with the interests of a concept, for it would treat any 
disagreement as an illegitimate challenge to its rational leadership.1913 The example 
she gives is humanity. However, the warning is equally applicable to sustainability 
or responsibility or ‘European values’. We saw in Chapter Eight the strong 
identification between sustainability and capital intensive research and the EU’s 
exclusive imaginaries forged through the link of eco-efficiency, and between 
societal openness towards innovation and the treasured European way of life. The 
dismissal of opposition to certain types of technological innovation, ubiquitous in 
EU policy is arguably an illustration of the effect Mouffe describes. If so, this again 
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could prove a significant impediment to enhancing socio-technical integration in 
decision-making. 
The inherent flexibility of these concepts is both a boon and a disadvantage. 
Sustainability may have the potential to form (competing) imaginaries or generate 
its own politics but it is currently largely impotent in EU policy (see Chapter Four) 
and often operates within the overarching imaginary of technological innovation-
driven economic competitiveness. It is perhaps too early tell yet whether RRI will 
realise its potential. However, competitiveness discourses remain flexibly stable 
and there is evidence that such agendas are becoming revamped as ‘responsible’ 
or ‘green’ competitiveness.1914 This may indicate the overall survival of the EU’s 
ideational architecture and diminished hope of major change, particularly with 
respect to increasing socio-technical integration, partly due perhaps to the 
phenomenon identified by Mouffe, above.  
Chapter Eight discussed the potential for imaginaries to determine what is visible. 
Sustainability and RRI could render the previously invisible visible; in other words, 
repoliticise or open up pertinent questions. Within this framework of imaginaries, 
narratives and ideas, other concerns are perhaps not ‘seen’ or not seen as valid, 
however valid or rational they are demonstrated to be by the social sciences (see 
Chapter Two). Many of the types of concerns expressed in relation to risky 
technologies – speed of change, commercial purpose, corporate control, 
industrialisation of nature – are hallmarks of the prevailing policy, as argued in 
Chapter Eight. To integrate and respond to those concerns by adapting the current 
arrangements of evidence-based decision-making could represent a fundamental 
conflict with the precepts of that policy which has all those arrangements as vital 
to achieving its goal of EU economic competitive leadership, allegedly the only 
route to addressing European problems, societal challenges and to maintaining the 
European way of life. This impasse is further entrenched by the appropriation 
(discussed above) or possible instrumentalisation of certain potentially disruptive 
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concepts, such as sustainability or responsibility, so weakening them as tools to re-
politicise or creating an arguably false consensus around the words and associated 
agendas, but not their substance. Ultimately, intentions to realise policy 
commitments to enhance socio-technical integration made in one area of policy 
seem overwhelmed by imperatives defined elsewhere. This implies that closing the 
policy-practice gap remains a distant prospect. 
It is, admittedly, hard to see how this might change. As discussed in Chapters Five 
and Eight, deficit models of the public pervade EU innovation policy. Indeed, the 
imposition of a universal objective (risk-related) meaning on public questions 
regarding technological innovation and its implications imposes a model of a 
standard citizen who accepts such meanings and is incapable of constructing their 
own independent social meanings without the aid of expert framings of the 
relevant questions.1915 This is also an instrumentalised model of citizens for whom 
safety is the ‘central end and meaning in public life’.1916 It is possible that the 
reference in Commission v Poland and Compassion to science hints at the potential 
for a consensus to be formed around objective scientific evidence which again 
denies the rationality of different framings and pre-empts autonomous moral 
judgment. AG Léger’s approach in Compassion at least seemed to reflect a model 
of citizens who care only about safety and suggested the removal of the agency of 
morality to determine the (un)acceptability of a particular practice and, with it, 
cause to regulate on that ground. Such deficit models generally seem to 
disincentivise attempts to take valid public concerns seriously. 
Technological determinism and the linear model of innovation also pervade EU 
policy on synthetic biology and innovation generally. As discussed in Chapter One, 
the assumption is that innovation shapes society rather than the other way round, 
again limiting reasons to imagine that publics may make valid contributions to 
deliberation over possible or desirable socio-technical futures. It is arguably not 
surprising then that engagement instead pursues public trust for these pre-
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determined pathways. As discussed in Chapter Eight, according to EU innovation 
policy, innovation drives socio-economic change. Economic interests prevail, or are 
seen as the means by which to protect or realise social, environmental or other 
values. As historical context, in framing its problems as insufficient economic 
competitiveness and a failure to keep up with the technological advances of their 
rivals, the EU in fact continues an ancient idea, dating back at least to rivalry 
between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BC.1917 Problem-framings, including 
assumptions of an anti-science culture, can be very resistant to change despite 
contrary evidence;1918 this one particularly perhaps due to its longevity. Against this 
background, the chances of public concerns being heard, exerting influence and 
being responded to in decision-making, thereby contributing to closing the policy-
practice gap, seem slim. 
4. Conclusion 
I started this chapter with the observation that the question ‘what kind of society 
do we want?’ is often at the wellspring of the concerns, values and ideas expressed 
at every stage of innovation systems. It may be seen as inspiring reactions to 
innovation in the early stages of development and as informing the diverse 
attitudes expressed towards the risks of technological innovation downstream. At 
EU level, so far, the answer to this question seems to have been pre-determined: 
leadership in global economic competitiveness and resolved societal challenges, 
both driven by innovation distributed by the completed internal market. The 
durability of that vision is a testament to its flexibility and the myriad means it 
employs to secure support or assent, some of which I discussed in Chapter Eight 
and above. These include, most fundamentally, its ability to depoliticise by 
obscuring the existence of choice at all levels. Opposition to increments of 
technological innovation may indicate a broader dissatisfaction with a system in 
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which citizens are reduced to consumers,1919 cultivated as a resource and educated 
out of irrational contumacy into apolitical acceptance and demand.  
Some responsibility for the difficulty in achieving greater socio-technical integration 
must lie with the current shape assumed by the European and WTO trading regimes 
which may, at least partly, be attributable to aspects of the ideational architecture 
I discussed in Chapter Eight, particularly a commitment to governable emergence 
and the attribution to science of priority of agency. Trading regimes/markets do not 
emerge in isolation of human agency; they are constructed1920 and they are 
currently constructed in a certain fashion. We could have trading regimes not 
constructed to appeal primarily to technical assessments to prove the lawfulness of 
regulation and which do not assume that certain trade-restrictive measures, if not 
justified by science, are protectionist.1921 Efficiency need not always be the ultimate 
goal of innovation and its governance. Governments should be able to respond to 
cultural norms and concerns of citizens which recognise different framings of risk 
and uncertainty and that sometimes those contingencies are reflected in scientific 
evidence. This is partly about accepting different types of evidence. A changed 
trading regime which respected some of these values would think carefully and 
specify clearly the type of evidence which could be relied on, or the steps necessary 
to demonstrate the concerns are valid, such that an Austria could perhaps 
represent its cultural identity in relation to certain technologies in legal 
proceedings. 
Of course, policy and regulation are not monolithic, as I have attempted to make 
clear in the foregoing chapters, and the wisdom of providing a single aetiology for 
a complex policy and regulatory disposition is questionable. However, the 
ideational architecture I have attempted to elaborate is also complex as well as 
                                                          
 
1919 Although consumption can have a political edge, Stokes, ‘You Are What You Eat’ (n 94) 
192. 
1920 Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism’ (n 1216) 102–105; Lang, ‘Reflecting on 
“Linkage”’ (n 998). 
1921 See Ruggie’s take on so-called ‘New Protectionism’ and the growth of new trade barriers 
in the 1970s, Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism’ (n 1216) 88–89. 
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long-standing and powerful and ultimately a major force, I argue, behind a 
reluctance in the EU to put its policy on socio-technical integration into practice. 
That is for both its normative and substantive effects. Substantive because of the 
irresistibility of its promises. Normative because of its tendency to throw an 
invisibility cloak over its choices and alternatives and an irrationality cloak over the 
concerns and objections of those who resist acceding to the ‘rational consensus’ 
around its substantive promises. The combination of those two elements, I argue, 
cannot otherwise than work to build support for the realisation of those promises 
by (almost) every means possible, particularly by keeping technology assessments 
technical and risk-based and thereby reducing opportunities for other concerns, 
perhaps trivial by comparison, to derail that realisation. It is hard to prove causation 
but, in that context, trade-offs to which risk assessments contribute seem already 
tipped in favour of the course of action (usually authorisation) most likely to 
produce the economic and social benefits expected to flow from technological 
innovation. And it is perhaps no surprise then, in that context, that economic and 
social drawbacks tend not to be identified and weighed in the balance against 
commercialisation. Not authorising a technology, after all that, would seem to dash 
all those dreams in one fell swoop.  
However, that vision is one vision amongst many. We have choices; about the 
future of Europe and European society; about the types of innovation pursued; 
about the way we solve problems and address societal challenges; about which 
problems and challenges we discern and how we frame them (with, not subsequent 
to, science) and about the type of markets and economy we create. The existence 
of a choice is central to the constructivist thinking, which defines the approach I 
have adopted to science and technology, and to the market,1922 and challenges the 
assumption that things (technologies, markets etc.) spontaneously emerge without 
human agency but rather are made up of ideas.1923 Now, different ideas are needed, 
of which sustainability and responsibility are two. The task is considerable, not least 
                                                          
 
1922 ibid 92–93. 
1923 ibid 108; Rosamond (n 1602). 
314 
 
because, in part, the raison d’être of the EU is at stake here; its identity, 
constitution, integration, legitimacy, success, its means to progress and survive. It 
has sought to define itself as a political entity through its biotechnology policy1924 
and as an economic unit against an external competitive threat.1925 However, as 
Aristotle observed, the task of constitution-building is a kind of techne.1926 And to 
this kind of techne at least, we should not be averse.  
 
                                                          
 
1924 Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (n 11) 77–78, 92–93. 
1925 Rosamond (n 1602). 
1926 Heller (n 1774) 261. 
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